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P R E F A C E 
SCOPE 
In modern era, the term nuclear energy is gaining 
importance day by day because it is widely used for peaceful 
or non peaceful purposes. Some countries use it to counter 
weapons of its adversary. Some find nuclear weapons cheaper 
alternative to the military dangerous conventional arms 
race. The other countries may use nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes like producing electricity. As far as 
India is concerned it wants nuclear power as a result of a 
combination of various factors. Although India does not 
have a well defined formal nuclear policy. Yet it has 
achieved remarkable success in achieving nuclear power 
India's resistence to stop CTBT on certain valid grounds, 
has evoked a mixed reaction from all over the world. It is 
for this reason India's nuclear policy has been the focal 
point both within the country and abroad. In view of 
growing importance of India's role in the non aligned 
movement as well as in global disarmament the topic has been 
selected for the present study. The bibliography consisting 
of about 200 articles is not comprehensive but is fairly 
representative of all the aspects covered under the subject 
•India's Nuclear Policy'. 
IV 
METHODOLOGY 
For the collection of material, Maulana Azad Library 
as well as the Seminar Library of Centre for Strategic 
Studies were consulted. The collection of Centre for 
Strategic Studies proved much helpful as it subscribes to 
all the core journals on the subject. The files containing 
paper clippings in the centre were also consulted for the 
collection of material. Using ISI standards of biblio-
graphic description, entries were prepared. Each article 
was given an informative abstract. 
SUBJECT HEADING 
Attempt has been made to give co-extensive subject 
heading as much as possible. It will facilitate readers to 
find out desired article (s) from this bibliography. 
ARRANGEMENT 
An entry is preceded by the subject heading in 
capitals. The entry begins with the Entry Element 
(i.e. Surname) of the authors in capitals, followed by the 
Secondary Element (i.e. forename) in parenthesis, and then 
the title of the article, which is followed by the title of 
the periodical, its volume, issue number, date of 
publication, after which, are given the pages in inclusive 
notation of the articles. The each entry is then followed 
by an informative abstracts of the article. 
STANDARD FOLLOWED 
Care has been taken to strictly follow the rules and 
practices of the Indian Standards for Bibliographical 
Reference (IS : 2381-1963) for each entry of the 
bibliography. Thus it gives a uniformity, for the 
bibliographical reference throughout the select 
bibliography. Attempt has been made to give a maximum 
abbreviated form for the name of periodical. The items of 
bibliographical reference for each entry of a periodical 
article are arranged as follows : -
(a) name (S) of author (S) 
(b) Full stop (.) 
(c) Title of contribution including sub title, if any 
(d) Full stop (.) 
(e) Title of the periodical in abbreviated form as far 
as possible 
(f) Full stop (.) 
(g) Volume Number 
(h) Comma (,) 
(i) Issue number 
(j) Semi colon (;) 
(k) Year of publication 
(1) Comma (,) 
(m) Month 
VI 
(n) Comma (,) 
(o) Date of publication 
(p) Semi colon (;) 
(q) Inclusive pages of the article 
SPECIMEN ENTRY 
SINGH (Jasjit). India's nuclear Policy t A Perspective. 
Strategic Analysis. 12,8; 1989, November; 781-802. 
India's nuclear policy is predicted on the belief 
that a non-nuclear weapon world is not only desirable and 
feasible, but also a inescapable necessity. Meanwhile, 
cognizant of the realities of a world full of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and nuclear coercion, and its own 
national interests in the critical areas of national 
security, sovereignity, and independence. India has sought 
to keep its nuclear weapon options open, 
INDEX 
The index part contains an author index and a title 
index. The ISI rules for Alphabetical indexes are strictly 
followed for both the indexes. Each index guides to the 
specific entry or entries in the bibliography. It is hoped 
that they will be found very useful in consultation of the 
bibliography. 
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INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY -» 
1. WHY NATIONS SEEK NUCLEAR POWER 
Generally, nations try to acquire nuclear weapons 
capability because of the one or more of the following 
reasons: 
1.1 Nations always try to counter weapons of its 
adversary who has introduced new weapons. 
1.2 A state may want nuclear weapons for fear that its 
great power ally will not retaliate if the other 
power attacks. 
1.3 A country without nuclear allies would want nuclear 
weapons all the more if its adversary has them. 
1.4 A country may want nuclear weapons because it lives 
in fear of its 'adversaries' present or future 
conventional strength. 
1.5 Some may find nuclear weapons cheaper alternative to 
the economically runious and military dangerous 
conventional arms Race. Nuclear weapons may promise 
increased security and independence at an affordable 
price. 
1.6 Countries may want nuclear weapons to enhance their 
international standing. This in fact may be both 
the cause and effect of acquiring the nuclear 
weapons. 
As regards the nuclear developments in South Asia* 
efforts of India and Pakistan can be said to be the result 
of a combination of various factors mentioned above. 
Opinion in both the countries is highly divided on the 
issue of acquiring nuclear weapons. Given the mutual 
distrust and traditional rivalry between the two countries, 
nuclear factor makes the matter more complicated, yet 
curious, both of them, however, had initially embarked upon 
nuclear programme with a view to using nuclear power for 
developmental purposes but appear to have strayed from that 
path as the time passed by. 
2. INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY 
Indian approach to the nuclear energy programme was 
ennunciated immediately after independence. It was shaped 
mainly because of two reasons : 
(a) The Indian Government under Nehru was forced 
to define its nuclear policy in relation to the arms 
control and disarmament talks from 1945 onwards. 
(b) . The ideas for peaceful use of nuclear 
energy such as those contained in 'Atom for Peace' plan 
also required a suitable response from New Delhi. Above 
all, there was scope for Indian Government to develop its 
own policies with regard to development of nuclear energy, 
whether for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes. 

It may be clear at the outset that the Government of 
India has neither come out so far with a definite and formal 
Nuclear Policy as such, nor has placed any guidelines in 
this regard before parliament. However, it could be 
gathered from the statements made by the military and 
political leaders from 1948 onwards within and outside 
parliament. 
2.1 Historical Perspective 
2.1.1 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru 
India, aftejr Independence resorted to massive industria-
lisation under planned economic development. Nehru believed 
that political independence can be preserved and protected 
only when the country has economic independence too. This 
fact had always been uppermost in Nehru's mind while 
shaping India's domestic and foreign policies. 
Nehru, with deep quest for self-reliance wanted the 
country to produce energy by exploiting all indigenously 
available resources to the maximum possible extent, so that 
the increasing demand of energy could be met from with in. 
Nehru and Dr. Homi Bhabha, men largely responsible for 
initiating nuclear programme in India, visualised the 
crucial role to be played by nuclear energy in future to bring 
the nation out of hunger and poverty. Nuclear power was 
considered vital for reconstruction and rehabilitation of an 
industrially and economically poor nation like ours. 
Infact, India's nuclear programme owes is entirely 
to Nehru's abiding interest in science and technology, 
while emphasising-the role of nuclear energy in the country's 
economic development. Nehru said in the constituent assembly 
(legislative) on April 4, 1948, that the atomic energy was a 
vital source of power that was coming to the world and that 
its use for constructive purposes was more important for a 
country like India whose power resources were limited then 
for an industrially advanced country^ India must develop it 
for using it for peaceful purposes. 
Thus the tone of India's nuclear policy was set by 
Nehru's speech in constituent assembly on the Atomic Energy 
Bill and on subsequent occasions. Nehru told the Assembly 
that nuclear research in India would be directed towards 
peaceful purposes and not for making Atom Bomb. 
On 20th January 1957, while inaugurating first 
nuclear reacter Apsara at Tixxnibay.Nehru stated categorically: "No 
man can prophesy the future. But I should like to emphasise 
on behalf of any future Government of India that whatever 
might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never 
use this atomic energy for evil purposes". 
Nehru's stand in this regards seemed to have 
softened when after three and a half years he declared in 
the Lok Sabha on 10th August, 1960, that "no declaration 
that I make today will necessarily bind people in future, 
but I do hope. We shall create the atmosphere in the country 
which will bind every Government in future so that it may 
not use this power for evil purposes". 
It may be mentioned here that these assertions gave 
rise to one important effect to reassure relevant foreign 
Government about the use to which their specialised 
assistance in this area was likely to be put. 
Therefore, during the year 1945-55 numerous 
collaborations and agreements, concerning the future 
development of Indian nuclear technology were announced 
involving United Kingdom, United States of America and 
Canada. 
There was no guise in Nehru's Nuclear Policy as it 
originated from a mind imbued with high idealism, deep sense 
of history and a World view backed by a vision of strong and 
modern India. The concluding phase of the second world war 
had its impact on him and hence on the formulation of his 
policy. 
The use of Atom Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
demonstrated their destructive capacity which instilled in 
him hatred and allergy for nuclear energy as a new factor in 
development. Even after realising that much of the 
rationale of his nuclear policy was made redundent by the 
preffidicious Chinese attack on India in 1962 and that the 
strategic environment had got deestablished. Nehru 
intensified his campaign for outlawing nuclear wars with a 
great deal of prestige and moral backing. He advocated to 
abolish everything that had got to do anything with the 
nuclear weapon. He said in an interview on May 18 1964, 
that "We do make bomb. I do not think we will make the 
bomb. 
The policy enunciated by Nehru was reiterated by his 
successors at various national and international fora 
including Parliament. They all favoured the use of nuclear 
energy for economic development of the country. They stuck 
more or less, to the policy of peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy without either conceding to the internal pulls or 
bowing to the external pressure to accept an international 
agreement (NPT) detrimented to the national interest. 
The Chinese nuclear test in 1964 had significant 
repercussion on Asia particularly on India's Nuclear 
Policy - a policy which had ruled out for all time the 
possibility of India developing her own nuclear weapons. 
Until 1962, such a policy enjoyed general support within 
the country but after 1962, the consensus began to break 
down. The Chinese attack gave rise to a feeing in India in 
favour of nuclear weapons which began to be articulated in 
and outside of Parliament. Nehru resisted this proposal 
till his death. But after his death in May 1964, and 
China's first nuclear detonation in October 1964, the 
demands for Indian nuclear weapons increased. These demands 
came mostly from political parties including 
parliamentarians, the press, intellectuals, the armed forces 
and others. 
2.1.2 Shri Lai Bahadur Shastri 
It was in this context that the new Prime Minister 
Shri Lai Bahadir Shastri, declared during annual conference 
of Congress Party in Durgapur, that "I can not say anything 
about the future but Present Policy is not to manufacture 
Atom bomb". He said in the Lok Sabha that while India was 
against developing nuclear explosives, provided they were 
used for tunnelling, moving mountains and other such 
purposes. This was the first time that the development of 
explosive technology was publicly favoured in India. This 
technology is only marginally different from that required 
for nuclear weapons. 
By advocating the development of peaceful Nuclear 
Explosive (PNE), Shastri, in effect, was allowing Indian 
nuclear scientists to reach up to a point where if and when 

necessary it would be easy to switch over to ^  weapons 
production in a short period of time. Thus he agreed to 
keep a weapons option open for the future. It did not 
suggest, however, any radical change in existing nuclear 
policy. Shastri had no less commitment for using nuclear 
power for constructive purposes personally, he was against 
all kinds of nuclear weapons but he was forced to think 
seriously in this regard in view of strong pressures. 
2.1.3 Shrimati Indira Gandhi 
The death of Shastri and Dr. Bhabha caused a 
temporary pause in this regard. The new Prime Minister 
Shrimati Indira Gandhi was careful enough to endorse a 
policy that might lead India being blamed for the breakdown 
of negotiations for the NPT. Shrimati Gandhi, however, 
never questioned publically the wisdom of developing PNE 
technology. Her doubts were shortlived and were caste aside 
within one year of becoming Prime Minister. Her final seal 
of approval for carrying out a PNE, was evident in 1968 when 
she agreed to the funding of Poornima reactor. 
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION (1974) 
On May 18, 1974 India carried out first underground 
nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. India became the 
first developing country, apart from the big five, to have 
carried out such a nuclear experiment. The Government had 
undertaken this programme to keep itself abreast of 
development in this technology, particularly with reference 
to its use in the field of mining and earth moving 
operations. It had no intention of producing nuclear 
weapons. The then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reiterated 
in a news conference on the evening of 18 May, 1974, that 
the test formed a part of the study of peaceful uses of 
atomic energy : that the country was committed to its use 
for constructive purposes. 
The experiment brought spontaneous public and press 
reactions both in the country and abroad. To allow the 
doubts raised at various quarters, Mrs. Gandhi in an 
interview with the 'Newsweek' correspondent clarified that 
there was difference between a nuclear country and a nuclear 
weapons country and use this knowledge for any other purpose 
then peaceful purposes. It was not to strengthen and create 
a fear or pride, or prestige on any of these emotions. 
THE NON PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
Efforts at the global level to check the nuclear 
proliferation witnessed a partial success when the NPT was 
concluded in 1968. Unfortunately doubts were raised from 
the beginning about the operational success of this treaty. 
It was described as "fradulent" and a calculated attempt of 
the superpowers to legitimise their nuclear monopoly. India 
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opposed the kind of nuclear regime the two superpowers 
sought to impose upon the rest of the world through this 
treaty. India has always held that the NPT is one sided 
and seeks to reserve all rights and privileges for nuclear 
weapons states - making the others feel that they are the 
bearers and carriers of all obligations. The treaty was 
seen by India as a political instrument of superpowers to 
divide nations into the nuclear haves and have nots. Its 
various provisions are designed to maintain the ascending by 
the former over the latter. Hence, highly discriminatory. 
With non-proliferation as the main aim of the 
treaty. India questioned how the nuclear weapons power can 
insist upon their right to continue to develop stockpile and 
deploy nuclear weapons. If the idea of the NPT is to free 
the world from the curse of nuclear weapons, then why is it 
that a few nations continue to claim possession of nuclear 
weapons as their exclusive and legitimate right? It is 
essential for the survival of humanity that the development 
of nuclear weapons of all types and shapes be banned, and 
the existing nuclear weapons dismantled, and plutonium used 
for power production. India is concerned that the NPT tends 
not only to prohibit the horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
science and technology. New Delhi rejected the view often 
expressed in the developed world that the fruits of nuclear 
science should not be made available to under-developed 
states. 
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Such a criticism of NPT by India and the nuclear 
explosion conducted by her led to the misconception about 
India's nuclear policy. Critics of Indian policy asserted 
that she should have easily acceded to the NPT, had her 
intention been to pursue a policy of peaceful nuclear 
development, instead of spearheading a Vehement antitreaty 
compaign. India, infact, was not opposed to NPT but against 
its discriminatory character. By refusing to sign it India 
was demonstrating the concern of non-nuclear weapons states 
in this respect. It advanced the following three main 
conditions if arms control, global as well as regional; 
(i) nuclear weapon states negotiate a CTBT. 
(ii) they themselves must accept full scope safeguards 
which would terminate further production of weapon-
grade material, 
(iii) they make concerted but since efforts to reach a 
common accord on comprehensive nuclear disarmament. 
India's nuclear policy comes under wide ranging 
scruting after the PNE conducted in 1974. The immediate 
significance of the test was that it proved India's 
capability to adopt its civil nuclear programme for military 
needs. It was argued that it would undermine global peace 
as well as development tasks. Fear was expressed that 
medium and small powers might trigger off nuclear war in 
regional conflicts, thereby risking the global peace. 
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As a result, it led to an immediate suspension of 
Canadian nuclear assistance and enriched uranium export from 
the United States. The US tried to invoke the provision of 
the nuclear Non-proliferation Act, 1978 which signified that 
China became entitled to procure nuclear technology from the 
U.S where as India did not due to dichotomous nature of the 
U.sn'iclear policy, India sought to keep its nuclear option 
open. 
Ever since the first atom bomb was exploded by the 
United States in August 1945, a controversy has existed in 
the minds of people regarding the prospects of nuclear 
energy. Though the first bomb was exploded during the war 
and caused unprecedented destruction, its use was justified 
by the American President on the ground that it was exploded 
to save the lives of the U.S soldiers by forcing a rapid 
conclusion of war with Ja^ jan. We are not concerned here 
with the motives and the considerations which guided the 
American leadership to make use of atom bomb, but we are 
concerned with the great potential of atom and the 
possibility of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
and check the growth of nuclear weapons. 
It is now universally admitted that nuclear energy 
if properly lamed, can bring immense benefits to humanity. 
It can be used for raising the standard of live everywhere 
specially in improving the life of the people of Asia and 
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Africa. It can help the desert areas of the world to 
blossom and backward areas to develop into thriving 
industrial centres. 
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE CENTRES 
But it can not be denied that it has also posed a 
serious threat to the very existence of humanity. When not 
applied to the welfare demands, nuclear energy can produce 
most powerful terror weapons of mass destruction. The 
various nuclear powers are already engaged in improving upon 
the existing weapons and devices to secure an edge over the 
adversary. This mad race for production of larger and more 
destructive weapons can greatly contribute to the misseries 
of the people by spreading death and destruction, 
transforming the thriving industrial centres into deserts 
and obliterating all forms of life on this planet. The 
gravity of the situation can be gauged from the fact that, 
at present nuclear weapons technology has developed to such 
an advanced stage that the destructive potential of the 
modern weapons has increased by more than 1000 times as 
compared to the destruction caused by the bomb at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. What is still worse that a frantic 
competition is going on between the two superpowers, each 
trying to further improve the nuclear weapons and technology 
to ensure that its adversary does not overtake it. Thus 
their rivalry has got set into an ever expanding spiral and 
threatens to engulf the entire world into the nuclear 
terror. 
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3. PTBT (1963) 
Ever since the use of atomic bomb in 1945, the 
nations of the world have been making efforts to control the 
nuclear arms race. TheU.Shas been clearly articulating its 
non-proliferation objectives, it seeks to cap, reduce and 
eliminate nuclear capabilities in South Asia, in other 
words, create a nuclear weapon-free zone. This is the 
reason why even later variations of the five nation dialogue 
continue to be deeply suspect in Indian eyes. The U.S has 
been saying that it has no fixed agenda, but the picture at 
the end of the road has been clearly defined. It claims 
that the composition could be decided through prepatory 
discussions but it seems to have strong reservation about a 
composition that does not stack up in favour of its goals. 
The years from 1945 to 1963 proved fruitless in regard to 
the efforts made in this direction. 
The first success in this regard was achieved in 
August 1963 when UK, USA and USSR signed the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty (PTBT) also known as the Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapon Test in the Atomosphere, in outer space and under 
water. The treaty was made open to all other states as 
well. 
In the preamble to the treaty, the signatory states 
proclaimed their aim as the speediest achievement of an 
agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict 
international control in accordance with the objectives of 
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the United Nations which would put an end to the armament 
race and eliminate the incentives to the production and 
testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons. 
These states also expressed their determination to achieve 
discontinuence of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 
for all time and to put an end to the contamination of man's 
environment by radioactive substances. 
The PTBT actually came into force on 10th October 
1963. The treaty was signed with great enthussiasm by the 
states and a large number of them immediately signed the 
treaty in the hope that this would pave the way for further 
agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and may 
ultimately lead to disarmament. On the other hand France 
opposed the treaty because it did not in any way contribute 
to the process of nuclear disarmament. And it kept on the 
other hand the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons 
powers intact, and also permitted them to refine their 
weapons. China not only refused to sign the PTBT but also 
exploded the first bomb in 1964. Even USA and USSR 
continued to conduct nuclear tests. 
Thus it is clear that the main intention of the two 
superpowers has been to control the spread of nuclear 
weapons as well as nuclear technology, rather than to 
effect nuclear disarmament. This is further brone by the 
fact that despite repeated resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly calling for a comprehensive test ban. The nuclear 
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states have continued underground tests. The non-nuclear 
countries have argued that unless the nuclear powers stop 
their vertical proliferation, it will not be possible to 
prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
In this direction the countries like Ireland, India 
and Sweden continued to press for non-dissemination and non-
acquisition of nuclear weapons. As part of this integrated 
approach, India suggested at the UN Disarmament Commission 
in June 1965 that the nuclear powers should give an 
undertaking not to transfer nuclear weapons or the 
technology to others, they should undertake not to use 
nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess them, 
they should give undertaking through the United Nations to 
safeguard the security of the countries which may be 
threatened by powers having nuclear weapons capability, the 
non-nuclear countries should undertake not to acquire or 
manufacture nuclear weapons, there should be tengible 
progress towards disarmament, including a comprehensive test 
ban treaty, a complete freeze on production of nuclear 
weapons and means of delivery, as well as substantial 
reduction in the existing stocks. 
In June 1965, the Disarmament Commission of the 
United Nations adopted a resolution and called upon the 
Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference to meet and accord 
special policy to the consideration of the question of a 
treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
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On 17th August 1965, USA submitted a draft treaty, 
in this direction and a month later on 24th September, 1965 
the Soviet Union submitted a draft for non-proliferation to 
the General Assembly. But both these proposals did not 
find approval with each other. On 24th August 1967, the 
Soviet Union and United States submitted to the ENDC 
identical but separate drafts of non-proliferation treaty. 
However, these proposals were not acceptable to the non-
nuclear powers and they suggested a number of ammendments 
and comments. 
4. NPT 
Ultimately on 11th March 1968 the United States and: 
Soviet Union introduced, a joint draft treaty which also 
incorporated some of the suggestions and submitted it to the 
General Assembly for its consideration. After a detailed 
debate on the merits and shortcomings of the proposed 
treaty, it was ultimately adopted by the General Assembly on 
12th June 1968 by 95 countries. The treaty of non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons was simultaneously signed 
at London, Moscow and Washington on 1st July 1968 and it 
actually came into force on 5th March 1970. In all the 
treaty contained eleven articles and an elaborate preamble. 
The main provisions of the treaty are : 
4.1 The nuclear weapons states party to the treaty 
undertake not to transfer to any recipent nuclear weapons 
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or other nuclear devices. They also undertook not to 
assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapons state to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. 
4.2 The non-nuclear weapon states, members to the 
treaty undertook not to receive the transfer of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from any nation. 
They also undertook not to manufacture or receive any 
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear device. 
4.3 The non-nuclear weapon states undertook to accept 
safeguards, to be negotiated and concluded with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, for the exclusive 
purpose of verification of fulfilment of its obligations 
assumed under this treaty with a view to prevent diversion 
of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices. 
4.4 The States signing the treaty undertook to facili-
tate and to participate in the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
4.5 The signatories to the treaty undertook to ensure 
that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear 
weapon states who were parties to the treaty without 
discrimination. 
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4.6 The parties to the treaty undertook to pursue 
negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
work for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control. 
4.7 The treaty was not to affect the right of any group 
of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure 
the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories. 
4.8 The parties to the treaty were given the right to 
propose ammendments to the treaty. All such proposed 
ammendments were to be submitted to the depository 
Government which were to circulate the same to all parties. 
4.9 The treaty was to be open to all the States for 
signature. The states were also given the opinion to accede 
to it after the treaty came into force. The treaty was to 
be subject to ratification by signatory states. 
4.10 The States signing the treaty were given the right 
to withdraw if they felt that certain extraordinary events 
had taken place which has distributed the supreme interests 
of its country. 
4.11 INDIA KSD THE NPT (NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY) 
The nuclear NPT produced a mixed reaction among the 
States* While some states considered it as a gueat landmark 
which could prove to be a turning point in human history, 
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the other States looked at it as an attempt on the part of 
the United States and Soviet Union to establish their 
nuclear hegemony over the entire world. For instance the 
USA and USSR described the treaty as the most important 
international agreement in the field of disarmament since 
the nuclear age began. 
On the other hand the Chinese Government strongly 
denounced the NPT describing it is a big plot of the US and 
USSR Government to deprive the non-nuclear nations under the 
threat of their right to develop nuclear weapon. 
India's policy on nuclear non-proliferation and the 
decision to stay out of the NPT announced on 14th May 1968 
was motivated by China's entry into the nuclear club in 1964 
and the resulting security dilema to India's national 
interests. India also considered that NPT sponsored by 
USA, UK and USSR as having various loopholes. Some of 
these can be listed as : 
a. The treaty did not ensure the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons but only stopped the dissemination 
of weapons of non-nuclear weapon States without 
imposing any curbe on nuclear weapon States. 
b. The treaty did not do away with the special status 
of superiority conferred on those states which 
possessed nuclear weapons. 
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c. The treaty did not provide for a balance of 
obligations and responsibilities between the nuclear 
weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States. 
d. The treaty did not constitute a step by step 
approach towards nuclear disarmament. 
e. The treaty did not prohibit one nuclear weapon 
State from assisting another nuclear weapon State 
by providing technical aid. 
f. It was discriminatory in regard to the peaceful 
benefits of nuclear explosions. 
g. It was discriminatory in regard to the safeguards 
and controls which are all imposed on the non-
nuclear weapon States while none such impositions 
were on nuclear weapon States. 
India, and the nuclear weapon states have differed 
on the basic meaning of proliferation to the nuclear weapon 
states, proliferation is one of horizontal type, that 
results in the increase of the number of states with nuclear 
weapons. India on the other hand looked at the same issue 
as one of vertical proliferation. India observes the real 
problem of proliferation in the continuing qualitative and 
quantitative proliferation of nuclear weapons by the five 
acknowledged nuclear weapon states namely USA, UK, USSR, 
France and China. 
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India voiced serious objections to the treaty as 
there was no linkage between the non-proliferation treaty 
and disarmament. Article VI of the NPT did not provide any 
credible commitment by the nuclear weapon States. From an 
Indian point of view, a real and credible security guarantee 
could only be provided through nuclear disarmament. 
Likewise the issue of control and safeguards are 
dealt with in an article 111 of the draft treay and the 
obligation to accept control and inspection or safeguards 
apply to non-nuclear weapon states only. The nuclear weapon 
states are free from any obligations whatsoever. India 
considered the NPT safeguard system as another symbol of 
discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon 
states. 
India has criticised the treaty as it has also 
failed to provide the non-nuclear weapon states, with the 
civilion benefits of nuclear technology on a non-
discriminatory basis. India's ultimate energy resources 
are insufficient to permit her to negotiate successfully the 
industrial transition. This means that if she is to succeed 
with her plans for development she must eventually shift 
from a dependence upon coal, petroleum and water power as 
resources of energy to a dependence upon nuclear energy. 
India is not the only country which has refused to 
ratify the NPT, a number of other countries also refused to 
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do so. These include Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, South 
Africa, Spain, Argentina, Brazil etc. Even the then two 
nuclear powers China and France, refused to sign the treaty. 
The main ground on which most of these states refused to 
sign the treaty was same as that pointed by India, that is 
the treaty was discriminatory in nature and sought to 
perpetuate a discriminatory nuclear world order for the 
benefit of the nuclear states. Further they have demanded 
that the advantages of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
technology should not be denied to the developing non-
nuclear nations. 
India has consistently favoured the idea of use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, because it was a vast 
source of power and could help in the developing countries. 
The then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru said in 
the Lok Sabha in 1954 that the use of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes is far more important for a country like 
India, that is in a country whose power resources are 
limited, than for a country like France, an industrially 
advanced country. He asserted the determination of the 
Government of India to make use of the nuclear energy only 
for peaceful purposes while inaguratihg India's first 
nuclear Reactor 'Apsara' at Trombay in January 1957 while 
consistently asserting that India was not interested in 
making a nuclear bomb. Nehru insisted that the country 
should be self-relaint in the matter of developing nuclear 
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energy in the country because on others was bound to effect 
the capacity of the country to take independent decisions in 
this regard. 
At various international forums also India advocated 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and exploitation 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. India favoured 
grant of necessary powers to the International Atomic 
Development Authority (lADA) to ensure peaceful uses of the 
nuclear energy. One of the main reasons why India did not 
accede to the NPT was that it impeded the peaceful research 
in so far it did not permit the non-nuclear countries to 
have peaceful explosions. Accordingly India continued to 
persist with the policy of peaceful nuclear explosions. 
Finally after a great deal of work India ultimately 
exploded an unclear ground nuclear test device on 18th May 
1974 at Pokhran. Primarily with a view to find ways of 
using underground explosions for constructive purposes. 
India's peaceful nuclear explosion was received with a mixed 
reaction- While on one side the developing nations expressed 
joy over this achievement. The developed and nuclear power 
nations expressed their displeasure over this action. Some 
even alleged that the conduct of the nuclear explosion by 
India contravened with her commitment as a signatory to the 
partial Test ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear tests. 
But it may be noted that the PTBT prohibited the nuclear 
tests only in atmosphere including outer space or underwater 
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including territorial waters or high seas and certainly 
did not prohibit underground peaceful nuclear explosions. 
Also the PTBT restricted that no nuclear weapon test should 
have a yield exceeding 150 kilotons in this regard also 
India used only 15 kilotons of nuclear weapon for under-
ground test. 
Thus India's peaceful nuclear explosion was in 
confirmity with the nuclear policy of India and in no way 
contravaned her international obligations. 
For India, keeping the nuclear option open in a 
recessed deterrence posture is adequate. Even in the worst 
case scenario, the maximum capability that India would ever 
need is that of minimum deterence. There is thus, virtually 
no risk of an open-ended nuclear arms race in the sub-
continent. 
But at the same time, there is a need for 
strengthening regional peace and security. This can be 
enhanced by a multilateral dialogue in an Asia forum for 
peace. Kazakhastan has already proposed a conference on 
confidence building and peace in Asia, and China has 
supported the idea. Iran has been emphasising the need for 
regional solutions through regional cooperation. Time is 
therefore, ripe for providing the necessary impetus to a 
multilateral dialogue among the states of Asia on peace and 
cooperation to translate the concept of panchsheel into a 
new cooperative security framework under the principle of 
mutual and security. 
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4.12 PROBLEMS IN NPT 
Despite the wide adherence of 162 signatories the 
NPT is so frail, flawed and insufficient that it has failed 
to prevent new nations from going nuclear or nuclear nations 
from dramatically upgrading the quantity and quality of 
their arsenals. 
Unless practical steps towards active and effective 
denuclearization are taken now, a terrifying a new nuclear 
arms race may double, or even triple. The present number of 
nuclear nations by the year 2000 A.D. with that any 
realistic hope of nuclear disarmament will be gone foreover. 
Next year's on the NPT looks like a last chance to 
control and eventually get rid of these weapons. 
The non nuclear states agreed to permanently 
forswear these arms in return for guaranteed access to 
nuclear energy technology. Subject to international 
control, and a promise by the five of effective nuclear 
disarmament and elimination of their arsenals. 
But civilian nuclear reactors provide both, the 
material needed for making bombs and experts with the 
necessary know how. Thus the idea of peaceful atom is 
anachoristic and the controls unworkable. 
The nuclear nations were also prohibited to help 
other countries develop nuclear bombs, but as there was no 
system of control or punishment. They have assisted the 
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countries like Israel, Iraq and Pakistan with their nuclear 
bombs programme. 
The whole non-proliferation system must be 
strengthened to keep the present 162 NPT signatories on 
board and attract new members. For this the five nuclear 
powers must soon deliver on their NPT promises of effective 
nuclear disarmament. 
Researches must stop and a time table be established 
detailing a series of concrete steps towards the eventual 
elimination of nuclear weapons. Present controls limited to 
non-nuclear states should be extended to all nuclear 
facilities in all countries. 
The nuclear five should bring to the NPT renewal 
conference a treaty banning all nuclear tests as well as a 
plan for a full nuclear disarmament with in a short period 
of time. Perhaps by the year 2000 AD as proposed earlier by 
Mr. Mikhail Garbachev. 
The International Peace Bureau I.P.B in Geneva is 
now building a strong, world-wide coalition for non-
proliferation and with others organising a strong presence 
of citizens groups in New York for the NPT Conference in 
April 1995. 
The IPB is also behind the WHO request for a ruling 
on nuclear arms by the international court at the Hague in 
the hope that a verdict illegalising nuclear weapons will 
establish a non-discriminatory norms that will influence 
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non NPT members and increase pressure on the five nuclear 
nations to disarm. 
The fact that everyone today is against nuclear arms 
does not help much if they keep this opinion to themselves. 
Citizens of nuclear states must put pressure on their 
leaders to move towards nuclear disarmament while those of 
non-nuclear states must put pressure on their leaders to 
insist on an improved treaty and resist the pro-nuclear 
forces of the world. 
4.13 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING NPT 
According to a statement made by the Prime Minister 
Mr. P.V. Narsihma Rao his remarks rejecting as it stand and 
ruling out the capping of the missile programme have not 
been as convincing as was expected in the aftermath of the 
uproar connected with the London talks. His reiteration of 
the Indian stand that disarmament ought to be universal. 
Comprehensive and non-discriminatory as delineated by the 
Rajiv Gandhi action plan of 1988 does not quite match some 
of the governments recent moves or the statements emanating 
from the U.S. For instance the Prime Minister's reference to 
India's participation at the 1995 review conference to 
change the content of the NPT radically seems somewhat 
puzzling in this context. India has not yet attend any of 
the four review conferences of the NPT because it is not a 
party to it. It can, therefore, only participate as an 
29 
observer. Since the decision to allow observers was only 
taken in Jan. It is not clear what its status will be and 
or whether or not it can have a say on a treaty to which it 
does not subscribe. The Prime Minister has correctly 
defended the dialogue with the U»S. observing that it is 
important in the post cold war period to talk on disarmament 
issues. However he is seemingly finding it difficult to 
strike a balance between convincing the U.S.that India's 
goals are not threatening nor destablishing the world order, 
and measuring the public that this dialogue will not results 
in agreements that will impair India's security concerns. 
5. COMPREHENSIVE TESTS BAN TREATY. CTBT 
There is considerable debate in this country about 
the comprehensive test ban and strong views have been 
expressed against India acceding to the treaty and in favour 
of it. It is, therefore, desirable to have an overview of 
the issues involved and the present status of the treaty 
formulation while India has sought to define a nuclear test 
as one involving release of nuclear energy this is still to 
be agreed to by nuclear weapon powers. 
From the point of view of 178 non-nuclear weapon 
nations who are already members of the NPT, renewed 
unconditionally and indefinitely in May, 1995, they are 
already committed not to test produce or acquire nuclear 
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weapons. Therefore, the CTBT does not make any difference 
to them. It is clear that the CTBT is for all practical 
purposes a totally redundant step, the enormous emphasis on 
the treaty by countries like the U«S which opposed it till 
1992 and there after had a sudden conversion to it needs to 
be carefully analysed. It is aimed at freezing the present 
technological status quo and prevent the three undeclared 
nuclear weapon states Israel, Pakistan and India, from 
testing first generation weapons. It is also aimed China at 
the present level of technology. 
Unlike the case of NPT, India's accession to the 
treaty or staying out of it will make hardly any difference 
to the Indian deterrent posture. But a basic principle is 
involved. India did not sign the NPT since it was 
discriminatory. The discrimination was not merely in the 
present monopolistic possession of weapons but also in lack 
of raciprocity of obligations. In that sense of the CTBT 
not only continues the discrimination but freezes it 
forever.. This freeze should be taken into account along 
with the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT 
and the arrogant assertion before the world court by the 
nuclear weapon powers of their right to commit nuclear 
holocausts. When India pressed for CTBT it was primarily in 
the context of comprehensive disarmament and hence it 
featured in the Rajiv Gandhi plan which proposed a phased 
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programme of total elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1993 
India advocated CTBT when the world had not perpetuated the 
discriminate monopoly of nuclear weapons in the hands of the 
five most war-prone powers of the world and before they 
asserted their right to commit nuclear holocausts before the 
World Court. 
5.1 BACKGROUND OF CTBT 
A move to ban nuclear testing was mooted by India in 
1954. 
India signed the PTBT which prohibited testing in 
the open in 1963. 
India's only peaceful nuclear test was in May 1974 
since then India has kept its nuclear option open. 
Talks on ban on nuclear testing started at the CD in 
Geneva in January 1994. India and USA are among the 
original co-sponsors. 
After the permanent and indefinite extension of the 
NPT in May 1995. India linked the signing of the 
CTBT with a time-bound plan for global disarmament. 
This was done because the NPT failed to tackle 
disarmament which is one of its fundamental aims. 
The other two are non-proliferation and peaceful use 
of nuclear energy. 
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In addition to the five nuclear powers - USA, UK, 
France, Russia and China - India, Pakistan and 
Israel are "Threshold Countries" capable of 
developing nuclear weapons. 
CTBT seeks to achieve a total ban on nuclear 
testing. 61 countries have participated in the 
talks to decide the political and legal basis for 
the treaty. 
No. of nuclear Est. No. of nuclear 
tests conducted weapons 1995 
USA 1,032 8,711 
RUSSIA 715 6,833 
FRANCE 210 524 
BRITAIN 45 200 
CHINA 45 450 
5.2 INDIA'S POSITION ABOUT CTBT 
India has said that it will sign the treaty after 
the nuclear five agree on a time-table for total removal of 
nuclear weapons. Because India has decided to participate 
in the talks a veto on the draft is automatic unless the 
Entry into force clause is changed. 
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5.3 PAKISTAN'S POSITION ABOUT CTBT 
Pakistan's modified stand is that it will withdraw 
from the CTBT if a third country does a nuclear test. This 
follows the reported assertion by the Army Chief General 
Jahangir Karamat that Pakistan will consider CTBT based on 
its national security needs, and not upon India's action. 
5.4 CHINA'S POSITION ABOUT CTBT 
China's twin demand has been accepted making a 
physical verification difficult for America to manipulate 
and a review of peaceful Nuclear Explosions after 10 years 
of the treaty. 
5.5 RESISTING THE CTBT 
There has been immense pressure exerted on the 
Government of India by the United States which "isolated" 
India in the "World Community". The reaction of the major 
nuclear power, the United States, was typical of the country 
which has ambitions of dominating the world. The U.S. 
contents that the elimination of the existing pile of 
nuclear arms is not "practical". if that is so, says India, 
the application of its ban treaty to non nuclear powers is 
not practical. 
India was one of the first countries that demanded 
universal disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, 
nearly four decades ago. India still sticks to the demand 
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but, as a soverign nation, it has an inherent right to 
acquire the know how of nuclear arms o long as the five 
nuclear powers refuse to part with their huge pile of 
nuclear arms. 
U.S. warned India that it would have to "pay a 
price" for not "falling in line" with the U.S. dominated 
"world community". It is clear that the level of pressure 
exerted on India before it vetoed the CTBT will not only 
continue but will be intensified in the coming days. The 
tremendous pressure put by the United States today on Cuba 
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The people 
and the leaders in those countries have been bravely facing 
the troubles created by the U.S. embargo on Cuba and various 
other sorts of pressures on Korea. 
We know the heroism which the people of Vietnam had 
to show against imperialism in order to protect their 
freedom and soverignty. Chinese people too had to face 
heavy odds since American imperialism was determined to beat 
them down. The people of the Soviet Union in the days of the 
Great Patriotic War faced heavy odds and saved their nation 
though millions of them had to sacrifice their valuable 
lives. 
It is clear now that if India refuses to be cowed 
down by the threats and pressures exerted by the U.S. led 
nuclear powers, the people of India will have to undergo 
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suffering as their sisters and brothers in other countries 
did when they stood up against a single aggressive power or 
a combination of agressive powers. 
5.6 THE CTBT AND BEYOND 
The reasons for pursuing a CTBT today, as seen from 
the present study, have expanded. Not only is the 
willingness to accept a CTBT still widely regarded as the 
principle measure of a state's attitude towards the NPT^ 
but it has become more generally a measure of a state's 
seriousness with regard to the larger goal, the eventual 
total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. The 
substantial reduction in the stockpiles of the superpowers 
now called for by the various START agreements can, of 
course, be accomplished in the absence of a CTBT, but truely 
deep reductions by all nuclear states to levels in the low 
hundreds* or even less, can be realistically achieved only 
in the context of other security arrangements, including not 
only a CTBT but also certain other major restraints will 
describe below. 
The first attempts to control nuclear weapons were 
made immediately after the first bombs were used. The most 
important of the early steps was the so called Baruch plan, 
named for Bernard Baruch , who presented it on behalf of the 
United States to the United Nations in 1946. The substance 
of the plan was drafted by a group charied by David 
Lilienthal, the man who soon after become the first Chairman 
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of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Robert 
Oppen Heimar, the warline director of the Los Alamos 
Laboratory was one of the four other members. 
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In retrospect, the plan was indeed, too, radical too 
much beyond human experience." In particular is called for 
intrusions on soverignty that were totally unacceptable to 
the Soviets, then under the rule of stalin, and he believes 
the u.S Senate would have found them unacceptable also, if 
such an agreement had been put before it for ratification in 
those times. During the next dozen years others proposals 
were put forward, but none could be realized under the 
international conditions then prevailing. 
Finally, in 1958, President Eisenhower and Chairman 
Khurschev undertook the first serious negotiations designed 
to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing. 
He can not be certain of Khuruschev's motives, but I know 
that Eisenhower had two major goals and one minor one in his 
mind at the time. 
The first major goal was to take a decisive, though 
modest, first step down the long road leading to the 
eventual elimination of the nuclear threat that hang over 
the heads of all of us. There had been many prior proposal 
for achieving some sort of control over the atom. Some were 
simply much too broad and much too difficult to verify 
"General and Complete Disarmament". For example, others 
required too much international intrusion on national 
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soverignty, the Baruch Plan is an eq. Others were rejected 
because they seemed threatening in other ways. Eisenhower's 
open skies" proposal may have been in this category. In 
any event, all prior attempts to restrain nuclear arms had 
failed, and in 1958 a CTBT being both limited in scope and 
relatively easy to monitor, seemed to offer a good chance 
for getting the whole process restarted. 
The second major purpose was to begin the gradual 
process of opening up the Soviet Union. Recall that in 
those days the USSR was still a very highly closed society. 
From the beginning of the new negotiations, all parties 
seemed to recognize that some sort of international 
observation and inspection system would be needed for a 
CTBT. And, since visitors of any kind to any part of its 
vast territory were still few and far between, the 
possibility of opening up that huge country to any sort of 
international inspection, however, modest seemed to be a 
useful step in the right direction. 
Eisenhower's minor goal was to eliminate atmospheric 
tests in particular, tests which were then causing an 
increasingly troublesome radioactive pollution of the 
atmosphere. Ever since the fallout accident at the U.S 
Pacific Test site in 1954, radioactive contamination of the 
atmosphere by nuclear testing had been a political issue, 
both at home and abroad. This minor goal was eventually 
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accomplished through the- limited test Ban Treaty of 1963. 
Achievement of a more comprehensive ban would have to wait 
for other major changes in the international political 
environment. 
In the meantime, in the mid 1960s, after the first 
five states had already tested and deployed nuclear weapons, 
negotiations on a treaty to stop further proliferation got 
underway. The final result was the NPT. The NPT which 
entered into force in 1970. Article six of that treaty 
calls on "each of the parties to pursue negotiations in good 
fedth on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament under effective international control". The 
preamble of the treaty and the negotiating record make it 
abundantly clear that a CTB was a ban and was widely 
considered to be an essential part of this whole process. 
Thus, by 1970, the achievement of a CTB had taken on a new 
purpose and new importance. Such a ban had become, in 
brief, a part of the promise the states that had nuclear 
weapons made to the States that did not have them in order 
to persuade them to forever. The acquisition of such 
weapons for themselves. No time limit was set at that time, 
and the arms race has been reversed in some of its other major 
dimensions in the meantime, but even so it is still widely 
believed that the fulfilment of this particular promise 
is longover due. 
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In September 1993, President Clinton proposed 
negotiation of a global, multilateral and verifiable 
convention to ban the production of plutonium or highly 
enriched uranium for nuclear weapons^ nuclear explosives, 
or not under international safeguards, or, for short, a 
cut off. Since then, a number of steps have been taken. 
The United Nations General Assembly has endorsed the 
concept, consultations have been held among nations and at 
the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and Progress made 
towards creation of a formal CD Adhoc Committee with a 
mandate to negotiate a cut off agreement. 
Nonetheless, reactions to the proposed cut off 
remain mixed. Skeptics argue that with the end of the cold 
war, a global cut off convention is an idea whose time has 
passed. Even among many of its potential supporters, 
concerns have been expressed, for eg. that negotiation of a 
cut off would divert the conference on Disarmament from the 
more urgent task of concluding negotiations on a 
comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, could adversily 
impact support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
persuit of its indefinite extension, and would "legitimize" 
the unacknowledged nuclear capabilities of Pakistan, India 
and Israel. 
Despite these concerns, there are good reasons to 
continue to believe that overall a cut off would strengthen 
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not weaken global efforts to contain and then reduce the 
nuclear danger. Each of these potential pay offs of a cut 
off agreement is discussed briefly. 
6. SOME ASPECTS OF A CUT-OFF CONVENTION 
President Clinton has revived a forty-year old 
proposal to put an end to the production of fissile material 
for nuclear weapons, the so called "cut off". It addresses 
some issues raised by such a cut off. It examines the way 
in which a cut-off convention might change the status within 
the non-proliferation regime of the three remaining 
threshold states, India, Israel and Pakistan, and the 
problems that this might raise for the regime as well as 
some ways of minimising them. It examines the IAEA 
safeguards in the eight states likely to be most effected by 
a cut-off (the five declared nuclear weapon (NWS) and the 
three threshold states). 
6.1 A "CUT-OFF" AS PART OF A BROADER STRATEGY 
Provided that it were ratified by the eight states 
concerned, a cut-off coupled with a (CTBT) and an 
indefinitely extended NPT, would be an effective brake on 
further "vertical" as well as "horizontal" proliferation 
and would give a significant impetus to nuclear 
disarmament. It would make it difficult for the NWs and 
especially the U.S and Russia to resume the nuclear arms 
race (not that there is much danger of their doing so) and 
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well-nigh impossible for any threshold state to expand its 
nuclear arsenals. 
It should be noted, however, that the original aim 
of the cut-off concept was to put an end to the spiralling 
nuclear arms race of 1950s, 1980s between the NWS. That 
race ended several years ago and today a cut-off would 
chiefly serve the more modest purpose of restraining 
nuclear competition between the threshold states, in 
particular India and Pakistan. It should also be stressed 
that by themselves, the cut-off CTBT and NPT, would 
formally do little more than preserve the nuclear status 
quo. If the treaties are to endure indefinitely, the NWS 
must steadily "roll back" existing nuclear arsenals as they 
are require to do by Article VI of the NPT. 
A cut-off not accompanied by a CTBT would be much 
Itss effective in braking vertical and horizontal 
proliferation since it would permit the NWS and threshold 
states to improve their nuclear arsenals by underground 
testing, and even to expand them using fissile material 
that had been produced before they accepted the cut-off. 
7. CONCLUSION 
There is concern in some quarters that pursuit of 
a cut-off convention could undermine extension of the NPT 
in 1995. This partly reflects worries that cut off 
negotiations will lead to a diplomatic overlad at the CD, 
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there by setting back pursuit of a CTBT. There also is 
uneasiness about possible tensions between the verification 
provisions under a cut off agreement and under the NPT. 
To the contrary, pursuit of a production cut off 
(including establishment of a CD Adhoc committee and the 
start of negotiations) would be another important symbolic 
step to demonstrate, as called for by NPT Article VI, that 
the nuclear arms race has ceased and that good faith 
negotiations are underway on nuclear disarmament. By 
focusing on illuminating negotiating issues and 
ulternatives, a CD Adhoc committee on cut off, moreover, 
would usefully lay the grandwork for detailed negotiations 
after the NPT extension conference. Regarding 
verification, as considered more fully below, some 
differences between verification provisions under a cut-off 
agreement and traditional IAEA safeguards under the NPT may 
well result from the more limited scope and objectives of 
cut off. As long as a cut-off agreement is presented as 
only one among many non-proliferation measures however, the 
impact of such differences on the NPT is likely to be 
manageable. 
Along with a CTBT, a cut-off agreement would help 
bring the medium nuclear powers into the global nuclear 
arms control process, without that participation, it is 
likely to be increasingly difficult to convince officials in 
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the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals below 
the currently envisaged levels of several thousand nuclear 
warheads. More narrowly, China's readiness to adhere to a 
cut off agreement would cap its further nuclear expansion. 
This would enhance stability in Asia by reassuring China's 
neighbours that Bejing's Burgeoning economy will not be used 
to fund a quest for growing military power. 
There is likely to be support for linking the 
duration of the convention to that of the NPT and CTBT. It 
is hardly likely that the NWS would accept an indefinite 
cut off if the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the NNWS. 
were of a more limited duration. If, as seems likely, the 
cut-off convention required comprehensive safeguards on the 
civilian nuclear programmes of all its parties the NNWS 
party to the NPT are also not likely to accept such 
safeguards for a period that is longer than that prescribed 
by the NPT. 
The pervent proponents of a CTBT and of a cut-off in 
the NWS should therefore know that neither of their goals is 
likely to be achievable unless it is accompanied by a 
current NPT, in other words the three treaties should run 
in tandem. Since they would be mutually reinforcing they 
should logically have the same duration preferably 
indefinite. 
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INDIA'S STANCE ON CTBT 
India's refused to allow the CTBT to be forwarded by 
the CD to the United Nations General Assembly on August 20 
has been welcomed at home but has expectedly evoked a sharp 
response from many of the major powers. "The nation is with 
us, we will make no compromises on national security". 
Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda declared during the course of 
his speech. 
India's opposition to the CTBT treaty was that the 
"Current Government in New Delhi wants to maintain the 
Indian nuclear weapons option". India's principled 
rejection of the CTBT that the decision not to sign the CTBT 
did not mean that "we are going in for new weapons, 
particularly nuclear weapons". 
India's stand that the country was left with no 
other option but to block the CTBT as its demand that the 
CTBT be linked to a timetable for the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons had not been accommodated in the text. The 
nuclear weapons states showed no interest in giving up 
their nuclear hegemony. 
Iran which had joined India in delaying approval, 
was pressured into backing down at the last minute, leaving 
India with the task of single - handedly blocking consensus 
on sending the record of the CTBT negotiations to the 
General Assembly. 
PART: TWO 
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NUCLEAR POLICY 
BABAR (Farhatullah). India's nuclear Policy. Regional 
Studies. 4,4; 1986 Autumn; 16-36. 
India's nuclear policy under Rajiv Gandhi is 
shaped by three interlinked realities. These are 
(1) the building of a vast nuclear infrastructure the 
foundations of which were laid even before Rajiv was 
born (2) the underground nuclear explosion of 1974 and 
the resultant confidence in indigenous national 
capability and (3) India's success in overcoming 
successive technological barriers resulting in the 
shrinking of political constraints on it to go 
nuclear. Today/, India has a completely unsafeguarded 
nuclear fuel cycle enabling it to produce platonium 
free from any international control. The development 
of indegenous technology, the commissioning of various 
nuclear plants, resufed to sign the NPT, the growth 
of a strong probomb lobby, persistent refusal to open 
up its facilities to international inspection and a 
change in the rehotric of Indian leadership make one 
suspect that it is not mere option building: it might 
well be an expression of its policy to build nuclear 
weapons. 
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2. DAALDER (Ivo H). What vision for the nuclear future? 
Washington Quarterly. 18, 2; 1995, Spring; 127- 42. 
Despite weapons reductions, a clear statement 
concerning the globe's nuclear future is non-existent. 
The opponents of a nuclear - weapons - free world 
(NWF) hold that enforcement of a NWF agreement depends 
on the perfect operation of a collective security 
accord, a system wide open to cheating and blackmail. 
In addition, nuclear weapons remain highly valued by 
their possessors, who continue to believe that 
international clout resides in the possession of these 
dissussive arms. The maintenance of a small number of 
nuclear weapons by a privileged few is advocated on 
the grounds that (1) nuclear weapons continue to deter 
any offensive attack (2) nuclear arsenals held by 
friendly regional hegemons deter their acquisition by 
weaker states. It is imperative that the U.S and its 
allies achieve a general consensus to uphold the terms 
of the NPT. Future negotiations should include: 
1. CTBT, a world wide cutoff of fissile material 
production for weapons purposes and international 
control or verification of all fissile materials not 
used for weapons purposes. 2. negotiated consent on 
the part of the five nuclear power to eliminate all 
non strategic nuclear forces and multiwarhead missiles 
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on land and sea. 3. a world wide ban on all land 
based missiles with a range greater than 150 kms. 
NAIR (Vijai. K). An Assessment: The Contemporary 
Security Environment and India's nuclear stance. 
Indian Defence Review. 9,1; 1994, January; 27-33. 
The time has come for India to exercise her 
nuclear option. Procrastination at this point of time 
would only leave the nation vulnerable to a Pre-
emptive strike or erode the nation's capacity to 
operate as a soverign state in the global community. 
The question that arises is how to minimise the 
turbulence that such a change will engender in the 
global community and, therefore, the analysis to 
arrive at options, their evaluation to assist in the 
decision making process and contingency plans to cater 
for an unwanted fallout. In doing so, a major area of 
concern is the imperative to ameliorate the threat 
perceived by extra regional powers and to objectively 
assess the ripple effect that the Indian nuclear 
option would have on the regional states. It would be 
pertinent to study the ongoing diplomatic exchanges 
between the United States and China where in the 
former's threat perceptions are dangerously aggravated, 
and the case of Israel's nuclear potential despite 
American strategic interests in the region. In both 
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cases the United States is as conceived, if not more, 
with the effect on proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Interdependence international relations is not a 
one-sided function • while one does not suggest 
outright defiance or denial of the other party's 
interests and perceptions. One does feel that India 
needs to pragmatically consider her strengths with 
equal vitality as it is sensitive to its weaknesses. 
This would provide policy makers with vitable options 
to formulate and implement a meaningful nuclear option 
before it is too late. 
SINGH (Jasjit). India's nuclear Policy: A Perspective. 
Strategic Analysis. 12,8; 1989, November; 781- 802. 
India's nuclear policy is predicated on the 
belief that a non- nuclear weajjon world is not only 
desirable and feasible, but an inescapable necessity. 
Meanwhile, cognizant of the realities of a world full 
of proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
coercion, and its own national interests in the 
critical areas of national security, Soverignity, and 
independence. India has sought to keep its nuclear 
weapon options open. 
49 
5. SRIVASTAVA (H.K.). Nuclear India. Indian Defence 
Review. 8,1; 1993, October; 34-39. 
India's stated ploy of strategic ambiguity might be 
working well where needed. Its technical capability 
of becoming an overt and significant nuclear power is 
also well known. The trouble with all this cleverness 
is not allowing Pakistan and the USA to smoke India's 
current nuclear status into the open has a total flow. 
The executive arms who are finally tasked to emplace, 
put the complete strike-difference organization into a 
coherent form and if necessary use only or absorb 
counterforce nuclear strikes are completely in the 
dark. That is Srivastava's stand • So where do the 
commanders and troops obtain nuclear warfighting 
nittie-gitties from? If abjurning hard nuclear 
capability is the actual policy then what are the 
alternative before 1995? 
6. UNTAWALE (Mukund G) . India and the World. Conflict. 
11,2; 1991, April-June; 113- 29. 
Focuses on significant policy aspects of 
India's interaction with the world in the following 
issue areas : 1. nonalignment. 2. The quest for 
economic equality and jostice. 3. nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons and 4. India's role in regionalism in 
South Asia. The concluding section draws inferences 
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from this brief analysis regarding India's involvement 
in world affairs. 
WHY GO Nuclear? Economic Times, 17,298; 1991, 
February, 20; 10. 
To the votaries of an overt Indian nuclear 
weapons policy, the case had never before appeared as 
attractive as it is today in the context of the Gulf-
war. The hawkish call for the bomb has gone shrill 
once again. Defence against possible nuclear 
blackmail by nuclear weapons powers in a unipolar 
world, is the argument now for shelding nuclear 
abstinence. The logic that the nuclear powers' 
bullying of small nations is inversely proportional 
to the latter's nuclear deterrent capacity is 
consistent and, even perverse in some ways. The world 
is 45 years v/icer after Hiroshima, and the 
international outrage that any nuclear attack is 
likely to lead too would be so enormous that any 
country would be relactant to resort to a nuclear 
strike. In any case, what is the level of dete'x-rent 
capacity that country like India should aspire for 
against a super power's nuclear blackmail? Second 
strike capability. Third strike capability? How is a 
country to know the tenacity of the potential bully? 
When these points are raised^ the arguments shifts to 
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Pakistan. Moreover, India has lived with the perceived 
Chinese nuclear threat for 27 years. So where is the 
need to go nuclear and catapult the region into ever-
escalating nuclear rivalry? 
8. WHY INDIA Thinks U.S. Motives are Suspect. Frontline. 
19,8; 1994, April, 30; 45- 9. 
India's policy planners were divided over how 
much importance the new U.S initiative deserves. 
Several key Government officials dismissed it as 
"banalexercise" meant only to bail out the U.S weapon 
industry. The recent success of Agni, India's 
Intermediate range ballistic missile, is one such 
rung. It gives India an ideal delivery vechicle to 
launch nuclear warheads to distances as far away as 
1,500 km to 2,500 km. bringing China under its range 
apart from many Central Asian and Gulf countries. If 
the U.S move to freeze nuclear weapons succeds, it 
will, for the first time, bring into the open the two 
nations capabilities. Even now India maintains that 
its atomic energy programme is directed towards 
peaceful uses and that it does not make nuclear bombs. 
Now India and Pakistan will have to move beyond the 
present stage of nuclear ambiguity bluff and gamesman-
ship and elector the world of stable. The concepts of 
"overt nuclear status" and "minimum deterence" are. 
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infact the new buzzwords of the nuclear non-
proliferation lobby India's inability to deal with the 
situation bilaterally with Pakistan has been a major 
diplomatic failure. Western experts estimate that 
India has enough weapons-grade plutonium to make over 
100 bombs. 
ZUBERI (M). India in the Nuclear Age. U.S.I. Journal. 
123 514,-1993,October-December; 496-598. 
While inaugurating the first indigenously built 
reactor in Asia in January, 1957, Nehru said that the 
atomic revolution has something in the nature of 
inevitability about it ; either you go with it or you 
succumb and others go ahead, Jawaharlal Nehru played 
an important role in the global disarmament 
negotiations starting with the appeal he made in March 
1954, after the Bravo test of the United States which 
was that of a hydrogen bomb. He was the first states 
man in the world to appeal for a cessation of nuclear 
tests. The number of nuclear tests has considerably 
decreased in the last two or three years and more than 
70 resolutions have been passed by the United Nations 
General Assembly pleading for a complete cessation of 
nuclear tests. The non-proliferation regime consists 
of treaties, safeguards and inspections, and export 
controls. And the linchpin of this non-proliferation 
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regime is the Non-proliferation Treaty. The non-
proliferation regime is now under great strain. It 
failed first of all to stop transfer of nuclear 
materials and technology from nuclear weapon powers. 
Indias's position has been consistent on the question 
of safeguards. Dr. Bhabha participated actively in 
negotiations for the establishment of IAEA. 
, ARMS RACE, SOUTH ASIA 
10. MILHOLLIN (Gray). Stopping the Indian bomb. American 
Journal of International Law. 81,3; 1987,July;593-609. 
Both Pakistan and India may have the capability 
to produce an atomic bomb. However, it is India that 
dominates the South Asian arms race. India's greater 
wealth, population and conventional strength means 
that Pakistan must either match India in nuclear arms 
or be dwarfed. Nuclear confrontations in the area 
can be avoided if the U.S., Canada and the USSR act 
decisively by insisting upon the broadest reasonable 
interpretation of India's duties under the nuclear 
trade agreements India owes the U.S. a pledge of 
peaceful use and safeguards in perpetuity for Tarapur 
Plutonium and other vital components of a potential 
nuclear arm. 
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, COLD WAR, SOOTH ASIA. 
11• AKHTAR MAJEED. Nuclear Brahmacharya: India stands to 
lose from emerging South Asian asymmetry. Indian 
Express. 62,104; 1994, February; 16;8. 
The objective of the nuclear policy followed by 
India and Pakistan is to make certain that there is no 
direct nuclear threat without them being able to 
retaliate. During the cold war, each had the 
strategic support of a super power. There has been 
talk that while India may not sign the NPT, it will 
unilaterally give an assurance to abide by its 
provisions. Obviously, such proposals have not taken 
into consideration the ineffectiveness of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency verifications as 
far as clandestine diversions are concerned. We know 
too well about Israel, South Africa, Iraq, Pakistan 
and North Korea. 
12. JONES (Rodney W). Old quarrels and new realities : 
Security in Southern Asia after the Coldwar. 
Washington Quarterly. 15, 1 ; 1992, Winter; 105-128. 
The watershed events connected with the end of 
the cold have fundamentally altered the global context 
of foreign and security policy making of India and 
Pakistan. Continued Indo-Pakistani rivalry, emerging 
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nuclear weapon capacities, domestic instabilities, and 
the violence in Punjab and Kashmir have increased the 
risks of a major regional conflict, including nuclear 
weapons use, between India and Pakistan. The weakening 
of the USSR and the decline of East-West tension. 
However, have removed the options India and Pakistan 
each formerly had to exploit superpower rivalry for 
local military gains. Lessons drawn from the economic 
achievements of those Asian countries that have relied 
on market economics and international trade has 
finally begun to take hold in India and Pakistan 
through urgently adopted policy reforms. 
Notwithstanding their old quarrels, the responses of 
India and Pakistan to Post-Cold war international 
security trends and positive results from their 
market-oriented policy reforms could strengthen their 
confidence and improve the prospects for serious 
negotiations to reduce nuclear risks and the dangers 
of war. 
, CRITICISM 
13. BIDWAI (Praful). Nuclear Policy Under.' NWFZ The 
Realistic Way Out. Times of India. 154, 283; 1991. 
November, 27; 6. 
Nothing has exposed the incoherence of India's 
current nuclear stance as sharply as the visit of the 
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U.S. Under Secretary of State for international 
security affairs, Mr. Reginal Bartholomew. If he 
made no secret of the express purpose of his visit, 
New Delhi could not conceal the grave paralysis in its 
nuclear policy-making either. However, it is far 
from clear if there is a principle involved in this 
shift which seems to carry all the marks of a change 
effected under pressure or for political expediency. 
Thus, New Delhi has opened itself to the charge that 
it is on the way to capitulating to America's 
insistence that it give up the nuclear weapons option 
and sign the humiliating NPT. It is futile to argue 
that such an agenda is unrealistic or unimplementable 
and hence should not be pursued. 
14. , DEFENCE, OPTIONS 
INDIA'S NUCLEAR option. Democratic World. 19,9j 1990,. 
March, 4; 4. 
A national debate, although on a hush-hush 
scale, is going on regarding the "nuclear" option in 
defence matters. To put it crudely : will India 
produce nuclear weapons and face the outside world 
boldly? When two scientists - Prof. M.G.K. Menon and 
Dr. Raja Ramanna - were appointed ministers in the 
central cabinet, there were speculations that India 
would have a fresh look into the nuclear policy. The 
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ministerial team is good and also the environment 
they deal with. But there are many other 
considerations which weigh down a nuclear option. 
Firstly, it will go against the concept of peace. 
Secondly, it is a costly proposition. But now Prime 
Minister V.P. Singh himself has come out with a 
statement that India would have to review her peaceful 
nuclear policy after 1974 "implosion" at Pokhran, the 
Indian Scientists have not taken any steps for such 
experiments. It is true that India has the capacity 
and material for going in for any frontline nuclear 
weapons. 
, DETERENCE 
15. DOULOSE (T.T.). Minimum deterence : A fallacious 
concept. Indian Express. 63/ 77 ; 1995, January, 19;8. 
All nuclear weapon states first created the weapon 
technology and then began the quest for strategic 
doctrines. Henry Kissinger's book. Nuclear weapons 
and foreign policy (1957), Succinstly explains this 
phenomenon. One of the impediments to start a serious 
debate on nuclear doctrines in India is the enigmatic 
dogma called the nuclear option. For India, nuclear 
option may be a necessary evil but a nuclear doctrine 
can not be crafted on ambivalence, conjectures and 
hypothesis. Unless India comes out openly as a 
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nuclear weapon state, it is absured to talk about 
India's nuclear doctrine. A non-weaponised deterrence 
is a bluff. If India and Pakistan have not deployed 
nuclear forces then there is no deterrence. That is 
the stark reality. No wonder, it has been described 
as "beesting" capability, China like France was 
building a minimum deterrence in the initial years of 
its nuclear weapon development. But it was more 
cautious about its small nuclear force. 
16. , ,EQUILIBRIUM 
WARD (Hugh). Recent games theory and the ethics of 
nuclear deterence. Politics. UK. 7, 2; 1987, October, 
3-8. 
The grounds for believing that stable deterence 
will emerge from rational action remain weak. Even 
if the strategist's assumptions about rationality are 
granted, common forms of moral objection to nuclear 
deterence still seem to be viable. Outlines the most 
common forms of moral objection to nuclear deterence, 
and the manner in which such objections have been 
countered by strategists. Discusses the idea of a 
deterence equilibrium developed in the recent 
literature and to show the particular application this 
idea might have to the debate on the ethics of 
deterence. In the next section he shows that, 
because there are also stable 
59 
outcomes in which nuclear weapoms are used, the 
possible existence of deterence equilibrium does not 
necessarily imply that stable mutual deterence will 
ensure. Thus, even if the assumptions of yames theory 
are taken as given and many readers will find those 
assumptions objectionable - it is possible to make 
out a case against the morality of nuclear deterrence. 
Finally, shows this lather abstract argument might 
have particular application to the debate about the 
strategic Defence initiative. 
17. , , PROBLEMS 
THAYER (Bradley A). Risk of nuclear inadvertance» a 
review essay. Security Studies. 3, 3; 1994, Spring; 
428- 93. 
There have been three great debate in the 
literature of nuclear deterrence. The first debate, 
begun in the 1950s, focused on the vulnerability of 
nuclear forces to attack. The second debate, begun in 
the late 1970s, focused on the vulnerability of a 
state's command and control of nuclear forces to 
attack. The third debate, which is beginning with the 
works of Bruce Blair, Peter Fever and Scott Sagan, is 
focused on the risk of nuclear inadvertance, the risk 
that nuclear weapons may be used accidently, without 
authorization or by third parties. These authors argue 
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that the risk of inadvertance was higher during the 
cold war than here to fore believed, and that emerging 
nuclear states face a greater risk of nuclear 
inadvertance but the authors are wrong to argue that 
it is necessarily higher than the risk faced by the 
superpowers. 
, , SOUTH ASIA 
18. BHIMAYA (Kotera M.). Nuclear deterence in South Asia ; 
Civil military relations and decision making. Asian 
Survey. 34, 7; 1994, July; 647- 61. 
The developed nations are seriously concerned 
about the possibility of nuclear arms race between 
India and Pakistan. An examination of the higher 
defence control organizations in these two countries 
reveals that civilian control in India is firm, 
although the military's influence in strategic 
decision-making has been increasing. Unlike India, 
Pakistan has a mechanism on a permanent basis to make 
integrated decisions but the military has a greater 
say, even in political decision-making. The behaviour 
of the important actors during pact crises reveals 
that Indian and Pakistani leaders have been rational 
in decision-making. However, the command, control and 
intelligence set up is not adequate to meet the 
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stringente standard of safety demanded by nuclear 
weapons systems. Coercive measures against, and 
punitive policies towards nuclear proliferation tend 
to be counter productive. Future coinflict in 
Asia should be managed with deterrence as well as 
reassurance. 
19. , DISARMAMENT 
CHEEMA (Pervaiz Iqbal). India's nuclear goal and 
policy. Regional Studies. 5, 2', 1987, Spring; 26-35. 
India's nuclear programme is fairly advanced and 
the most diversified in the Third World. Indian goals 
in the nuclear fields seem to be to attain self-
reliance and self-sufficiency in nuclear technology 
and to keep the nuclear weapon option open. India 
emphasizes nuclear disarmament because it would 
increase India's relative prestige and role in world 
affairs and because India is aware that disarmament 
may not take place for a long time. It is a case of 
pulling others down while pushing oneself upwards in 
order to gain proximity to the desired status and 
role in world affairs. 
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20. CHENGAPPA (Raj). Nuclear Dilemma. India Today. 19,8; 
1994, April, 30; 42- 5. 
Exactly 20 years after the Pokhran explosion 
India is now being confronted by one of the most 
determined initiatives ever by the US to pressurise 
the nation and its neighbours. Pakistan, to foreclose 
the option of using nuclear bombs. Unlike in the past, 
the US is manoeuvring at several levels. At the 
bilateral plane, it is employing both pwoerful 
incentives and disincentives to get the countries to 
toe its line. Multilaterally, it is putting together 
a group of the world's most powerful nations to 
breaker a deal in the subcontinent. And at the global 
level, it is planning major disarmament proposals. It 
has already been set into motion to make it appear 
that the U.S. is making concessions to India's 
demands. India had maintained for a long time that 
it would not sit at any negotiating table on non-
proliferation unless the measures proposed were 
"universal^ comprehensive, non-discriminatory and 
verifiable". As Talbott said before leaving the 
subcontinent. "We have laid the conceptual basis for 
our objectives of first capping, them reducing and 
eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction 
from South Asia. We are optimistic of its success". 
63 
. ARMS CONTROL 
21. ADLER (Emanuel). Arms Control* disarmament and 
national security : A thirty year retrospective and a 
new set of anticipations. Daedalus ., 120, L; 1991. 
Winter ; 1-20. 
Analysts have come full circle and returned to 
the role of ideas in world politics. During the first 
chapter of the nuclear age the world was able to take 
a few steps back from the abyss; arms control has been 
one of the tools that have kept it from falling over 
the edge. The development of arms control ideas and 
practice allowed nation states to share expectations 
of proper action and to calculate their choices 
according to a common understanding of the situation. 
International cooperation during the last thirty years 
has depended on the shared concepts and expectations 
that arms control has helped to provide. If the 
world is to keep away from the abyss in the future. 
It must be do more that just junk some tanks and 
bombs ; collective understanding practices of 
government and norms must continue to evolve. 
22. NELSON (Linden) and BEARDSLEY (George L. Jr). Towards 
an interdisciplinary model of barriers to nuclear arms 
control. Social Science Journal. 24, 4; 1987; 375-388. 
The nuclear arms race is a powerful phenomenon 
with political, technical. Historical, economic and 
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psychology dimensions. Most analysis concentrate on 
the political, technical or historical dimensions to 
the neglect of the economic and psychological factors. 
This article seeks to correct this neglect, arguing 
that serious barriers to arms control arise from 
economic and psychological forces. 
, ^ « EVALUATION. 
23. POSEN (Barry R). Crisis stability and conventional 
arms control. Daedalus. 120, 1; 1991, Winter, 
217- 32. 
Early theorists of nuclear arms control argued 
that heavily armed political competitors had a strong 
interest in crisis stability and in the reduction of 
military incentives to strike first under crisis 
conditions and that arms control could help them 
achieve this objective. Two sets of obstacles must be 
considered in assesing the prospects for such 
agreements. Political obstacles obstruct both nuclear 
and conventional agreements. Military obstacles 
should be low for nuclear agreements, but much higher 
for conventional ones. The very nature of conventional 
warfare - especially among land powers - makes it 
difficult to design forces that simultaneously 
contribute to crisis stability and to deterrence of a 
motivated adversary. 
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, HISTORY, 
24. DOTY (Paul). Arms Control 1960, 1990, 2020. Daedalus. 
120, l; 1991, Winter; 33-52. 
The year 1990 will end with hope and promise far 
beyond any imaginable dreams of 1960 and the 
intervening years, but with unforeseen challenges 
obscuring the outlines of the distant shore. Two 
developments that can go either way are certain to 
determine the choice between catastrophic war and 
peace in the coming decades. One development is the 
way nuclear weapons are managed : the extent to which 
they are rolled back and deemphasized by the present 
nuclear powers and the extent to which they spread and 
are constrained by the new nuclear powers that may 
arise. The second seminal development is more widely 
based. It is the myriad of problems - at all levels, 
including the military that will accompany the 
catastrophic impact of adding nearly five billion new 
habitants to the earth's fragile biosphere by 2020. 
These two challenges will dominate the generation 
that will give thought and guidance to the early 
21st century. 
25. FREEDMAN (Lawrence). Arms Control : thirty years on. 
Daedalus. 120, 1; 1991, Winter; 69-82. 
There is real cause for complaint in the failure 
of theory to recognize the links between arms control 
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and political change which has been evident throughout 
the past thirty years. It is necessary to focus on 
the political dimension of arms control and in 
particular, on conventional arms because these are the 
most relevant to the sort of change recently 
witnessed. The strategic nuclear focus has 
encouraged arms control theory to concentrate on 
standards of stability with in a bipolar military 
relationship and this has always been to the 
deteriment of conventional arms control which has 
always been shaped by complex political relations. 
A theory for a period of political transition is 
lacking. 
* , , INDIA'S ROLE 
26. CHENGAPA (Raj). Playing the spoiler. India Today, 11, 
17 ; 1996, September, 1-15; 120- 1. 
What's clear is that India's stand has upset and 
angered many nations. The US is miffed because it had 
persuaded the other four nuclear-weapon powers-
Russia, France, United Kingdom and China - to agree on 
a moratorium on nuclear tests, a major achievement 
in itself. But faced with an Indian veto, US 
President Bill Clinton, standing for re-election this 
year, sees one of his major foreign policy initiatives 
slipping away. Even in the US, resistance is building 
up against moving towards a test ban. Republican Trent 
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Lott, who succeded Robert Dole as the Senate majority 
leader, is known to be in favour of developing US 
nuclear-weapons capability. Pakistan, which has so far 
not exploded an explosive device, is also reluctant 
and looking for a way out. Indian strategists believe 
that China would increasingly challenge India's 
position of dominence in South Asia. They believe that 
India has to build a credible nuclear deterrence if it 
is to keep China at bay. To do that, India would have 
to master the technology of making hydrogen bombs that 
yield an explosive power 10 times more than the 1974 
Pokhran atomic explosion. 
^ SOUTH ASIA. 
27. CHEEMA (Zafar Iqbal). Nuclear Arms Control in South 
Asia. U.S.I. Journal. 123, 513; 1993, July-September; 
354- 72. 
The genesis of South Asia's nuclearization dates 
back to the 1950s when under Nehru's Government India 
kept open its nuclear option. Nehru supported general 
and complete disarmament as essential instrument for 
peace, security and development. He often spoke very 
strongly against the develcypanentof nuclear weapons by 
the great - powers as deterimental to internal peace 
and security. No Indian Government has ever 
acknowledged the initiation or existence of a nuclear 
weapons programme. However, with the continual growth 
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of a seizeable nuclear weapons capability. Whether 
India has actually integrated nuclear weapons into its 
armed forces at this stage is not known. There is no 
public evidence as yet to identify the support 
mechanism for their immediate assembly in crisis 
situations, deployment strategy or target acquisition 
alternatives. There was no significant interaction 
between India and Pakistan in the field of nuclear 
arms control untill the 1974 Indian nuclear test. 
Both countries had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty 
in 1963 immediately after its conclusion but Pakistan 
did not ratify it untill 1988. India and Pakistan 
actively participated in the NPT negotiations but 
unlike India, Pakistan hailed its conclusion and 
expressed the hope that all the potential nuclear 
weapon states would join it as members. India pursues 
a policy of nuclear ambiguity which is considered the 
best strategy until India is able to develop a 
strategic traid like the superpower model, i.e., long-
range ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and 
submarine-based ballistic missiles. 
28. SEGAL (Gerald). Arms Control in Asia. Arms Control. 
8, l; 1987, May; 80-94. 
If the geopolitical trend of history is a guide, 
then Asia has something to learn from Europe in its 
transition from economic boom and devastating war to 
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armed peace and controlled conflict. Is Asia now ripe 
to begin considering various types of arms control 
that have been used in Europe and between the super-
powers to help keep the peace? The immediate answer 
must be no, because Asia is obviously a very 
different place, and with very different problems. 
, , , , US ROLE 
29. HAAS (Richard N). South Asia * too late to remove the 
bomb? Orbis. 32,1 ; 1988, Winter ; 107- .18. 
US efforts to maintain friendly relations with 
both India and Pakistan continue to suffer from 
tensions arising from contested territorial claims and 
the growing local nuclear competition. US Security 
assistance to Pakistan (which has increased to ensure 
Pakistan's support for US Policy towards Afghanistan) 
appears sufficiently large to anger India (already 
upset over its own non-eligibility for the most 
advanced forms of US technology) but nevertheless 
unable to persuade Pakistan to forego its own nuclear 
ambitions. Although the US should persist in its 
efforts to promote Indo-Pakistan dialogue and slow 
Pakistan's nuclear push, Washington soon may have no 
choice but to adopt a policy of "management" for 
South Asia that would seek to bring about stable 
deterrent forces. 
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30. , , , STRATEGIC STABILITY 
CARTER (Ashton B). emerging themes in nuclear arms 
control. Daedalus. 120,1; 1991, Winter; 233- 50. 
The nature of the new military arenas created by 
recent events calls for arms control ideas of a kind 
that had not been called forth by the cold war nuclear 
confrontation. The intellectual challenge is to 
discover the engineering principles - if such exist -
that will make the many and diverse national arsenals 
around the world reflect a stable international 
security. Two areas of conceptual innovation will be 
needed. The first need is to identify types of 
strategic stability and thus objectives of 
negotiation - besides assuring retaliation to a first 
strike. The second is to develop a consistent out 
look on limited nuclear use. And the arms control 
principles to go with it. The first area of innovation 
involves mainly the strategic forces, the second 
involves mostly the tactical forces. 
31 , , , TREATY, ARMS CONTROL, ON RESOLUTION 
CHELLANEY (Brahma). India's wrong signal on fissile 
cut-off. Indian Express. 63, 169; 1995, April,22; 8. 
India's position is that it will support a 
proposal for fissile cut-off that is based on the 
three principal elements of the UN resolution of being 
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universal, non-discriminatory and effective verfiable. 
The issue of asymmetries is a sensitive one and is 
reflected in the passion it has aroused in Geneva over 
whether the cut-off treaty should deal with future 
production or also with existing stock-piles. 
Unfortunately those countries that wish to go beyond 
the original UN mandate and tackle past production are 
trying to look at only non-weaponised fissile-
material stockpiles. The US - Russian arms control 
treaties were designed not as steps towards a non-
nuclear world, but to stablise deterrence by 
eliminating the most vulnerable and destabilising 
weapons. 
, , NON PROLIFERATION 
32 BOUDREAU (Donald G). On advancing non-Proliferation. 
Strategic Review. 19, 3; 1991, Summer, 61- 7. 
The recent UN campaign in the Persian Gulf 
region has drawn worldwide attention to the dangers of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
presenting an auspicious opportunity for stemming the 
flow of such weapons to volatile areas of the world. 
Through the expansion and strengthening of multilate-
ral arrangements such as the Missile technology 
control Regime and in pursuing more aggressive action 
in international force such as the UN International 
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Atomic Energy Agency, the international community has 
a window of opportunity for limiting the alarming 
number of regimes likely to posses nuclear and 
chemical weapons and ballastic missile as we enter the 
21st century. 
33. TATE (Treuor McMorris). Regime building in the non-
proliferation system. Journal of Peace Research. 
27, 4 ; 1990» November; 399-414. 
The article analyses the main institutions, 
agreements and understandings that comprise the issue 
area of nuclear non-proliferation and situates them in 
the frame work of the international regimes 
literature. In explaining the process of regime -
building and maintenance in the area of non-
proliferation the author draws on insights from 
modified structural and cognitive theories. The main 
argument is that self interest and learning best 
explain the persistence of the non-proliferation 
regime. Further, as nuclear proliferation is a 
fundamental determinent of political, not technolo-
gical factors efforts to strengthen. This regime must 
begin from this premise. One of the main conclusion 
is that the non-proliferation project will continue to 
face new challenges, but that self-interest, cognitive 
development and the nature of the issues obviate the 
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likelihood of collapse on the non proliferation 
regime. 
, , , DEFENCE POLICY 
34^ WELCOME TRANSPARENCY. Times of India. 159, 199; 1996, 
August, 2l;l0. 
The annual report of the Ministry of Defence 
this year has finally come round accepting the harsh 
realities of international and regional security 
affecting India. The usual skirting round of real 
issues and obfuscating them in banal platitudes have 
given way to a refreshing candour. The defence 
ministry has to be congratulated on this degree of 
transparency and one hopes this healthy habit will be 
sustained and improved upon in future reports. The 
statements made in the report on pressures on India 
on missile and nuclear issues contradict the 
ministerial statemants of the past denying any such 
pressures. The reports commitment to the development 
of the Agni missle and deployment of Prithivi missile 
to counter the new threat of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and missiles in our neighbourhood is entirely 
wallanted. However, the picture of the external 
security environment painted in the report would beg 
the question why this year's defence expenditure has 
been fixed at a level that would not cover the 
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expected inflation. It will lead to a mixing up of 
two distinct responsibilities assessment and policy-
making, and a consequent risk of intelligence 
assessment being tailored to suit the adhocist 
policies of the moment. The country expects a 
meaningful debate on the demands of the Defence 
Ministry in the Parliament based on the assessment 
provided in the present annual report. 
, , PUGWASH MOVEMENT. 
35. UDGAONKAR (B.M). Anti-Nuclear Role of Pugwash 
, Movement. Times of India. 159, 17; 1996 January, 
19 ; 10. 
A characteristic of the Pugwash movement is the 
combination of ideals and long-term goals with 
concrete work aimed at more immediate targets. This 
was to be noticed in the complementary speeches made 
by Mr. Rotblat and Mr. Holdren. Mr. Rotblat made a 
strong plea for getting rid of all nuclear weapons, 
through a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting all 
possession of nuclear weapons. An Indian has been on 
the Pugwash Council most of the time, and also on the 
executive from time to time. Indian participants have 
tried to project a third world point of view in 
conferences where 90% of the participants have been 
from the North. India has hosted two annual pugwash 
conferences in 1964 and 1976 and several international 
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pugwash workshops. Earlier, Indian contribution was 
significant in the elaboration of a Pugwash Draft Code 
for transfer of technology. Indians put non-military 
dimensions of threats to security, and small and light 
arms, on the pugwash agenda by organising 
international pugwash workshops in 1989 and 1995. 
, , SECURITY 
36. LODGAARD (Sveue). Global security and disarmament 
regional « approaches. Bulletin of Peace Proposals. 
22, 4; 1991, December 337- 86. 
There is growing recognition that in two 
respects mankind faces a common fate : the threats of 
(1) nuclear war and (2) environmental. This common 
fate, in addition to growing economic interdependence 
and revolutionary developments in communications, 
brings nation closer together. The structural 
implications are manifold. One of them is that groups 
of states are seeking enlarged mutual benefit, 
usually, but not always, in geographically contiguous 
areas. There are strong incentives for regional 
cooperation, and in many parts of the world regional 
organizations are growing stronger. The UN should 
encourage growth of regional bodies and seek dynamic 
interplay with them. Regional cooperation among 
buyers and suppliers of arms could help constrain the 
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arms trade. Regional integration could also help 
eliminate secessonist movements motivated by 
nationalist ideals. 
, , TREATY-COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. 
37. CHENGAPPA (Raj). Queering the Pitch. India Today, 
1995, July, 15. 
Ironically, two years ago, when negotiations 
began for the treaty, which seeks to bring about a 
global ban on nuclear testing, India had been one of 
its most active proponents. But by late last year, 
it began hardening its stand and said it would get on 
board only if the five nuclear powers - the US, 
Russia, France, Britain and China - simultaneously 
announced a time-bound programme for the elimination 
of their nuclear arsenals. As the June 28 deadline 
for negotiations to conclude drew nearer the nuclear-
weapon states made it clear to India that they were 
unwilling to make any commitment to total disarmament. 
Nuclear powers like France and China were also 
initially opposed to the CTBT because they suspected 
the US of wanting to retain its lead in the nuclear 
race. China was especially concerned because it had 
conducted the least number of tests among the big five 
and was way behind them in nuclear-weapon technology. 
So, apart from insisting the treaty exclude 
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"Peaceful nuclear explosions" from its ambit, China-
like France - conducted tests even as the treaty was 
being negotiated. The US has been able to convince 
France to abstain from further tests by signing on 
agreement with it in early June for transfer of 
technology that would enable it to simulate tests 
using computers, this avoiding the need for an actual 
explosion. 
38. INDIA AND The CTBT. Competition Master. 37, 7; 1996, 
February," 592- 93. 
India has not co-sponsored the UN resolution 
calling for an immediate conclusion of the CTBT. It 
has earlier co-sponsored similar resolutions in 1993 
and 1994 and its refusal this time led to conster-
nation among the western powers. India's backtracking, 
however, is not strategic but seems to come from a 
lack of direction in its nuclear policy. Matters are 
complicated by the blatant hypocrisy of western powers 
on the issue of nuclear weapons. while professing 
nuclear non-proliferation. They have gone ahead with 
nuclear testing and refining their weapons. India 
insists that the nuclear weapon states should commit 
themselves to nuclear disarmament in the CTBT. This 
feature looks at the compulsions of the CTBT and 
Indxa's stand on xt. It descrxbes the reasons for the 
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insistence of the west in pushing this treaty. Coming 
as it does after the Nuclear NPT which legitimises 
nuclear weapons in the hands of the five nuclear 
weapon state, what are the options before India. 
Moreover, since its nuclear policy is not very well 
defined. Can the country make any difference in the 
nuclear power politics being played in the 
international arena. 
39. VANAIK (Achin). Test ban Treaty: The Indian response. 
Indian Express. 64,1; 1995, November, 6; 8. 
The Indian bomb-lobby has woken upto the "danger 
of the CTBT" only in the last couple of years. It is 
not as if there has been any qualitative change in the 
last decade between the status of NWS and Non-NWS that 
some how makes the non-proliferation aspect of a CTBT 
far more pernicious now then it would have been had it 
been in place a decade ago. As long as the CTBT was a 
distant prospect. The Indian bomb lobby could occupy 
the moral high ground and wax eloquent about its 
commitment to such 'universal and non-discriminating' 
disarmament steps. The moment the CTBT has become a 
real and imminent possibility, it has got a worsening 
case of the jitters because if India acceds to such a 
CTBT, it will make its own effort to lobby for 
establishing a "minimum stable deterrent" in the 
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future significantly more ineffectual. Our top 
experts can not even conceptually agree on what is a 
stable minimum deterrent position. How would they do 
so if nuclear weapons were actually deployed? Not 
acceding to a full-fledged CTBT would decisively 
weakers India's pretensions to being genuinely 
concerned about global nuclear disarmament or even 
about "Universal and non-discriminatory" steps to 
achieve this ; and all this will leave India exactly 
where it has been for so long - in a State of nuclear 
ambiguity with no change in its current position of 
nuclear security. 
, , ,ARGUMENTS, INDIA'S ROLE. 
40. FORCEFUL ARGUMENTS. Indian Express. 64,286; 1996, 
January, 30; 8. 
India's representative at the conference for 
Disarmament in Geneva has made a clear and forceful 
argument for a CTBT which furthers International 
Security and is truely comprehensive. Being well-
reasoned, the argument ought to set at rest domestic 
speculation about the weakening of the Government 
resolve on this question and encourage non nuclear 
states to adopt similar positions. The CTBT parleys 
provide an opportunity to undo it so that the world 
does not remain divided for ever between the nuclear 
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"haves" and "have-nots". After the French and Chinese 
tests, Australian views have been hardening. The fact 
that the five weapon powers alone have conducted 
thousands of nuclear tests should make it impossible 
for Washington to argue for exceptions of any kind 
from the test ban treaty. As to whether the CTBT will 
open for signature in September as Washington would 
like will depend on how realistic the weapons powers 
can make their promises to disarm. 
* * , CHALLENGE. 
41. DIXIT (J.N.). Challenge of CTBT Towards a new 
policy. Indian Express. 64, 224; 1996, June, 18; 12. 
The most important country voicing reservations 
about the CTBT till recently, China, announced through 
its Ambessodor at Geneva on June 6 that it will be a 
signatory to the treaty. China withdrew its reser-
vations on provisions and stipulations governing 
peaceful nuclear explosions, negative security 
assurances and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the 
proposed agreement. Another significant point to be 
noted is that China has been stridently insistent that 
the CTBT should cover all nuclear-capable states. 
Procedurally, we cannot block the signing of the 
treaty. Politically, such an attempt will only spell 
international isolation, with material implications. 
The threat can be met, but only by tactical 
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adrioitness. Punitive action envisaged in the CTBT 
against states not participating in the treaty must 
also be taken of. The treaty provides that states. 
Parties to the treaty, can impose collective sanctions 
against those countries which violate its principles 
and objectives. We must ensure that our nuclear 
manpower and technological capacities are not eroded. 
Our research programmes should be continued and our 
scientific manpower nurtued so that it can be engaged 
in sustaining^ our nuclear capacities. Tactical 
adroitness* rather than futile defiance, is in order. 
, , , DISCRIMINATORY. 
42. DANDAVATE (Madhu). Discriminatory CTBT: India's 
concerns ignored. Indian Express. 64,254; 1996, 
July, 18; 8. 
Despite all professions about the 'equality 
among nations' made from international fora, the 
attitude of the developed countries, particularly the 
nuclear powers, in regard to disarmament, non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons and comprehensive ban 
on nuclear tests is highly discriminatory. Different 
yardsticks are used for the developed and developing 
countries and nuclear and non-nuclear states.The 
nuclear states wanted the NPT to be extended 
unconditionally before a full review of its 
performance by 165 countries, which are a party to it. 
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These nuclear states have been creating hurdles in 
evolving a comprehensive approach to nuclear 
disarmament. India's support to the CTBT would mean 
accepting a treaty which would put severe restraints 
on non nuclear states while giving a privileged 
position to the Big Five with no checks on their 
nuclear powers. The conference at Geneva which debated 
the CTBT was oblivious of these obligations. India had 
the sense of realism to comprehend that commitment to 
associate with the CTBT, without any guarantee of a 
time bound scheme of global disarmament, was fraught 
with dangerous consequences. Learning from the past 
experience, India had to take note of the stark M.1> 
reality that the main nuclear powers had built up an 
extremely iniquitous system, which gave a privileged 
position to them and meted out discriminatory 
treatment to the developing countries. The perspective 
which India has adopted regarding the CTBT is in tune 
with its consistently correct approach. 
, , , DRAFT. 
43. CHERIAN (John). Standing up to Pressure : India 
rejects the CTBT draft. Frontline 13,18; 1996, 
September 7-20 ; 53. 
India's refusal to allow the CTBT to be 
forwarded by the CD. to the United Nations General 
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Assembly on August 20 has been welcomed at home but 
has expectedly evoked a sharp response from many of 
the major powers. "The nation is with us, we will make 
no compromises on national security. Prime Minister 
H.D. Deve Gowda declared during the course of his 
speech from the ramparts of the Red Fort on 
Independence Day. India's opposition to the CTBT 
treaty was that the "current Government in New Delhi 
wants to maintain the Indian nuclear weapons option. 
India's principled rejection of the CTBT that the 
decision not to sign the CTBT did not mean that we are 
going in for new weapons, particularly nuclear 
weapons. 
India's stand that the country was left with no 
other option but to block the CTBT as its demand that 
the CTBT be linked to a timetable for the elimination 
of all nuclear weapons had not been accommodated in 
the text. The nuclear weapon states showed no 
interest in giving up their nuclear hegemony. 
, , , ,NATIONAL SECURITY. 
44. DIXIT (J.N). CTBT draft Large gaps and loopholes. 
Indian Express. 64,238; 1996, July, 2; 8. 
The nuclear weapons powers have carried out more 
than two thousand tests since mid-fifties. There is 
confirmed information that nuclear weapons powers 
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have many more designs and drawings for nuclear 
weapons which are being tested. Some have been kept 
in reserve after preliminary tests with weapon 
designers. The politically puzzling point made by the 
Indian delegation in Geneva in late March was that 
India does not believe that the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons is essential for its national security. While 
our worries about the CTBT are principled in political 
terms and valid technologically, the dilemma that we 
face is that of isolation, if we categorically reject 
the CTBT. The solution seems to be to participate in 
the comprehensive test ban process safeguarding to the 
maximum extent possible our nuclear and missile 
security capacities. It is a difficult exercise of 
tight-lope walking no doubt, but has to be undertaken 
because it is relevant to national security which is 
beyond the issue of signing or not signing the CTBT. 
, , , EVALUATION. 
45. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). CTBT Issue - I: Ploy to freeze on 
Unequal Order. Times of India. 159, 33 ; 1996. 
February^?; 10. 
There is considerable debate in this country 
about the comprehensive test bans and strong views 
have been expressed against India acceding to the 
treaty and in favour of it. It is therefore^ 
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desirable to have an overview of the issues involved 
and the present status of the treaty formulation. The 
conference on Disarmament in Geneva with the 
participation of 37 members and in collaboration with 
other nations has formulated a rolling text of the 
draft-treaty. The articles in Part II relate to 
preamble, scope, peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Peaceful nuclear explosion, the organisation for the 
comprehensive test ban including the conference of 
states and the executive council. President Jaques 
Chirac while announcing the end of the current series 
of French tests has asserted that they were necessary 
to ensure the realibility and safety of nuclear 
weapons and for future application of computer 
technology for simulation techniques. Unlike the case 
of NPT, India's accession to the treaty or staying out 
of it will make hardly any difference to the Indian 
deterrent posture. But a basic principle is involved. 
India did not sign the NPT since it was 
discriminatory. The nuclear weapon powers are not even 
prepared to start the process of delegitimisation of 
nuclear weapons by agreeing to a no-first-use 
commitment. 
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, HEGEMONY U.S 
46. CALL THE Bluff. Times of India. 159, 198; 1996, 
Auguat, 20 ', 10. 
The US state department spokesman's unseemly 
outburst on the CTBT - he asked those standing in the 
way of the treaty to get out - is reflective of an 
undemocratic temparament, of course. But« more than 
that it reveals a fear - that the treaty, finalised 
secretively by the nuclear cabals may not survive a 
public debate in the UN General Assembly without 
significant damage. It may be difficult for US 
official to understand that the world is not 
divided into nuclear hegemons and docile nations. It 
should be obvious even to those who usually shut 
their ears to the views of other nations that what has 
been rejected at the level of the secretary of state 
is not going to be revised in response to the bluster 
of middle level officials. India has seen such 
bullying tactics before and has taken them in its 
stride without loosing its cool. One recalls 
President Lyndon Johnson's displeasure with Indira 
Gandhi over her condemnation of the bombing of Vietnam 
and his tectics of keeping the famine stricken 
population of Bihar on ship-to-mouth rations. The 
unexplained mission of USS Enterprise is seared on the 
psyche of Indians. Those were days when the 
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vulnerability of India was far more that what it is 
today. 
, , , INDIA'S ROLE 
47. BIDWAI (Praful). case for a CTBT : India Must Seize 
the Moment. Times of India. 159,11 ; 1996. January, 
12; 10. 
The case for a CTBT arises from its function as 
a nuclear constraint or capping measure. Although it 
is not by itself a disarmament measure, it can 
contribute significantly to disarmament. New Delhi 
should do its best to secure a zero-yield, non-
discriminatory, and verifiable CTBT of indefinite 
duration, which does not permit derogation in the 
"supreme national interest". The present moment is 
critical. It offers India an opportunity to campaign 
for a truly comprehensive ban. If the momentum is 
lost, the treaty might be deferred indefinitely - as 
happened in 1963, 1974, 1977 and 1991 - thanks to 
uncertainties in the NWs! over elections in the US 
and Russia, over the future of European security, and 
over China's military plans. Deferral will set the 
disarmament agenda back by decades and open the 
floodgates to unbridled proliferation. 
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48. CHERIAN (John). Treaty trouble : India and CTBT 
Prospects. Frontline. 13, 14 ; 1996, July, 26; 49-50. 
The global nuclear test ban treaty that was 
widely expected be signed on June 28 will now have to 
wait for at least a couple of months to be ratified. 
India's objection to the CTBT was the main reason for 
the 61-nation conference on Disarmament in Geneva 
being unable to come to an agreement. The new text 
wants a list of 37 countries with international 
monitoring stations, seen as essential for the success 
of the CTBT. On June 26 the chief Indian 
representative informed the C D that India would no 
longer be able "to maintain its offer of CTBT 
monitoring facilities as part of the international 
verification system. The CTBT, many analysts say, was 
only designed to ban nuclear tests, not to bring about 
total global nuclear disarmament. They point out that 
India was the first country to propose a nuclear test 
ban as early as 1954. They also claim that a ban on 
non-explosive laboratory experiments and computer 
simulation would be unverifiable. Signing the CTBT 
would have deprived India of the nuclear option, he 
says, "No signing will help us retain the kind of 
deterence we would like to keep". If India has to opt 
for a hydro-nuclear weapon, then the testing option 
has to be kept open. The loopholes in the treaty will 
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make it easy for the nuclear powers to improve their 
existing stockpile. Dubey is of the opinion that 
ultimately the CTBT will sail through after the 
unanimity clause is amended. 
49. MOHAN (Saumitra). Unravelling the Nuclear Skein : Need 
of an Escape clause. Third Concept. 10, 110-11; 1996, 
April-May ; 19-20. 
Since beginning, India has been an avowed 
champion of the nuclear test ban right since her 
inception and it was infact, India which in the 1950s 
mooted the idea of test ban treaty. India became a 
party to the limited Test ban treaty of 1963 and ^ince 
then has been expausing the need for CTBT. If China 
and Pakistan today sign the CTBT with nuker in their 
armoury India would be virtually jeopaldising her 
security by signing the CTBT. Ergo, India is more than 
justified in not signing the CTBT and rightly demands 
that the CTBT be spliced to complete disarmament if it 
is to be meaninfful and non-discriminatory. The CTBT 
is a real can of worms, a real hot potata and India 
should see to it that it does not burn. Therefore, 
India should tread very cautiously so as not to barter 
away her national interest at the prodding or 
arm-twistings of the self-professed supercop{s) of the 
world. Though many other options could also be 
contemplated, the "Escape clause" proposition also 
needs serious thinking. 
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50. PRINCIPLED STAND. Times of India. 159, 26; 1996, 
January, 30 ;8. 
The claim that CTBT leads to disarmament is 
totally insincere. If the five nuclear weapon powers 
want to stop further testing, they can do so with an 
arms control agreement among themselves and need not 
drag in other nation which are already committed not 
to test. The US is now trying to reopen the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, and no one can be certain 
that a CTBT would stop the US from developing nuclear 
weapons if that suits its interest. A propaganda war 
has recently been initiated that the present Indian 
stand is dictated by the forthcoming parliamentry 
elections, and that India would change its views and 
fall in line. Similar baseless predictions were made 
about India's stand on the NPT too. 
51. SABHERWAL (O.P). CTBT and India: Playing an active 
role. Indian Express. 64,85; 1996, January, 29; 8. 
India's role in the CTBT conference is bound to 
determine its nuclear status. The pact that it plays 
will also have a significant bearing on the fate of 
nuclear disarmament in the international arena. There 
are two cardinal requisites from India" standpoint. 
First, to link the CTBT firmly with nuclear 
disarmament and the concept of phased cuts in nuclear 
stockpiles.Secondly, the recognition of India's weapon capability 
91 
status based on Indigenous nuclear technology develop-
ment. India also needs to mend fences with Japan and 
Germany, Yoked successfully by Washington to its 
projections for the present. The vista of nuclear 
colonialism playing a role in the 21st century cannot 
be attractive to either of the economic giants who 
should be convinced of India's exemplary restraint in 
not building nuclear stockpiles despite its 
capability. 
52. SEPRILL (Michael S). Trouble at the Threshold. Time. 
148,7 ; 1996, August, 12;19. 
After decades of debate, the world is 
tantalizingly close to achieving a comprehensive 
nuclear weapon test ban treaty. So near, and yet so 
far. One country, India stands in the way of 
ratification of the historic agreement. And no amount 
of arm twisting seems likely to change New Delhi's 
mind. Across the table in Geneva, Indian negotiators 
offer three objections to the treaty. First, they 
reject as overly coercive the "entry into force" 
provision that would ban the testing of atomic weapons 
by the superpowers and the "threshold" nations. 
Second, India says signing the treaty would tie its 
hands in responding to threats from its two friendly 
neighbors, Pakistan and China. Third, India is upset 
that the five declared powers would be allowed to 
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keet?. their nuclear arsenals intact. Taking the high 
moral ground, New Delhi insist it will not sign a 
treaty unless it is part if a plan for global nuclear 
disarmament. The treaty supporters last, desparate 
hope is to submit the document to the U.N. in 
September as planned, and they rely on the General 
Assembly to pressure India to change its position. 
53. SINGH (Natwar K). I.K. Gujral and CTBT. Mainstream. 
34, 34 ; 1996, July, 27; 15- 5. 
To counter the misinformation being spread about 
India's final stand on the CTBT, the Minister for 
External Affairs instructed our lady in Geneva on June 
26, 1996 to inform the president of the CD and the 
chairman of the adhoc committee on CTBT negotiations 
that India would no longer be able to maintain its 
offer of CTBT monitoring facilities as part of the 
international verification system. A treaty that will 
check the nuclear weapon states to continue 
developing and refining their nuclear arsenals through 
non-explosive means. The partial test ban treaty only 
pushed testing below the ground. Should we now 
acquiesce in a CTBT under which testing thrives in 
laboratories which are not open to universal 
inspection? More importantly, India wants the CTBT to 
be the first decisive step on the road to total 
nuclear disarmament. This in our judgement can only be 
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achieved of the treaty includes a clear commitment to 
achieving a nuclear weapons free world within a time-
bound framework. 
54. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). CTBT issue : Merely Arms Control for 
Big five. Times of India. 159^ 69; 1996, March,22;10. 
There is an alternative way of looking at the 
treaty in realistic terms. It is only an arms control 
measure among the five nuclear weapon powers to be 
situated in a larger arms control measure - the NPT. 
The nuclear weapon powers are pursuing the CTBT only 
in fulfilment of their obligations to the non-nuclear 
weapon powers for supporting the indefinite and 
unconditional extension of the NPT. If the CTBT is 
recognised as an arms control measure within the 
framework of the NPT India has no obligation to join 
it, since it has not joined the NPT. India can leave 
it to the NPT community to negotiate this arms control 
and not get deeply involved. India did not avail of 
the invitation to be an observer at the NPT extension 
conference but stayed out. The CTBT is good as a 
permanent moratorium on nuclear testing among the 
five nuclear powers. Therefore, there is no reason 
why India should do anything to oppose that 
particular development. A world with a CTBT as an arms 
control measure among the nuclear five is marginally 
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better than one without it. Some have argued that 
India should continue with its efforts to get a 
meaningful disarmament linkage for the CTBT during the 
Geneva negotiations. The sooner India leaves the CTBT 
negotiations the lesser will be the tensions with the 
NPT community since India will not be accused of being 
an obstruction to getting the treaty through. 
55. VENKATESWARAN (A.P). Nuclear test ban - India must 
block treaty. Indian Express. 64, 178; 1996, May,3;8 
India should go beyond mere opposition to the 
US - continued CTB. It must ensure that the major 
powers do not succeed in thrusting a fraudulent and 
unacceptable treaty down the throats of non-nuclear 
nations. India's reasonable requests that in the 
aftermath of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty's 
indefinite extension and the consequent legitimisation 
of the nuclear-weapons monopoly of five states, the 
CTB should at least be moulded in a disarmament frame-
work continue to be contemptuously dismissed. It makes 
no sense for India to permit a spurious CTB to be 
finalised and then be pursued as the prime target 
in spite of its staying out of the treaty. Even more 
self-defeating would be for India to allow such a CTB 
to be concluded not become a signatory and yet not 
test. 
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,INDIA'S STAND, 
56. GUJRAL (I.K). CTBT ; Physician, Heal Thyself. 
Competition Success Review. 33, 03;1996, September;17. 
India has always stood for total nuclear dis-
aramament and taken the resolute stand that any treaty 
or agreement that detracts from this pool proof 
clause would heighten international tension and stoke 
the fires of fear and mutual distrust. India's 
opposition to the extension of the NPT in May 1995 and 
the CTBT has to be seen from this vital angle. The 
hypocrisy and double standards of the nuclear club 
apart, India's stand has also been governed by the 
overall security imperatives in the Indian subconti-
nent. When enlightened self-interest is the lodestar 
in international or bilateral relations, treaties like 
the NPT, for all the pious platitudes it promises, 
becomes a sterile exercise. Yet another striking 
illustration that actions seldom match the sermon on 
the Mount was shown recently when China conducted its 
45th test at lop Nor on July 29, 1996 even as India 
was being put in the dock for its opposition to the 
CTBT in its present form during the ongoing dis-
armament negotiations in Geneva. India believes that 
no country can really be sage or free so long a few 
aerogate to themselves the right to be the policeman 
of the world. Each nation has to defend itself and 
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India too believes that it does not want to compromise 
on its soverignty by surrendering its right to defend 
itself to others, however, powerful they may be. 
57. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Banning Nuclear Tests : Hard 
Decisions in the Making. Times of India. 159,130; 
1996y June, 2;10. 
India, with an overwhelming national consensus 
against signing the CTBT as proposed by the nuclear 
weapon powers, is not in a position to sign the CTBT. 
Indian opposition to CTBT may help the nuclear weapon 
nations to get out of their commitment to sign a CTBT 
(which may not be a true test ban treaty but which 
they have successfully sold to the international 
community as a genuine one) and blame it all on 
India. The treaty provides for the withdrawl of a 
country on the ground of its supreme interests being 
jeopardised. That provision should be invoked by India 
at this stage to stay out of the treaty so that there 
can be no clauses in the treaty which would require 
India's accession and ratification to bring the treaty 
into force. The CTBT is totally worthless in the 
absence of such a system and appropriate preventive 
measures to ensure such transfers do not take place. 
Allegations of technology transfers, whether true or 
not, have been made which highlight the possibility of 
such a threat. There is hardly a week or ten days left 
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for India to act if it is to avoid being dubbed as a 
wrecker and subsequently pressurised, or to face the 
humiliation of acquiescing in a treaty which 
jeopardises its security. 
, , « INDIAN VETO. 
58. CTBT : WEST Plans to bypass Indian Veto. Indian 
Express. 64, 267; 1996, July, 31; 9. 
Western powers, determined to prevent India from 
blocking a landmark global treaty banning nuclear 
tests* are considering a risky diplomatic play that 
could help push though the agreement on the CTBT if 
current talks fail. "It is really the last resort and 
no one wants to do it, but it is a way around the 
problem of how to get the treaty to New York and have 
it opened for signature". Said one Western diplomate. 
The world" declared nuclear powers - the United 
States, Russia, China, France and Britain - Promised 
last year to complete a treaty by the end of 1996. 
Others say that India could be persuaded in the coming 
years that it should sign and ratify the agreement and 
that the immediate priority is to get the treaty 
opened for signature. 
, , ,NATIONAL SECURITY. 
59. SECURITY FIRST. Times of India. 159,140 ; 1996, June, 
13 ;12. 
India has always emphasised that disarmament, 
provided it is universal and non-discriminatory, would 
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enhance the security of all nations. But in a world 
where only a test explosion ban treaty is being 
adopted, and the nuclear weapon pwoers are investing 
heavily in new technologies to develop weapons without 
detectable explosive testing. Lest it be wooded into 
courting disaster, the Government of India would do 
well to bind itself securely with a unanimous 
parliamentary resolution that Indian nuclear and 
missile capabilities are non-negotiable except as part 
of global disarmament. There is also an imperative 
need to convence an all party conference to finalise 
the Indian response to CTBT. 
, , , , INDIA. 
60. SUNDARJI (K). CTBT and National Security : Options for 
India. Indian Express. 64, 151; 1996, April, 6 ; 8. 
The United States CTBT juggernaut is on the 
roll, going by the way the permament extension of the 
NPT was buldozed through, one may expect a similar 
result in the case of the CTBT as well. Most of them 
rest their arguments on the explicit or implicit 
assumption that minimum nuclear deterence apparently 
does not work, why else would the big powers have 
gone in for such a large and varied inventary of 
nuclear weapon system, having received a first strike, 
if we can mount a nuclear attack on five Pakistani or 
10 Chinese cities, the amount of damage would be ample 
99 
for deterrence. Three fission warheads would be 
adequate per city. At the other end of the spectrum 
are critics who claim that while a nuclear deterrent 
might be an essential national security requirement 
for India, the country can not afford the financial 
burden or the societal costs of going nuclear. By 
implication some of them, though in a minority, 
suggest that we could sign the CTBT. 
, , ,NEGOTIATIONS 
61. COHEN (Stephen P). Making sense of CTBT. A late of 
two positions. Indian Express. 64, 284 ; 1996, August, 
17 ; 8. 
As the CTBT was rages, on American academic 
stumbles on two "Secret documents" explaining India's 
position to Washington the US stand to New Delhi. 
CTBT diplomacy has inadvertently produced an opening 
for meaningful dialogue by creating a fourth class of 
"threshold" states. These are friends of ours vAio might 
have to go nuclear India should be pleased to be in 
such good company, by moving closer to us, it can 
influence us, as we can influence it. This is better 
than a "Policy of making faces". Finally, be alert to 
the possibility that someone may be signalling us. 
CTBT negotiations have invented a new category of 
"threshold nuclear states". While it is demeaning to 
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be put in the same category as tiny Israel or hostile 
Pakistan, it appears to be a recognition that we do 
have legitimate security concerns* and need to 
preserve an option. 
62. SUBRAMANIAM (Chitra), CTBT negotiations begin today 
amidst divisions. Indian Express. 64, 79 ; 1996, 
January 23 ;8. 
India has thrown its weight behind calls for a 
treaty that would prohibit, prevent and bind states to 
not carry out any nuclear test explosion which 
releases nuclear energy in any form or type, or any 
other nuclear explosion at any place or environment. 
Indication of how the major powers view the CTBT has 
come in the form of a refusal to set up a parallel 
negotiations aimed at reaching a timetable for 
complete and total disarmament. The nuclear five have 
ignored calls by developing countries, including 
India, to look at the CTBT as one step on the road to 
total disarmament and not an end in itself. A CTBT has 
been as sought after as it has been elusive for the 
past four decades, when India, as early as 1954, 
called for a "Standstill agreement to halt all testing 
of nuclear weapons". This call has been repeated over 
the years and finally took shape in the form of a 
United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted in 
1993. 
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.INDIA'S ROLE 
63. Abraham (Amrita). Test ban negotiations Rethinking 
India's strategy. Indian Express. 64, 127; 1996, 
March, 13;8. 
India's representative, Arundhati Ghose, set out 
two essential conditions for India's approval. One, 
all forms of testing, explosive and non-explosive, 
must be banned. Two, obligations under the CTBT must 
be linked to obligations on the five weapons powers to 
disarm. The US has two interests in the CTBT. It is 
seen as freezing the nuclear status quo between the 
weapons powers and ensuring US supermacy. Secondly, it 
will cap the nuclear programmes of threshold states 
like India and Pakistan which are not signatories to 
the NPT and thereby prevent the unravelling of the 25 
year-old regime. If India does not sign the CTBT, the 
reality is that the combination of moral and real 
politik factbrs which inhibited if from testing 
weapons in the past will continue to have the same 
force as before. The South Asia Section of the State 
Department, left pretty much to itself in translating 
principle into practical policy, seized on two issues. 
Kashmir where military was rife and non-proliferation 
and concluded the next nuclear theatre would be the 
subcontinent. For the fore seeble future, the best 
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strategy for keeping that option alive is build a 
position of strength a strong economy to underpin 
indigenous technological development and diplomatic 
efforts. More thought should be given in New Delhi to 
exactly what it wants to achieve in Geneva. 
64. SABHERWAL (O.P). India's nuclear achievement : A 
matter of pride. Indian Express. 64, 20 ; 1995, 
November,25 ; 8. 
The underplaying of India's nuclear potential 
must end. The world must be given a full picture of 
the attainments of Indian nuclear institutions and 
the status of our nuclear capability. India has 
nothing to hide. The most important thing is to remove 
the knots of India's nuclear policy. First and 
foremost, the underplaying of India's nuclear policy. 
First and foremost, the underplaying of India's 
nuclear capability must end. The world must be given a 
full picture of the attainments of Indian nuclear 
institutions and the status of India's nuclear 
capability. There are some encouraging signs of New 
Delhi strengthening its stand on the on-going 
negotiations for the CTBT. India has added a 
significant rides for the first time to its support to 
the ban proposal, saying that it be linked with a 
categorical statement for nuclear disarmament by the 
five weapon powers. 
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65. SUBRAHMANYAM (K) . CTBT Negotiations : The case for 
India's withdrawal. Times of India. 159, 56 ; 1996, 
March, 7 ;12. 
It is now abundantly clear that the CTBT will 
not be comprehensive universally applicable or a step 
towards disarmament. Even the claim of the nuclear 
weapons powers and their camp followers that it will 
prevent new NWs from emerging has been disproved. The 
CTBT died along with the NPT when US defence 
secretary William Perry announced in his speech to the 
national defence college that China has been 
transferring nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan. 
Most of the non-nuclear nations realise that the CTBT 
is not a meaningful document so far as they are 
concerned since they have already committed 
themselves not to test weapons through their 
membership of the NPT. Therefore, finally the document 
will be adopted as the five nuclear weapon powers 
decide to agree upon.Therefore, India should declare 
the CTBT has no meaning in the light of the new 
developments. Since the NPT has been indefinitely and 
unconditionally extended there is no possibility of 
repairing the breaches of Articles I and III of the 
Treaty. In any case the breach of Articles I and III 
of the NPT, and consequent loss of purpose of the 
CTBT are of immediate relevance to Indian security 
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since that transaction has taken place between two of 
India's nuclear neighbours. In these circumstances 
India should withdraw from the CTBT negotiations after 
citing these reasons. India, by living the CTBT on 
such grounds, will set itself apart from the other two 
nuclear weapon capable powers, Israel and Pakistan. 
Such a move will focus international attention on the 
loopholes in the so called non-proliferation regime. 
, , , PROBLEMS 
66. MAJESTIC VETO : CTBT falls apart, test ban may not 
hold. Indian Express. 64, 284*, 1996, August 17, 8;8. 
India's 'no' at Geneva puts an end to any 
prospect of a universal test ban treaty. Although the 
US and some other countries intend to take the next to 
the UN General Assembly, whatever emerges from there 
will not be the same thing. Even if the draft treaty 
wins a majority vote, it will lack the kind of 
legitimacy that would come out of a consensus of 
negotiating countries at the conference on 
disarmament. India's tough stance has been welcomed as 
an assertion of its right to think and act 
independently. The Christopher formula for India came 
close to swaying some minds and is very likely to be 
pressed harder. It was a sound decision to reject it 
the first time and to do so on the same grounds again. 
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if necessary, even though Washington is prepared to 
commit itself in writing to the promise contained in 
the formula. Until the end it was uncertain whether 
China would go along with the draft CTBT and it took 
concessions from the US as well as the EIF to bring 
Beijing round. Without that fundamental change no 
amount of tinkering can change India's mind. The 
question that will concern India when, as seems 
inevitable, no treaty emerges from Geneva, is : will 
the five-power informal moratorium on nuclear testing 
hold? That gain from two years of negotiations should 
not slip away. 
, , , ,REAPPRAISAL, INDIA'S STAND 
67. STATEMENT : CALL for Reappraisal of Indian stand on 
CTBT Negotiations at Geneva. Mainstream. 34,33; 1996, 
July, 2 0;6. 
The adjournment of the UN CD without finalising 
a CTBT offers India a unique opportunity to preasses 
its stand and contribute positively to completing a 
significant nuclear restraint measure which Nehru 
Poineered 42 years ago. It would be tragic if India 
is seen to be negatively disposed towards a treaty it 
itself pioneered and has long canvassed for. If the 
CTBT talks fail, the post-cold war momentum towards 
nuclear restraint would be undermined, and even 
existing arms-control agreements could unravel. 
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New Delhi must discharge the moral and political 
responsibility it proudly assumed in 1954, by securing 
a good CTBT through a constructive, consensual 
approach. 
, , ,NEW DRAFT, PROVISIONS, INDIAN'S STAND 
68. BALACHANDARAN (G). New Draft of CTBT:Threatens India, 
Times of India. 159,173 ; 1996, July, 22 ; 10. 
The current text of the CTBT has been circulated 
by the CD Chairman, Mr. Jap Ramaker, for 
consideration by the various governments. Earlier, 
last month India had made it categorically clear that 
it would not sign a CTBT which did not have a time-
bound nuclear disarmament plan. The first draft of the 
CTBT had made Indian ratification of the treaty a 
precondition for its EIF. Now the concept 
international peace and security is one which is of 
central significance for the system of the UN Charter. 
Article 11 and Article 39 both make explicit 
references to international peace and security. The 
CTBT is not the end of the road. It is going to be 
followed by the fissile material cut-off treaty. 
Since, it is unlikely that India will agree to sign 
that in the absence of any provision for a time-bound 
nuclear disarmament, those in favour of a 
confrontation with India, will include in that treaty 
as well, an EIF article that will mak , Indian 
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radification mandatory. It is therefore, all the more 
better that India forces the issue right now. 
, , ,NUCLEAR TEST, CHINA 
69. BHASKAR (Uday C). Chinese N-test CTBT and India's 
Security dilemma. Times of India. 159,140; 1996, 
June, 13 ; 13. 
China's nuclear test conducted last Saturday and 
the CTBT deliberations currently in their last lap in 
Geneva have a symbiotic linkage that may offer some 
cues in managing India's complex nuclear dilemma. 
They bring into sharp focus the insecurity index of 
the declared nuclear powers in the post-cold war 
world and their attempts at attaining a sense of 
adequacy by imposing or resisting global regimes and 
treaties. The present geo-political environment has a 
few significant characteristics. China's 
reservations about nuclear and missile regimes stem 
from this quest and is in keeping with the pattern of 
complex and contradictory strategic engagement that 
characterises the Sino US relationship. With every 
degree of improvement in the chines capability, this 
coercive index increases whether India acknowledges it 
or not. The manner in which the major powers are 
defining and attaining security adequacy in a post-
cold war world where the nuclear weapon still remains 
a prized clausewitzian currency of power. A pointer 
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to the task is available in the Chinese Olympic 
training village outside kumming where a banner 
exhorts the athletes. 
70. CHINESE CHALLENGE. Times of India. 159,137 ; 1996, 
June, 10 ; 10. 
The Chinese test is an explicit reminder that 
far from being over, the nuclear arms race has 
entered a new phase. What the nuclear weapon powers 
have alone is to rationalise their arsenal, eliminate 
their obsolete weapons and reduce the highly risky, 
forward-deployed tactical weapons. The US has offered 
to share with China computer based technology for 
testing reliability and operationality of nuclear 
weapons. China should be aware that this would be a 
restricted exercise and it would get only the 
technology US choose to transfer, china is also fully 
aware that the real purpose of the US' s efforts to 
develop ballistic missile defence system - despite the 
US's efforts to develop ballistic missile defence 
system - despite the US's claim that it is intended 
only to defend the US and its allies against nuclear 
missile threats of rogue states - is to degrade 
China's deterrent capability vis a vis the US. 
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71. ONE MORE Provocation. Times of India. 159,180; 1996, 
July, 30;10. 
The Chinese nuclear test on the morning of the 
resumed meeting of the 61-nation committee on 
Disarmament in Geneva sends out several messages. The 
preplanned provocation show's China's utter contempt 
for the deliberations of the committee. At the same 
time, China, by declaring that it will be pining the 
test moratorium of the other four nuclear weapon 
powers, has deprived the sponsors of the CTBT of any 
compulsion to conclude the treaty urgently. Since that 
is their wish there is no need to worry as many of us 
do about the consequences of our rejection of the 
present draft. Since all five nuclear weapon powers 
are now agreed on a moratorium, heavens will not fall 
because of India's rejection. It is now a test of the 
bonafides of nuclear weapon powers to have a nuclear 
test explosions ban treaty. 
, , , OPTIONS 
72. CHITNIS (S.G). CTBT and India's options. Daksh. 1,1; 
19 96, July; 13- 6. 
India had proposed the CTBT in 1954 "Standstill 
Agreement" as a disarmament measure and also as an 
environmental measure for stopping atmospheric 
pollution with radio-active fall out. CTBT as 
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originally mooted was a disarmament measure, leading 
to phenomenal vertical nuclear proliferation and 
selective horizontal proliferation. Its purpose is to 
foreclose the nuclear option the undeclared NWS. 
During the last 25 years the NPT was violated by the 
NWS on a massive scale leading to the NWS hegemoney on 
the nuclear option of NNWS. The NPT is a futile treaty 
with no safeguards against NWS breaching the treaty 
obligation. It is predicted that India will play a 
major role in the coming century, not only in Asian 
politics but also in politics involving the Third 
World countries. It gets a seat in the security 
council it will gain in World status. Not signing the 
NPT may be overlooked provided she does not carry out 
a nuclear test in the near future. Some experts favour 
signing the CTBT, at best, getting an assurance from 
NWs to discuss elimination of nuclear weapons. They 
consider that this would improve Indias bargaining 
strength in many areas. Instead of reacting from time 
to time to the stances of the NWs specially the U.S., 
India's nuclear policy should be based on short term 
as well as long term strategic perceptions and should 
respond to the challenges in adequate measure. 
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,TREATY, NON-PROLIFERATION AND COMPREHENSIVE 
TEST BAN, OPTIONS. 
73. MENON (Raja). India and the Bomb - III ; Limits to 
make believe options. Times of India. 159, 18 ; 1996, 
January, 20 ; 10. 
India never had a nuclear weapon policy upto 
1994. It probably still doesn't. But this 
non-existent policy has to be defended because the 
weapon states have demanded an Indian signature on the 
NPT and CTBT. In the current shadow play, the 
strategically-minded are grapping with the various 
options available, to select one that is best suited 
for country. India today has a nuclear bomb 
capability but no delivery systems, although there is 
a school which believes that even a camel or bullock 
cart is a delivery system is to detonate a nuclear 
device on the other side of the border. When in actual 
fact, the objectives is to own such a fool proof and 
credible delivery system that the enemy is deterred. 
Today, neither Pakistan nor India possess credible 
nuclear weapon systems. Today India cannot field a 
force of missle firing submarines that remain on 
patrol in a near continuous relay. It has launched a 
missile from under water, it has not married a nuclear 
propulsion reactor to a submarine hall, although it is 
reported that both tasks have been independently 
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achieved. Unless and untill the country's technolo-
gical base is capable of doing all this, a nuclear 
capability is only a waste of money. 
,DISARMAMENT, TREATY-COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, 
POLITICS 
74. BIDWAI (Praful). Delegitimising N-Weapons : Middle 
Ground 'Must Asserritself'. Times of India. 159,204; 
1996, August, 27; 10. 
The present CTBT is a significant restraint 
measure. or else, a large chunk of the US establish-
ment, represented by the Republicans - who control 
congress - won't stoutly oppose it. They oppose 
precisely because they fear the CTBT will impede the 
perpetuation of US hegemony not further it. There is 
a strong, tight connection, between New Delhi's 
"external" stance on the CTBT and its "internal" 
accommodation to hawkish pressures for extending the 
option. It is not an accident that there is greatly 
increased, vissible convergence on the CTBT and 
blocking between the BJP and the government and 
between it and other political parties. given that 
the BJP is the only Indian party to demand overt 
nuclearisation, this degree of convergence is 
distressing. They should insist that India must never 
conduct a test, but simultaneously demand an 
indefinitely long moratorium on test from all states -
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whatever happens to the present CTBT - and take the 
intiative for further multilateral restraint and 
disarmament. In promoting this agenda, "middle ground" 
moderates will realise that their real allies are not 
supernationalist hawks and arms-restraint opponents, 
but those who demand rapid systematic movement 
towards a nuclear weapons-free world, free of the 
convoluted logic of deterrence. 
75. SUBRAHMANYAM (K) . Nuclear Disarmament". No Place in 
Weapon Power's Future Plans. Times of India. 159,182; 
1996, August, 1 ; 10. 
Western propaganda which has successfully 
influenced large sections of the world's population, 
including a significant number intellectuals in 
developing countries, would have us all believe that 
the end of the cold war has led to considerable 
progress in disarmament and that we are moving 
steadily towards the ultimate goal of the total 
elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. The 
indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-
proliferation Treaty was the enforced acknowledgment 
extorted from the international community on the 
hegemonism of nuclear weapon powers over the rest of 
the world and legitimisation of their nuclear 
arsenals. The CTBT is yet another step to make the 
international community pay obeisance to the 
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overlordship of the nuclear weapon powers and swear 
their own perpetual servitude to the nuclear five. 
, , , PROBLEMS 
76. BIDWAI (Praful). CTBT and Weapons Option ; Nuclear 
Policy in a Mess. Times of India. 159, 108 ; 1996, 
May 7 ;10. 
Most of the current arguments against the CTBT 
are mistaken. Broadly, these fall into three 
categories. First, the CTBT today, unlike in 1954 or 
even in 1993 when India co-sponsored a motion with the 
US urging a CTBT. Without mentioning nuclear 
disarmament - will be unequal and discriminatory, and 
aimed at horizontal* rather then vertical, prolife-
ration. Second the NWSs in particular the western 
ones, are so technologically advanced that they don't 
need to test. And third, detection of clandertine 
tests by the NWSs will be virtually impossible under 
the verification system proposed. Will the CTBT lead 
to an elimination of India's weapons option? 
Whatever the US's stated objectives, and however 
questionable, the CTBT is not an effective means of 
achieving them. It will not commit India to 
degrading, leave alone rolling back, its capability, 
any more then it would compel the US to do so. This is 
not to argue that India should play a passive role at 
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Geneva and blindly sign any treaty that comes ftlong. 
On the contrary, it should try to secure a bonafide 
zero-yield treaty with tough verification, and a 
preambular commitment to complete nuclear disarmament. 
77. BIDWAI (Praful). Test ban : India, China isolated. 
Times of India. 159, 41 ; 1996, February, 16 ; 11. 
There is growing clarify among delegates at the 
UN CD that the function of a CTBT is what of a 
restraint measure which discourages horizontal and 
vertical proliferation and generates momentum towards 
nuclear disarmament. India's ammendments linking the 
CTBT with time-bound nuclear disarmament have very few 
takers. Although New Delhi's concern with time-bound 
disarmament may be genuine, many states also believe 
the proposal is a device to keep its own nuclear 
option open. The linkage and India's move to get a 
G-21 resolution passed calling for CD negotiations on 
"nuclear disarmament", are seen as indicating a 
certain posture or intent. Besides scope and linkage, 
a major divise issue is on-site inspections. The 
western states demand on-site inspections. Which are 
triggered by international monitoring system - to 
detect dandestive nuclear explosions - and 
intelligence gathered by spy satellite^, and which do 
not need prior approval of the CTBT Secretariat. Most 
G-21 countries and China strongly oppose this and want 
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no on-site inspection unless authorised by the 
Secretariat. Russia and China also differ on the 
monitoring of certain test sites. However, there is a 
high likelihood of these being resolved. 
78. DATTA (Savita). A comprehensive test ban problems and 
prospects. Indian Defence Review. 10, 1 ; 1995, 
January-March ; 21- 5. 
It was in 1954 that India's first Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a 'standstill' agreement on 
nuclear testing. A ten-megaton U.S test in the South 
Pacific, which killed a Japanese fisherman and forced 
the evacuation of the population of Rongelap Atoll, 
inspired this response from him. Worldwide concern 
about the nuclear fallout brought the subject of a 
test ban on the centre stage once again. In 1955 as 
part of a programme for global denuclearization, the 
Soviet Union put forward the proposal for a 
comprehensive Test Ban. The UN General Assembly 
considered the question in 1957. 
The adhoc committee of the CD was directed by 
the conference "to negotiation intensively a universal 
and multimaterally and effectively verifiable 
comprehensive nuclear test ban traty, which would 
contribute effectively to the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. 
117 
to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to 
the enhancement of international peace and security. 
Any treaty text which does not fulfill this 
mandate would not constitute a step foreward. It would 
be an exercise in fertility. 
79. SIMPSON (Dian G). Nuclear testing limits I Problems 
and Prospects. Survival. 33, 6 ; 1991, November-
December; 500- 16. 
Efforts to reduce nuclear testing reached to the 
heart of the nuclear debate. Recently a compre-
hensive test ban has again been advocated by some 
members of the arms-control community. An examination 
of previous efforts to limit nuclear testing, the 
current status of the CTBT issues and the 
recommendations for further limitations and their 
effects on existing testing programmes suggest that 
additional limitations could be implemented which 
would permit maintenance of credible nuclear 
deterrence and still demonstrate support for ending 
the nuclear arms race. A partial reduction in the 
yield threshold combined with a reduction in the 
number of annual tests could serve both ends and 
satisfy both opponents of and those working towards a 
CTB. 
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80. SUBRAHMANYAM (K) . India's Nuclear Policy: Official 
Inertia Weakers Position. Times of India. 158,259 ; 
1995, November 24;12. 
The UN General Assembly is at present 
considering a number of resolutions on the nuclear 
issue. The international court of justice has just 
concluded hearings on tne legality of the use and 
threat of use of nuclear weapons and the US 
authorities are stepping up their campaign on the 
conclusion of a CTBT designed to fulfill their 
paroctical goals. In these circumstances, the Indian 
nuclear policy makers are faced with the difficult 
problem of formulating a strategy which will continue 
to allow India to take the high moral ground against 
nuclear weapons and support their total elimination. 
India's problem is compounded by the fact that 173 
nations, including over 100 non-aligned, have adjured 
their nuclear options while at the same time 
legitimising these weapons in the hands of five 
nuclear weapons powers. Nuclear capability is a much 
wider term than nuclear weapons and includes the use of 
radiological agents. Recently, the UN team checking on 
Iraq disclosed that it had plans for using such 
agents. India will have to make clear that it will not 
sign a CTBT unless all facilities of nuclear weapon 
powers are shut down and there is an international 
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verification regime to ensure that there will be no 
hydronuclear and other sophisticated testing. India is 
in reality like most other non-nuclear weapon states 
on the nuclear issue. The forthcoming session of the 
parliament provides one more test in this regard for 
the ruling and opposition parties. 
, , .SECURITY, MEASURES 
81. SINGH (Jasjit). CTBT and Security Needs :Persistence 
will play. Indian Express. 64,222; 1996, June, 16;12. 
The treaty must have an unambiguous linkage 
with commitment to disarmament. This could have been 
done with parallel negotiations. But the weapon states 
have not allowed the process to start. Among the three 
nuclear-capable states (India, Israel and Pakistan) 
India alone has carried out a nuclear explosive test. 
This was completely successful in relation to the 
forecast of parameters and results. The 1974 test at 
Pokhran had a yield similar to the Hiroshima Bomb. 
Building an arsenal of similar devices does not 
necessarily require further testing although it should 
be seen as desirable. In the final analysis, the 
worlds needs a good CTBT and India, that has sought 
one for than four decades, must remain in the 
forefront to ensure we have a treaty without loopholes 
and with effective international verification system. 
120 
, , , , , INDIA 
82. SUBRAMANYAM (K). CTBT is a trap for India. Times of 
India. 159, 145 ; 1996, June, 19 ; 10. 
The U.S administration, which is anxious not to 
risk its vital trade links with China by sanctions 
being triggered off under the U.S laws, is likely to 
continue to maintain that it is not in a position to 
make a firm finding on the M-11 missiles being 
deployed in Pakistan. The U.S administration chooses 
not to arrive at findings which do not suit its 
interests. This kind of "transparency" may pass muster 
with the U.S congress, the U.S media and academics, 
but we in India need to make an objective assessment 
as our interests are affected by such transactions. 
There is no need for Pakistan to test if it were to 
get fully tested weapons from China. The CTBT is, 
therefore, a dangerous trap for India and those who 
are asking India to accede to it do not care very much 
for India's security interests. 
, , , SIGNING, INDIA'S DILEMMA. 
83. DIXIT (J.N). Signing the C T B T ; The Indian dilemma. 
Indian Express. 64, 65 ;1996, January, 9 ; 8. 
Since the indefinite extension of the nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty, the focus of attention of 
Indian Public opinion and of security and disarmament 
experts has been on the next item on US's agenda on 
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non-proliferation. Should India abjore its 
established capacity to acquire deterrent strategic 
nuclear power or give some proof that our potentia-
lities are not just conceptual claims, but are 
operationally concrete? There are reports that there 
would be punitive clauses in the proposed CTBT which 
would apply even to countries which do not sign the 
CTBT, if they conduct nuclear tests after the CTBT 
comes into force. Our attitudes and policies at the 
political level as well as their operational trans-
mutation to our nuclear and missile development 
programmes have to be responsive to parliamentary and 
public opinion in India which as experience has shown, 
is acutely and accurately sensitive about the 
country's security interests. 
, , , INDIA'S STAND 
84. BHASKAR (Uday C). India and the Bomb-I^, The Anxiety of 
Nuclear Subalternity. Times of India. 159,16; 1996, 
January, 18 ;10. 
The need for India to sign the comprehensive 
nuclear test ban CTBT has once again come to the force 
and the proponents insist that 'national interest' 
lies in signing on the dotted line in October 1996. 
The START-related reduction in the global nuclear 
arsenal and the permanent extension of the NPT are 
often interpreted as major disarmament measures and 
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the CTBT is similarly packaged. Some fresh thinking 
and a reappraisal of extant nuclear theology is 
vissible in non-governmental quarters in the west and 
this is a welcome development. But the time lay 
between the aspiration for a non-nuclear and its 
implementation is many decades away. Prudence warrants 
that India weigh its options carefully and calibrate 
its responses. Indian vision of the long term core 
interest must translate into a posture that is neither 
confrontational nor differential but conforms to the 
tenet that power recognises and respects power. 
85. MATTOO (Amitabh). India did the Right thing at 
Geneva. Times of India. 159,150 ; 1996, June, 5; 10. 
Even those who have been fierce cities of 
India's nuclear policy and disarmament diplomacy in 
the past will find reason to support New Delhi's 
present stance at Geneva. Indeed, anyone who has been 
following the negotiations at the CD closely would 
have realised that there was virtually no interest of 
the country that could be served by acceding to the 
current draft of the treaty. The CTBT and a FMCT 
represent the only real chance that anyone has of 
extracting a commitment to disarm from the nuclear 
powers. Even India's ammendments to the rolling test 
of the treaty seemed farfetched. For instance, the 
Indian draft language on entry into force wanted the 
nuclear powers to commit themselves to the attainment 
of the goal of total elimination of all nuclear 
weapons within a well defined time framework (ten 
years). What India must do now is to put forward a 
serious, well considered, negotiating plan of 
disarmament even while insisting as Mr. Salman Haider, 
the foreign secretary, put it, that India does not 
believe that "the acquisition of nuclear is essential 
for national security". 
86. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). India and CTBT : Straregy Beyond 
Dissociation. Times of India. 159,149; 1996, June, 
24;10. 
India's stated position that it will not sign the so 
called CTBT was intended to test the sincerity of the 
nuclear weapon powers on their commitment to the 
treaty. By announcing its intention some eight 
days in advance. India has given notice that it 
should not be included in the list of countries which 
are to sign and ratify the treaty to bring it into 
force. The Indian approach has always been reactive. 
India did not thinl through the full security 
implications of the CTBT earlier. Now it is necessary 
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to have a proactive approach and deliberate and decide 
the steps that should follow. Alternatively India may 
register its protest and declare that it has no 
intention to sign and ratify the CTBT if and when a 
consensus is declared. Thereafter, India may not sign 
the treaty. The third alternative open to India 
if the clause is forced as it is to declare itself 
a nuclear weapon power on the basis of its test 
explosion of 1974. If India were to communicate 
that it is prepared to face all possible contingencies 
and is not unduly perturbed about the vague threat 
of its being isolated. 
,NONCOOPERATION. 
87. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Nuclear Imperialism : A Gandhian 
Response to NPT and CTBT. Times of India. 159,214; 
1996, January, 24; 10. 
Gandhi discovered non-cooperation as the best 
answer to colonialism. The same holds true today in 
the case of struggle against nuclear weapons. 
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Our basic strategy has to be non-cooperation with 
nuclear imperialism. The non-accession to CTBT is a 
logical extension of India staying out of the NPT, 
especially when nuclear weapons have been sought to 
be legitimised through their indefinite and 
unconditional extension. Therefore, nuclear weapons 
are essentially meant to be used as a currency, of 
power, to dominate and intimidate 'lesser nations'. 
Therefore, the country should think of adopting a 
Gandhian approach of non-cooperation with nuclear 
imperialism and should not accede to the CTBT. 
Generation of a sense of deterrence will be in 
consonance with the tenets of Gandhi but not the first 
use of nuclear capability. While our example should 
generate wider non-cooperation with the imposition of 
nuclear imperial Raj. India should also avoid any 
provocative action or behaviour. 
, , , SIGNING, PROBLEMS. 
88. BALACHANDRAN (G). Why India should sign the CTBT. 
Times of India. 159,151 ; 1996, June, 26 ; 10. 
The stand taken by India on the forthcoming 
CTBT is a classic example of the traditional Indian 
approach to security issues, namely make a grand 
symbolic gestures, meaningless in its content but one 
which gets substantial domestic acclaim and accolades. 
It is now clear that there will be CTBT which will not 
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make any concession to Indian sentiments on global 
timebound nuclear disarmament. It is equally clear 
that India will not sign such a treaty. Indian armed 
forces are not so confident. Therefore, any concept of 
national security that involves the nuclear option, in 
the true sense of a nuclear deterrent must of 
necessity require further tests in the absence of 
such tests there is no Indian option. The CTBT as it 
is proposed now does not in any way compromise such a 
position. It does not in any manner restrict India's 
traditionally accepted concept of 'keeping the options 
open' . By keeping out of the CTBT, India will only 
subject itself to a hostile propaganda campaign 
without gaining anything on the national security 
Front, further to add insult to injury. India's 
absence from the CTBT will not in any manner prejudice 
the objectives of the P-5 in sponsoring a CTBT. In 
any case, the P-5 are no doubt confident that India -
which had not shown any indication or disposition 
towards conducting any nuclear test after the first 
one in 1974, even in the absence of a CTBT. Therefore 
not signing the CTBT gains it nothing except an 
interim period in which it loses by bearing the costs 
of isolation, approbrium, shifting attitudes towards 
Pakistan etc. 
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,THREATS. 
89. SINHA (Sureshward). Nuclear Threats. Times of India. 
159,67 1 1996, March, 20 ; 12. 
It is absolutely essential that smaller and 
cleaner nuclear explosives are tested by us even 
before we even think of offering to sign the CTBT or 
the NPT as nuclear powers. Without such explosives in 
reserve our armed forces would be at a severe 
disadvantage when facing nuclear powers. We must also 
works towards a nuclear define with Pakistan and take 
up the suggestion of the Pakistan Prime Minister for a 
summit on this issue. It needs to be clearly asserted 
that there is no danger of a nuclear war in the sub-
continent, despite the regular howlers issued by 
American officials that such an event nearly took 
place in 1990. We need to understand that the danger 
today is not from a nuclear war with Pakistan but from 
a nuclear war with Pakistan but from a new era of 
neo-nuclear imperialism by the five recognised nuclear 
powers. Upgraded nuclear explosives with us will be a 
deterrent to any future neo-imperialist adventure in 
our region. 
,_ , , US Role 
90. AMERICAN DOUBLETALK. Times of India.158,169 ; 1995, 
July, 17 ;10. 
The U.S administration's thinking on the 
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proposed CTBT now under discussion in the conference 
of disarmament in Geneva, confirms Indian fears about 
the CTBT turning out to be an extension of the 
discriminatory NPT. At this stage it is incumbent on 
the Indian government to make it clear to the 
international community and the Indian public that 
following its logic of not joining the so called NPT 
on the ground of it being discriminatory and not being 
committed to nuclear disarmament India will not 
accede to any so called CTBT which continues to divide 
the world into haves and have nots. It is time 
parliament demanded and obtained by a firm declaration 
from the government that India will have nothing to do 
with a discriminatory treaty which pretends to 
enforce a comprehensive test ban. 
91. NAMBOODIRIPAD (E.M.S). Resisting the CTBT : Imperialist 
pressures will intensify. Frontline. 13,18 ; 1996, 
September, 7-20 ;108- 9. 
There has been immense pressure exerted on the 
Government of India by the United States isolated 
India in the World Community.The reaction of the major 
nuclear power, the United States, was typical of the 
country which has ambitions of dominating the world. 
The U.S. contends that the elimination of the 
existing pile of nuclear arms is not practical. If 
that is so, says India, the application of its ban 
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treaty to non-nuclear powers is not practical. India 
was one of the first countries that demanded 
universal disarmament, nearly four decades ago. India 
still sticks to the demand but, as a soverign nation. 
It has an inherent right to acquire the know how of 
nuclear arms so long as the five nuclear powers refuse 
to part with their huge pile of nuclear arms. U.S. 
warned India that it would have to "Pay a Price" for 
not "falling in line" with the U.S. dominated "World 
community". It is clear that the Ifevel of pressure 
exerted on India before it voted the CTBT will not 
only continue but will be intensified in the coming 
days. It is clear now that if India refuses to be 
cowed down by the threats and pressures exerted by the 
U.S. led nuclear powers, the people of India will 
have to undergo suffering as their sisters and 
brothers in other countries did when they stood up 
against a single aggressive power or a combination of 
aggressive powers. 
92. NUCLEAR BARGAIN. Times of India. 158,195 ; 1995, 
August, 16 ;10. 
President Clinton's decision to rule out small 
nuclear tests advocated by U.S weapon lobbies as a 
mean to carry out checks on safety and reliability 
of the existing nuclear arsenal, will significantly 
advance the prospects for concluding a CTBT in 1996 as 
promised by the nuclear weapon powers during the NPT 
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Extension Conference in May, 1995. The nuclear weapon 
countries have large arsenals of adequate sophistica-
tion, and have carried out enough tests and 
accomulated enough data to further weapon design 
through computer simulation and laboratory testing. In 
this context, there is no reason for India to appland 
President Clinton's decision as a significant 
contribution to further the cause of disarmament. The 
CTBT is likely to be a non-event, as many other 
earlier arms control treaties which agreed on 
circulating measures which in any case no nation had 
any intention of adopting, such as placing nuclear 
weapons on celestial bodies, in Antartica or on the 
sea bed. Today the U.S. is more keen on a CTBT that 
India. 
, , TREATY - CUT OFF, FISSILE MATERIAL 
PRODUCTION. 
93. BERHOOT (Fran). Cut off in the production of fissile 
material. International Security. 19,3 ;1994, Winter; 
167-202. 
A treaty to prohibit the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons is now under negotiation 
in the conference of Disarmament in Geneva. The aim is 
to produce a treaty which is universal, non-discri-
minatory and verifiable, and which would therefore 
reinforce the international nuclear non-proliferation 
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regime. However, a number of problems concerning the 
scope, and the technical and political feasibility of 
a treaty remain to be resolved. The alternative 
preferred by most nuclear weapon states a non 
retrospective treaty which allows the production of 
fissile materials under safequards may not acceptable 
to many other states since it is seen as freezing 
existing inventories. Verification of a cut off treaty 
is technically feasible and would be based on existing 
nuclear safeguards, but the high costs of verification 
may be regarded by many states as incommensurate with 
the marginal benefits of a treaty. Finally, it is not 
clear that a sufficient number of undeclared weapon 
states will want to become parties to a cut off 
treaty. 
, , TREATY-NON PROLIFERATION . 
94. ACTON (Philip), CROWE (Simon). Arms control and the 
non-proliferation Treaty : how secure is the treaty? 
Arms Control. 11, 1; 1990, May; 60- 8. 
The nature of the rel\ationship between security, 
arms control and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 
is at the heart of an appraisal of the effectiveness 
of the NPT. Arms control, of which the NPT is a part, 
seek to enhance the security of the participants, yet 
at the same time takes no account of the differing 
132 
concepts of security to which parties and non-parties 
adhere. The NPT addresses two concepts of security. 
Firstly as a collateral security measure and secondly 
as the basis for a collective security regime. It 
fails to take account however of those states which 
either refuse to sign or which despite signing, 
believe that their security would be enhanced by 
nuclear proliferation. The NPT is recognised as a 
unique incremental arms control measure, providing the 
foundation for a wide reacting non-proliferation 
regime focusing on issues outside the traditional 
conception of what an arms control measure should 
address. 
95. AKHTAR MAJEED. NPT Disarming the Unarmed. Times of 
India. 158,30; 1995, February, 4;12. 
The NPT is of major concern only to a limited 
number of countries which are using nuclear energy for 
peaceful or military purpose. The rest are not 
particularly bothered about the loopholes or 
injustice of this system. The majority is, thus, 
unlikely to mind going alongwith the NPT regime. The 
treaty is based on the presumption that the technical 
divide between peaceful and military uses of nuclear 
energy can be defended by a regime of safeguards. 
The very first article of the treaty, prohibit the 
transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive 
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devices and forbids the nuclear weapons or nuclear 
explosive devices and forbids the nuclear weapon 
states to assist other acquire such weapons or 
devices. Yet the treaty has not defined what a 
nuclear weapon is, while it prohibits non-nuclear 
weapon nations from conducting tests, the treaty does 
not define "nuclear explosive devices". The treaty 
overlooks the fact that a large civilian nuclear 
programme is really not required for a country to 
acquire nuclear weapons. There is no check in this 
system on the transfer of nuclear material from a 
non-nuclear weapons. State to a nuclear-weapons state. 
International security is more in danger because of a 
possible loss of control over nuclear arsenals than 
because of the possible acquisition of such weapons by 
threshold states. What is needed is an international 
convention on the prohibition of the use or the threat 
to use nuclear weapons, a CTBT and an undertaking by 
the threshold states not to cross the threshold, with 
a corresponding obligation by nuclear weapons states 
to gradually and expeditiously eliminate their nuclear 
arsenals. 
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96. CHELLANEY (Brahma). India's disarmament Policy * Focus 
on nuclear 'haves'. Indian Express. 63, 325 ; 1995, 
September, 25;8. 
The NPT's indefinite extension has fundamentally 
changed the world's strategic landscape by 
legitimising the weapons of holocaust and bolstering a 
security order pivoted on a five-nation nuclear 
monopoly. Disarmament has more than ever became a 
chimera, with the renewed French and Chinese nuclear 
testing helping to unmask the rhetoric. India needs to 
overhaul its disarmament policy to ensure that its 
support for new global measures does not mean 
acquiescene in a regime that sanctions nuclear weapons 
as lawful instruments of war. India cannot retains 
positions that are out of sync with its national 
interests or imply acceptance of the now permanent 
nuclear apartheid. The fissile cut-off and CTB 
together will ensure that India never emerges with 
full-fledged nuclear capabilities. It will be left 
with a Rudimentary capability which, while adequate 
against Pakistan, will buy it dubious deterrence 
against China and no protection against the kind of 
nuclear blackmail and threat if faced in 1971. 
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97. GOLDBLAT (Jozef). NPT and Nuclear Weapon free zones. 
Arms Control. 11, 1; 1990, May; 49-59. 
The 1968 NPT encourages the establishment of 
nuclear weapon-free zones in different regions of the 
world. Only one such regional arrangement has been 
concluded since the NPT entered into force - the 1985 
treaty of Rartonga establishing the South Pacific 
nuclear-free zone. The treaty of Rertonger is 
patterned after the treaty of Tlatelolco prohibiting 
Nuclear weapons in Latin America - which was signed 
before the NPT. The treaties are similar in this 
essential provisions. There are, nevertheless, 
several important dissimalarities. The treaty of 
tlatelolco covers a considerably wider geographical 
area and provides for more stringent measures of 
verification then the treaty of Rartonga. However 
the latter, unlike the former, has unambigiously 
banned nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and 
has thereby eliminated a dangerous loophole. Neither 
zones set up by these international instruments can be 
considered as nuclear-weapon Proof, as each treaty 
permits transit of nuclear weapons through areas 
formally denuclearized. 
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98. NARAYANAN (K.R). Indian and NPT. Economic Times. 31, 
190; 1991, September, 10;8. 
India has demanded that there should be substantial 
progress in nuclear disarmament globally before we 
sign the NPT. It has also held that a nuclear-free 
zone should not be an arbitrarily chosen area but a 
strategically integral region. This is not merely 
repetitive sloganeering. It is a product of India's 
geopolitical situation and the facts of power in the 
Asia Pacific region. As regards India's nuclear 
policy, it has been clear right from the start of its 
independent existence. As early as 1946, Mr. Nehru 
had stated that India will use atomic power for 
"constructive purposes" only but if India is 
threatened, she inevitably try to defend herself by 
all means at her disposal. This nuclear option has 
not been closed, but even 17 years after India 
demonstrated its nuclear capability through its 
peaceful explosion, it has not become an atomic 
weapons - power. There could be no greater proof of 
its nuclear intentions. India has not been sitting 
brooding darkly over its nuclear capability but 
engaged, from the time of Mr. Nehru, in the pursuit of 
nuclear disarmament with passion and sincerity. 
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99. NUCLEAR CHICANERY. Indian Express. 63,230*, 1995, 
June, 22;8. 
India's contention that Nuclear Non-proli-
feration Treaty gives nuclear weapons powers the 
licence to multiply their weapons of mass destruction 
has been proved right twice over within a month of the 
treaty being extended indefinitely. Scarcely was the 
ink dry on undertakings to exercise the utmost 
restraint in weapons testing than China carried out 
yet another underground test and France broke a three-
year moratorium by announcing a series of eight tests 
between this year and next in the south pacific. A 
CTBT is being undermined or made completely redundant 
in other ways too, including moves, reportedly, to 
exclude low-yield weapons testing from the ban. In 
that event, or because progress in laboratory testing 
will obviate any need to carry out actual physical 
tests, what has been promoted as an essential part of 
the architecture of disarmament will be a hollow shom. 
, , , CHALLENGES 
100. BERI (Ruchita). Challenge of Proliferation and the 
existing control regimes. Strategic Analysis. 16,10; 
1994, January; 1277- 89. 
The Non-proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone 
of the present non-proliferation system, signed in 
1968 by 62 nations, it came into force only in 1970. 
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The NPT is being treated as successful, for it seems 
to have achieved its original purpose of reducing 
nuclear proliferation to the minimum. Since the treaty 
entered into force, not one country has openly 
acquired and deployed nuclear arsenals. There has 
however been a fourfold increase in the number of 
nuclear warheads by the nuclear weapon states. The 
nuclear weapon states have created a discriminatory 
regime. They become advocates of non-proliferation 
after they themselves acquire nuclear weapons. The 
same sort of discrimination appears in the missile 
technology control regime, the current system that 
controls the spread of ballistic missiles. The 
ballistic missiles technology is denied to the 
developing states so that the industrial states can 
maintain their technological superiority to counter 
potential threats from the south. There is now an 
urgent need to look beyond these discriminatory 
control regimes, changes in ideas governing the use 
and usability of nuclear weapons would be important 
steps in this direction. 
101. DIXIT (J.N). India and NPT : The Challenges ahead. 
Indian Express. 63,207; 1995, May, 30;8. 
Four out of five nuclear weapons states, (except 
China), led by the U.S not only object to vote by 
secret ballot, but they did not want any voting at 
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all. They wanted the treaty extended by 'consensus'. 
The majority of the participants objected to open 
voting because they candidly articulated their 
apprehension that if they openly cast votes against 
indefinite extension. They would be subjected to 
puritive measures by the nuclear weapons states and 
advanced countries. India should continue to keep its 
nuclear options open. Tactical flexibility will be 
needed to interact with the nuclear powers to meet o^ ^^  
needs along with strategic firmness about an national 
security requirements. China conducted a major nuclear 
test with a week of the NPT being extended. He wonder 
what would have happened if India conducted a test a 
couple of days before the treaty was extended. There 
would have been a political and economic fall out 
creating some difficulties for India. But if we have 
national consensus India will have the resilience to 
meet these difficulties. The question is can we walk 
alone on this path towards securing our future. 
, , , COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, POLITICS^ 
INDIA'S STAND. 
102. SAHAY (Anand K). PM defence of missiles has gone 
unnoticed. Times of India, 159,12 ; 1996, January, 
13;11. 
Two recent development have caused in this 
country. The passage of the Brown Ammendment in the 
140 
United States and the U.S administration inspired 
reports in the U.S media that India was planning a 
nuclear explosion for the first time since 1974. At 
his level Mr. Rao chose to ignore the U.S as an 
interlocator. In replying to the Canadian Prime 
Minister Mr. Rao has replied to the Western block as a 
whole. He has as good as told them not to be 
sanctimonious and also has served virtual notice that 
India's defence expenditure was about to be upped. 
Signing the CTBT is a closely related matter. Coming 
on top of the indefinite extension of the NPT. The 
decision to re-arm Pakistan can only lead one to 
assume that India cannot be counted as a votary of the 
CTBT. 
, , , CONFERENCE NEWYORK. 
103. SIMPSON (John) and HOWLETT (Darryl). NPT [Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty] Renewal Conference : Stumbling 
towards 1995. International Security. 19,1; 1994, 
Summer; 41-71. 
Although a number of states could provide the w 
world with a "Proliferation stock" over the nest few 
years. The greatest uncertainty in the nuclear non-
proliferation area remains the out-come of the 1995 
conference to review and extend the treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The 1995 
conference will be a critical juncture for the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, as the delegates meeting in 
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New York have the opportunity to place this global 
regime on a solid footing. But in order to provide a 
propitious context for this to occur, a number of 
complexities in the areas of Treaty interpretation and 
substantive debate will need to be clarified. 
Moreover, this strategy should be supplemented by the 
three depository states, especially the U.S, engaging 
as many parties as possible in a dialogue on the 
Treaty well before the conference convenes. By 
pursuiting an active strategy of initiatives and 
consultation now, the potential can be reduced for any 
of the old issues which have caused disruption at past 
conferences, or any of the new ones that have emerged 
since 1990. 
, , .DEBATE, INDIA'S OPTION. 
104. SUNDARJI (K). CTBT debate; Choice before India. Indian 
Express. 64,29; 1995, December, 4;8. 
India is not against nuclear non-proliferation, 
indeed it has always been for it, proved it is applied 
universally. We would prefer that non-proliferation 
measures incorporate serious statements of intent of 
their commitment to universal nuclear disarmament from 
the nuclear Powers. Today a small group can build a 
nuclear device or produce biological agents for 
subversive or terrorist purposes. Thus, the ability to 
inflict grave damage is no longer the prerogative of 
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the pwoerful countries. Under these circumstances, 
anything that India does to delay or disrupt even the 
tenuous course of eventually establishing a world 
free of weapons of mass destruction, would not be 
tenable even as a morally correct stance. In an as yet 
imperfect world, if we have compeling national 
security reasons for not supporting the CTBT and the 
fissile material cut-off treaty. Such action can be 
justified. I believe we do not have such a reason. 
, , , EXTENSION . 
105. SAIGHAL v^inod). NPT extension: A betrayal of the 
world. Indian Express, 63,208; 1995, May, 31f8. 
WHO seriously believes that the have-nots are 
happy to prepetuate their insecurity by continuing to 
repose faith in people who have shown scant regard, 
even contempt, for the legitimate security concerns 
of others? The real consensus did not take place on 
May 11, 1995 at the UN Headquarters. The real 
consensus is now building up in the form of a global 
awareness that a great injustice has been perpetuated 
upon humanity by a handful of people holding the 
lovers of power. The lid has not been put on 
horizontol proliferation. The lid has been taken off 
the modest restraint that characterized the NPT upto 
May 11, 1995. The treaty signalled the end of reasoned 
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dialogue between nations. In fact, it might even have 
made diplomats redundant, they could soon be wheeler-
dealers and influence-peddlers. 
106. SUBRAHMANYAM XK). After the NPT Extension:Prepetuating 
Nuclear Status Quo. Times of India. 158,116; 1995, 
May, 16 ^ 0. 
The indefinite extension of the Non-prolifera-
tion Treaty by 178 signatories clearly establishes the 
following factors in the international politics for 
the foreable future. First and foremost the 
extension legitimises a weapon of mass destruction in 
prepetuity and by implication its use for which there 
is no historical precedent. The world with eight 
nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon capable powers is 
not more risky than theworld of five nuclear weapon powers 
which have incorporated nuclear weapon in their 
strategic doctrines, all of which are militarily 
aggressive and have been involved in more wars than 
other nations. The role played by many of the non-
aligned nations has been bizaire. They voted in the 
U.N General Assembly to refer the legality of the use 
and threat of use of nuclear weapons to the 
International court of Justice but did not raise the 
issue at the NPT extension conference and suggested 
that the indefinite extension should be held over till 
the opinion of the International Court is made 
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available. The same proliferation theologians have 
already talked about India being isolated and that in 
view of the overwhelming support for the NPT 
extension, India will have to come round. They are 
totally wrong. 
, , , .CRITICISM. 
107. LEGITIMISING HYPOCRISY, Times of India. 158, 115; 
1995, May, 15 >12. 
The outcome masquerades as a consensus and 
disguises dissent. There can be no two opinions about 
the fact that without a true consensus, the extended -
NPT lacks the credibility and moral force that are 
essential for universal adherence. An important 
opportunity has been lost,therefore, to move towards 
universal disarmament. The commitment to a 'systematic 
and persuasive' reduction of nuclear weapons globally, 
which appears in a statement of principles and 
objectives, appended to the NPT, is a weak substitute 
for binding, time-bound pledges on disarmament by the 
nuclear powers. The main thrust of the Indian argument 
in future should be not the discriminatory character 
of the NPT, India's position should be that it will 
have nothing to do with a treaty which legitimises a 
weapon of mass destruction and on instrument of 
holocaust. 
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108. SIDDHARTHA (V). NPT extension : Safer World only for 
US. Indian Express. 63, 181; 1995, May, 4;8. 
The indefinite and unconditional extension of the 
NPT amounts to a grave and unforgiveable mistake on 
the part of the international community. The hollow-
ness of the NWS claim to having pursued disarmament in 
good faith is brought out by the fact that their 
nuclear stockpiles have gone up manifold since the 
signing of the NPT in 1968. The end of the cold war 
may have seen a sealing down of Strategic stockpiles 
but the 1994 for the U.S and Russia are still very 
high. Today a metamorphosis is taking place in the 
arsenals of the nuclear powers. Nowhere is this 
process more evident in the U.S. In anticipation of 
the CTBT, the U.S is setting up facilities to replace 
full yield underground testing with computer 
simultation and extremely low yield hydronuclear 
tests. Research is also continuing on enhancing the 
THHAD and GPAZS systems including the Brilliant 
Pebbles space-based to kill interceptions. Given the 
NWs plans to go ahead with the development of more and 
more sophisticated nuclear weapons, their instance on 
the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT 
appears hyprocritical at best and simister at worst. 
The principal reason behind the NWs opposition to 
outlaw nuclear weapons is that their military 
doctrines actually envisage the use of nuclear weapons 
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,POLITICS. 
109 MENON (Bhaskar). NPT extension meet begins without 
voting accord. Times of India. 158,97; 1995, April, 
24 ;10. 
The developed countries of Europe and North 
America, which favour the indefinite and 
unconditional extension of the NPT want a roll call 
vote to extend the treaty, claiming that this will 
build international confidence in the treaty and 
ensure accountability. Many Non-Aligned countries, 
which are opposed to an unconditional and indefinite 
extension of the treaty because that would take away 
any incentive for the nuclear weapons countries to 
destroy their existing stocks and capabilities, want a 
secret ballot. India, which has refused to sign the 
NPT because it is grossly discriminatory between the 
five declared NWs and the rest of the world, is a 
member of the IAEA and will have a say in the adoption 
of the new measures. 
, , , , SECURITY ASSURANCES 
110. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Extending NPT: Negative Security 
Assurance. Times of India. 158,75; 1995, March, 
29; 12. 
The five nuclear weapon powers, U.S., Russia, 
U.K., France and China have reportedly decided to back 
a security council resolution assuring the non-nuclear 
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weapon states which are parties to the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty that they would take appropriate action in 
case of any threat or actual use of nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear weapon states. A nuclear threat 
or a nuclear attack can originate only from the five 
nuclear weapon states.Therefore, the most credible 
security assurance from the five nuclear weapon powers 
can only be offer of an unreserved 'no-first use' 
declaration in respect of nuclear weapons and a 
proclamation that any use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons is a crime against humanity. The security 
assurance offer is limited to those states which are 
parties to the NPT. It will therefore leave out 
Israel, Pakistan and India. The few other non-
signatories are mostly mini and micro states. This 
proposed resolution is an eye wash and an insult to 
the non-aligned nations. It does not provide any real 
security to the nations of the world. It only 
highlights that the five nuclear weapon proliferating 
powers are determined to keep the nuclear weapons 
legitimised and use them as a currency of power. 
, , , .SUGGESTIONS. 
111. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Indefinite NPT Extension^ India Must 
formulate Response. Times of India. 158,135; 1995, 
June, 7;12. 
With the unconditional and indefinite extension of the 
Non-proliferation treaty, the international security 
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environment has undergone a itadical change. 
Unfortunately the international community has 
legitimised nuclear weapons. The primary 
responsibility for moving the world towards further 
arms reduction and to nuclear weapon free status, if 
all this is feasible, is now limited to eight nations 
only - the five declared nuclear weapon powers and the 
three undeclared ones who are not signatories to the 
treaty. The indefinite extension of the NPT has 
regrettably increased the possibility and probability 
of use by terrorists of nuclear explosive devices and 
radiological agents. The nuclear theology has 
increasingly made acceptable to the world at large the 
concepts of deterrence and the holding of hostages 
implicit in the doctrine of deterrence. If it is to be 
taken seriously on these issues, India should 
announce in view of the legitimisation of nuclear 
weapons by the international community that it 
proposes to watch further developments carefully and 
will. Therefore, abstain for thepresent from support 
to the CTBT and fissile materials cut-off. India would 
like to see proof of the bonafides of the nuclear 
weapon powers before deciding on these two steps. 
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, US'S ROLE 
112. NAYAR (Kuldip). NPT extension: US lays down the law. 
Indian Express. 63, 206 ; 1995 May, 29 ; 8. 
By lining up 174 nations to endorse the 
indefinite extension of the NPT, the U.S has exhibited 
its muscle power. The Non-aligned nations showed a 
semblance of strength but in the end they too caved 
in, America did not want to give any leeway. It was 
open, blatant. Pressure even to the extent of 
blackmail. People under different climes expected 
that a new world would emerge from 1995, free from 
the fear of nuclear holocaust and safe enough to build 
a more peaceful life for themselves and their 
children. Only the Big-five can keep nuclear weapons 
the rest have to trust them and not contemplate 
acquiring such weapons. Those who claim to be 
protectors of human rights have shown contempt for 
human life. Since America or, for that matter, the 
big five powers have to lay down the law, what purpose 
will be served if there is a regular review of the 
NPT? 
113. SIDDHARTH (V). NPT extension : Safer World only for 
U.S. Indian Express. 63, 181; 1995, May, 4 ; 8. 
A key article in the Nuclear NPT - whose 
extension is currently being debated at a conference 
in New York - requires the five nuclear weapons 
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states to "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards 
an end to the nuclear arms race and "a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control". The U.S. is there-
fore, effectively giving itself a pretext to use 
nuclear weapons against any country by claiming that 
it is on the verge of developing chemical, bateriolo-
gical or nuclear weapons. Give their plans for new 
warheads and weapon-testing facilities, the call by 
the nuclear haves for an unconditional extension of 
the NPT appears hypocritical at best and sinister at 
worst. Their 'Security assurances' are pitifully 
inadequate. The main reason for the reluctance to 
provide legally-binding and enforceable security assu-
rances, unfortunately,is that the military doctrines 
of the U.S and others actually envisages the use of 
nuclear weapons against all states, nuclear-armed for 
otherwise. The U.S., for example, fully intends to 
hold on to enough strategic weapons so as to deal 
with any contingencies from global rivals like 
Russia, China (or even possibly Japan or Germany in 
the future), while deploying "clean nukes" to make 
sure there are no regional challenges to U.S hegemony. 
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,VOTING. 
114. MITRA (Nirmal). Secret ballot to decide extension of 
NPT. Statesman. 138, 97; 1995, April, 25; 7. 
Delegates from 178 countries will decide this 
week whether the voting to decide the fate of the 
current NPT will be done by secret ballot or a roll 
call. The non-aligned countries are opposed to the 
idea of voting for an indefinite extension unless they 
can secure an overwhelming majority, if not a 
consensus, for such an extension, observers argue that 
a consensus may not be realistic because all 178 
countries are not agreed on the issue. He said that 
the treaty had created a more secure world for all its 
members. By providing an internationally recognised, 
verifiable means for states to forswear nuclear 
weapons forever. The treaty helped to prevent 
regional rivalries from evolving into regional arms 
race . 
. , ,. , IMPLICATIONS . 
115. SHAH (Prakash). Nuclear Non-Proliferation Implication 
and the NPT Review : An Indian Perspective, Strategic 
analysis. 16, 2 ; 1993, Mayr 140- 46. 
Several thought-proviking presentations on this 
subject have inevitably brought the 1970 NNPT, into 
the forefront of our discussions. This is not 
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unexpected since the NPT review is due in 1995, there 
is an intense effort on the part of the nuclear weapon 
powers to convert it into on NPT extension exercise 
and there are grave apprehensions about the 
implications of such an exercise on nuclear 
disarmament and genuine non-proliferation. The 
advances in nuclear technology and development of 
indigenous capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons 
and delivery systems achieved by many countries both 
members and non-m embers of the NPT, have drastically 
changed the situation as it existed in 1970. India's 
position that the NPT is discriminatory is neither 
new nor secret. Several other countries have said so 
from time to time, including Japan, to agree to an 
indefinite extension of the NPT is to perpetuate this 
discrimination for * eternity. it would mean 
legitimising possesion and use of nuclear weapons by 
five nations. In end with a reference to the 1995 
conference, 1995 is not just the year of the NPT 
review. It will herald the 50th anniversary of the 
establishment of the United Nations. Above all, it 
was time, 50 years ago, in 1945, that the most 
horrendous tragedy of our times took place in 
Hiroshima. 
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.INDIA'S ROLE 
116. DIXIT (J.N). Nuclear non-proliferation : India won't 
give in. Indian Express. 63,147 ; 1995, March, 31}8. 
There have been media reports that India is 
foreclosing its nuclear options under U.S pressure 
that the U.S is gradually succeding in pushing New 
Delhi towards discriminatory non-proliferation 
arrangement through the measures of the comprehensive 
test ban, capping of nuclear technology and cutting 
off of production of fissile material. In brief, 
subjecting India to NPT arrangements without India 
having to sign the NPT. Given the ground realities of 
tactical nuclear weapons and missile deployment around 
India, there can be no question of New Delhi 
agreeing to any discriminatory non-proliferation 
arrangements. It should be remembered that India had 
already signed a bilateral agreement with Pakistan 
about not attacking each other's nuclear installations 
long before the Gates Mission to India and Pakistan. 
Then the under secretaries of states. India has agreed 
to discuss a regime for the cutting off of fissile 
material production and abjuring further production 
provided this also is universal, non-discriminatory 
and equally applicable to all countries,regardless of 
whether they are nuclear weapon or non-nuclear weapon 
powers. That this approach of keeping the options 
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open while remaining committed to peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy entails ambiguities is correct and 
there is reason for some of Indian experts to be 
impatient. Nor should there be any questioning of the 
thesist that nuclear weapons powers would like India 
to be subjected to non-proliferation regimes by other 
means since India would not sign the NPT. But the 
point is India has not succumbed to any such 
strategems so far. 
117. NAIB (V.P). Nuclear Threat. Indian Defence Review/ 
1993, January; 61- 3. 
The recent unequivocal statements by the Prime 
minister and the foreign secretary that India will 
not sign the NPT nor will it participate in the 
proposed conferenfe on the declaration of South Asia 
as a nuclear free zone have cleared somewhat the 
cobwebs obscuring our nuclear options. India's 
reaction to the likelihood of a nuclear attack by 
Pakistan is rather intrigoing. successive government 
have been blandly repeating the assurance that a 
retaliatory capacity will be available at short 
notice, should the need for it arise. The obvious 
inference is that the government has already taken 
the necessary steps to retaliate if Pakistan resorts 
to a nuclear first strike. The 'Short-notice' 
visualised by the government should either come from 
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our own intelligence sources, which are not yet 
adequate though in the process of becoming so or from 
U.S intelligence to gather upto date information to 
forestall either country's intentions to make war may 
act as a damper against starting a war. Even so this 
knowledge should not full us into a sense of false 
security. 
, , ,NON NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. 
118. DATT (Savita). NPT and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. 
Options and Non-options. Strategic Analysis. 15,10; 
1993, January; 911- 23. 
Even if India or most of NNWS were to make up to 
the opportunity and exercise it to effect a mass 
exodus from the NPT, it is not certain that the NWs 
would accept a treaty on comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament because they know that it is not the NPT 
which has kept the countries from going nuclear. 
Mostly it is their own wisdom and sagacity and 
requirement that has played the crucial role. They 
also know that a world without the NPT would not 
become totally nuclear. As far as safeguards and 
controls are concerned, the IAEA safeguards would 
continue despite the NPT and the rules related to 
materials supplied by supplier nations would continue 
to operate. What would clearly be exposed in the 
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eventually would be the intentions of the NWS. India 
would be free to go nucleous without compunition in 
that case. It would have done its best. The 
opportunity that Article VI of the NPT provides 
should, however, not be lost whether India goes 
nuclear or abides by the promises made by its leaders 
in the past. 
, , , OPTIONS 
119. DIXIT (J.N.). India's nuclear options : Pakistani 
Smuggling Underlines non-proliferation shortcomings. 
Indian Express. 62,297; 1994, August, 30; 8. 
Frank Theil, spokesman of the Ministry of 
Justice of the German Government announced on August 
18 his government success in preventing smuggling of 
weapons-grade plutonium 239 to Pakistan. Under Prime 
Minister Rao's directions our embassies concerned 
have approached the government of Germany and Russia 
for detailed information about these calendestine 
transactions. Calendestine illegal and unsafeguarded 
movement of weapons grade fissile material in our 
neighbourhood generates problems, disarmament experts 
asses that there is no effective control on the 
movement and sale of nuclear weapons ingredients. 
Pakistan's nuclear establishment is now endowed with 
gas centifuge plants* cryton switches tritum 
initiators for triggering fission, and design and 
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drawings needed for producing a uranium based nuclear 
explosive. Despite this scenario pressore on India 
continues for signing the NPT and putting our nuclear 
facilities under discriminatory fullscope safeguards, 
participating in a subcontinental nuclear-free-zone 
arrangement and in a multilateral conference the 
primary aim of which is only to lower the subcontinent 
with great power supervised and guaranteed non-
proliferation arrangements. In recent years India 
has participated in and agreed to arrangements related 
to weapons of mass destruction when they were 
fashioned on the principles of non-discrimination and 
global assumptions of obligations. The ambiguity in 
an nuclear policy is not obfuscation but a measured 
approach balancing our normative commitment to non-
proliferation. While ensuring fulfilment of 
substantive requirements of our defence and security. 
120. SUNDARJI (K). India's nuclear option : Ability to 
strike back. Indian Express. 64,101*, 1996, 
February, 14;8. 
By not signing the Non-proliferation treaty. 
India has theoretically kept the nuclear option open for 
minimum deterrence to be effective. We have to ensure 
that we can in a second strike, cause unacceptable 
damage to our adversary. Thus* the number of war 
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heads that we need is not open-ended. The elementary 
but effective method adopted by the U.S in the early 
days of keeping nuclear weapons dismantled and their 
components stored separately, would largely be 
adequate for India, a high degree of availability and 
reliability would be required if nuclear weapons were 
to be used for close support in war-fighting. But for 
minimum nuclear deterrende, that relies on a second 
strike against city targets, one can accept a very low 
availability-cum-reliability quotient. Say even of 
33.3%. If an Indian second strike can only attack two 
cities instead of the planned five in Pakistan, and 
four out of the ten in China, and only one of the 
three warheads actually detonates on each of these 
cities. 
, , ,POKHARAN' TEST. 
121. SABHERWAL (O.P). NPT review by weapon states tindia 
should not care in. Indian Express. 63, 155? 1995, 
April, 8;8. 
The refashioning of NPT into an equitable and 
sustainable regime for containing and eventually 
destroying nuclear weapons is a crucial task before 
the international community which brooks no delay. 
There is more to this Indians story. Some unique 
features need to be focussed in respect of this 
country's plutonium - based weapon capability. 
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By passing the enormously costly uranium enrichment 
route, Indian Scientists created weapon capability as 
a by product of India's atomic power generation 
programme as early as 1968. And so, the first Indian 
atomic bomb tested at Pokharan was the cheapest 
nuclear device built by any nation. So too is the 
further development of India's weapon capability 
during the last two decades. India's policy-making 
has been operating under duress of the west ever the 
since the 1974 Pokharan test, that duress has to be 
vacated. It is well known that the establishment under 
Indira Gandhi was divided on whether to conduct a 
second test within a couple of months after successful 
first test. A second Pokharan type device was ready 
at hand. But overwhelming western pressure scotched 
the proposed test. 
, ,POLITICS WORLD. 
122. SRIVASTAVA (H.K). Nuclear India. Indian Defence Review 
8,1 ; 1993, October; 34- 9. 
As 1995 draws nearer, India will be further 
presurised over NPT. To diminish the heat and take the 
Americans off its back, so to say, India has to adopt 
an aggressive but persuasive nuclear policy to show 
the Americans and the Western NWs their short-
sightness about pressure on India, and the gains in 
the 21st century by accomodating India on "as-is-
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where-is-basis" or in a modified NPT regime. Meanwhile 
India must take full advantage of the two-year period 
available to it before 1995 arrives in acquiring 
technical experts in all those aspects essential for 
nuclear war fighting through simulated exercise in 
nuclear warfare techniques. India need not reorganise 
or redeploy its forces on ground at this point of 
time. On another plane, to contain the likely 
bickering within its forces over nuclear 
unpreparedness, India must strike to reconvince its 
servicement that the country is determined not a let 
them face any asymmetrical weapon situation, or an 
adverse war scenario, conventional or nuclear. And 
nothing could be a better proof then demonstration of 
resolve by introducing nuclear warfighting exercises 
and training. This will reedem the pledges given by 
the Indian elite and the three service chiefs 
mentioned earlier. 
, , , PROBLEMS 
123. CHELLANEY (Brahma). Fissile Cut-off » India's crucial 
role. Indian Express. 63, 168; 1995, April, 21;8s 
A fissile cut-off, or even an interim 
moratonium, will impose a quantitative cap on our 
nuclear capabilities. Yet India has been an ardent 
advocate of a global ban, and co-sponsored the 1993 
UN resolution. The advantages of a fissile cut-off to 
161 
the United States are self-evident. It is awash in 
Plutonium and HEU to such an extent that the stocks 
are becoming a significant security and safety 
problem. Under arms control treaties with Mciscow. 
Warheads are not being fully dismantted, rather their 
core pits are being stored. Under this maximalist 
safeguards approach even India's natural uranium-
fulled candu commercial power reactors will have to 
come under IAEA inspections because of the recoverable 
Plutonium in their spent fuel. In other words, a cut 
off treaty will impose comprehensive safeguards on 
Indian commercial and research reactors, reprocessing 
and enrichment installations, and fuelfabrication 
facilities. The impact will be similar to India 
acceding to the NPT. 
124. DAVIDOV (Valerii). Indian proposal at UNSSOD-III : 
Problems and Prospects. Strategic Analysis, 13,6;1990, 
September; 609- 18. 
According to the proposal, when the first term 
of Non-proliferation treaty expires in 1995 and its 
member-states are to decide the future of the treaty, 
international negotiations are to begin for a new 
treaty. It would commit nuclear states to eliminate 
all nuclear weapons by the year 2010 and all non-
nuclear states not to cross the nuclear weapons 
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threshold. A majority of non-nuclear states may 
support this proposal. If nuclear states refuse to 
take far-reaching steps in the field of nuclear 
disarmament, the NPT regime will be in crisis in 
1995. 
125. SIMPSON (John). HOWEETT (Darryl). Nuclear non-
proliferation : the way forward. Survival. 33,6; 
1991, November-December; 483- 99. 
Nuclear non-proliferation policies must be 
revised to meet the challenges of the 1990s, three 
problems are at the heart of the current non-
proliferation regime. The limits of existing 
safeguards, verification and national export controls. 
The possibilities of conversion of nuclear power 
programs to military use and of development of nuclear 
weapon systems by states with unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities are two traditional concerns. The 1990s 
will face additional issues related to clandesline 
nuclear operations, testing, the collapse of the 
communist bloc and technological developments. The 
effectiveness and global acceptability of the current 
non-proliferation regime could be improved by 
expanding the resources and competence of the 
International Atomic Energy agency, developing more 
nuclear-free, zones and security arrangements 
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pursuing further arms-control measures and export 
controls, and linking economic and technical 
assistance to non-proliferation policies. 
, , .REVIEW 
126. DAS GUPTA (Analendu). India and the Bomb I Issues 
Revised by NPT Review. Statesman. 129, 9087; 1990» 
August, 18;6. 
India is not directly involved in this month's 
quinquerial review of the working of the nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty. Whether it should attend 
the NPT review conference in Geneva as an observer was 
considered by a specialist in group in New Delhi late 
last year. India need not complain over much, for it 
too could profit from the proposition. Though an 
Indian bomb would be viewed differently in the light 
of the U.S. "national interest", which has been 
plainly reconciled to the Pakistani preparations in 
recent years* even an unwelcome reality - if the 
proposition holds - would be assured of acceptance and 
eventually a certain legitimacy. This might mitigate 
the fear that an Indian bomb would entail an 
unacceptable political cost terms of international 
reaction. It has been argued that a small nuclear 
force is no real deterrent, that let alone make India 
more secure, it would only invite nuclear threats. It 
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has long been believed abroad that India possesses a 
fairly effective nuclear capability. India is already 
in possession of nuclear weapons let alone whether 
bombs and delivery systems are anywhere near the 
operational level. It has also been noted abroad that 
after testing its nuclear explosion technology at 
Pokharan Indian desisted from, a follow -up to produce 
actual weapons. The Indian capability is still more a 
matter of potential than of something that can be put 
to immediate or early use. 
, , ,_ ,CONFERENFE,NEW YORK 
127. TIME TO PUT NPT at risk. _ Statesman. 138,89; 1995, 
April, 15;5. 
The non-nuclear-armed powers appear to have let 
the nuclear mighties off the book. This is how it 
looks as the certain goes up on the Nuclear non-
proliferation treaty review conference in New York. 
The much trumpted trade-off in the treaty has been 
reduced once again to so much verbiage. The treaty 
states explicitly that the "nuclear have nots" will 
guarantee refraining from developing nuclear weapons 
if the "nuclear haves" make significant progress on 
nuclear disarmament, a cut-off would make irreversble 
the drawdown of nuclear weapons materials in the 
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super-power arsenals. It would cap the weapons 
stockpiles of the other "haves" and would bring the 
three defacto unannounced weapon states (Israel, India 
and Pakistan) into the non-proliferation regime by 
capping their weapons. Ideally, of course, New York 
would end with the both the indefinite renewal of the 
NPT and a fissile treaty. Some real muscle work 
combined with astute diplomatic brinkmanship could 
achieve the double whammy. 
, , .SAFETY, MEASURES 
128. SABHERWAL (O.P). Good work by India on nuclear safety. 
Indian Express. 63,213;1995, June, 5;8. 
The American threat of possible denial to India 
of safety equipment for its nuclear power plants is no 
more than a" bluff. If the chain of nuclear reactors 
operating in India and under construction had been 
hitched to safety equipment from the U.S. there would 
be now be a total shut-down of these plants. 
Fortunately, the reality is quite different. Ever 
since the Pokhran text of 1974, America imposed a 
blanket ban on export to India of all equipment even 
remotely connected with reactor operations or 
constructions. According to knowledgeable sources* in 
the aftermath of the NPT meet, pressure on Indian may 
be along several aspects. The most immediate point of 
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pressure is likely to be to cap Indian capability for 
production of weapon-grade plutonium. The idea seems 
to be to enforce a "threshold test ban" which seeks to 
ensure that "threshold" capability is not transformed 
into a ready-to-use-wea^jons capability. 
, , , SECURITY GUARANTEES . 
129. NOORANI (A.G). Hollow Promises NPT AND Security 
guarantees. Frontline. 12,8; 1995, April, 21; 58-59 
The three "reaffirm in the case of Ukraine, 
their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against 
any non-nuclear - weapon state party to the treaty on 
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons, except in 
the case of an attack on themselves, their territories 
or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their 
allies, by such a state in association or alliance 
with a nuclear weapon state". The last para made it 
plain that the guarantee was given on the 
understanding that all three act together. Ergo, 
Failure by one realised the rest. This becomes all too 
plain if China's pronouncements on tne guarantee are 
recalled on December 6, 1994, while welcoming Ukraine 
accession to the NPT. it said "The Chinese 
government has always maintained that under no 
circumstances will China use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or 
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nuclear weapons free zones. This principled position 
also applies to Ukraine. The U.S. and Britain have 
consistently voted in the U.N. General Assembly 
against resolutions urging adoption of a convention 
prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in any 
"circumstances". 
, , , SOUTH ASIA. 
130. DIXIT (Aabha). Pressure on NPT. Hindustan Times. 
79,173; 1993, June, 25;13. 
For many western strategic analyst, the year 
19 95 represents the achievement of a dream of nuclear 
non-proliferation. This is sought to be realised 
through the indefinite extension of the Nuclear NPT. 
The first preparatory meeting of the states parties to 
the NPT was held in New York and expectedly it broke 
up without agreement over procedural matters. The 
agenda for futurer meetings of the preparatory 
commission was set out by Australia.lt wants the IIAEA 
to expand its mandate to become a verification agency 
for nuclear non-proliferation.The nuclwar Renegades 
lines India, Israel,Brazil,Argentina,Ukraine,Kazakhstan 
and Pakistan have been subjected to pressure from two 
directions.There is the usual insistence on these 
countries signing the NPT and on the other hand, 
novel approaches like bilateral arrangements and 
nuclear related CBMs are being put forwarded. If 
168 
nuclear non-proliferation has assumed a very high 
priority for western countries, they would need to 
alter their basic attitudes on how to tackle the 
issue. Like the chemical weapons convention, where 
many states parties despite having the knowledge and 
technical capability have submitted verification to a 
higher body, the nuclear issue can be resolved by 
outlawing the stockpiling of nuclear weapons by 
individual countries and giving control to a higher 
body that makes its decision on consensus. 
131. HUSAIN (Saiyid Mubarak). Nuclear Weapon-free Zone 
[in South Asia] :A perception, Pakistan Horizon, 
43, 1; 1990, January, 65-78. 
So far India, in various international forums, 
has not adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the 
non-proliferation issue or for the certain of a 
nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia. It is 
therefore, unlikely that India would voluntarily join 
from the outset in the efforts of other countries in 
the region to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone on 
the ideal pattern according to the guiding principles 
identified by the UN in the mid-1970s, Pakistan could 
likely attract a favourable response from almost all 
the states of the region with the promotion of a 
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nuclear weapon - free zone. This could be one factor 
that could contribute to changing India's own nuclear 
policy. 
132. SUBRAMANIAN (R.R) . Arms Control at the global and 
regional levels. Strategic Analysis. 17,4; 1994, 
July; 475- 90. 
In the emerging world order, India needs to 
carve out a role for itself in the arms control 
processes, especially since President Clinton is 
presently focusing on regional nuclear non-
proliferation in South Asia. India can no longer rely 
on Moscow to turn a deaf, ear to its nuclear 
explosions. Multilateralism of the arms process in 
South Asia is needed, involving the five permanent 
members of the UN Security council, Germany and Japan, 
India and Pakistan and focusing on South Asia as a 
non-starter. The Asian region has unique 
characteristic unlike the European continent wherein 
regional powers have autonomous economic and military 
capabilities. Arms control and disarmament have 
global implications because of nuclear weapons and 
regional implications because of conflicts that could 
involve a modest number of weapons. 
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133. SUBVERTING NPT. Times of India. 159, 79*, 1996, 
April, 3;8. 
The information on transfer of weapon design had 
already been made available under the freedom of 
Information Act and published by the Kyodo News 
Agency last year. The state department's report, in 
three successive issues, to the U.S congress on the 
proliferation situation in south Asia has admitted 
Chinese involvement in the Pakistani weapons 
programme. This tradition of subordinating the 
proliferation objective to other expedient and 
commercial considerations continues as is now revealed 
by the Washington Post Story. Evidently the story was 
leaked to the press by the anti-proliferation 
crusaders in the bureaucracy who are dusmayed by the 
U.S administration shielding the continuing China -
Pakistan weapon relationship, and attemping to 
confuse the issue. The attempt to penalise only the 
corporation obfuscates the issue and can only send a 
signal to China and Pakistan that they are free to 
pursue their relationship. Pakistan cannot be blamed 
for doing what it considers to be in its national 
interest. The Chinese cannot be criticised either for 
continuing their established relationship with 
Pakistan. The hypocxisyand double standard and the 
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wilful misleading of its own legislature, which is now 
out in the open exposes the superficiality of the U.S. 
commitment to non-proliferation. 
, , , ,CONFLICTS, US ROLE. 
134. CHERIAN (John). Nuclear Questions. Frontline. 12,5; 
March, 10 ;46-48. 
With the Nuclear NPT completing 25 years and up 
for renewal, all sorts of pressures are being put on 
nuclear - capable countries such as India to play 
ball with the United States in its efforts to give the 
treaty a new lease of life. When the Clinton 
administration assumed power, it adopted a tough 
posture on the question of nuclear proliferation 
putting the 'roll back' of nuclear programmes in South 
Asia on the top if its agenda. India can expect 
renewed pressure from the Clinton administration once 
the NPT is extended in April. Since Bill Clintion took 
over as President South Asia has been described by the 
U.S. State department as an area where regional 
conflict has the potential to escalate into a nuclear 
exchange. 
, , , STRATEGY 
135. SUHRAHWARDY (Nllofar). India's multi-pronged 
N-Strategy may pay dividends. Times of India, 158,107; 
1995, May, 5; 13. 
India was the only country which had declined 
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observer status at the NPT review conference. Since it 
opposed the treaty, its attendance could have been 
constr^ uvred as its tacit consideration of treaty as 
significant. By keeping its nuclear option. India 
retains some diplomatic leverage the nuclear powers to 
work for disarmament. Besides, China's ambition to 
emerge as a prominent power in the region can not be 
ignored. With certain issues of dispute remaining 
unresolved, the risk of an open conflict between the 
two has been minimised by the possession of weapons 
by India that can hit China and vice versa. Likewise a 
full scale Indo-Pakistan war has been deterred by the 
respected nuclear strength of India and Pakistan. It 
is not likely that India will relax its reservations 
regarding the NPT till the nuclear powers focus on 
universal elimination of nuclear weapons. But 
acknowledging the significance of the U.S in the 
New World Order, New Delhi has apparently opted for a 
multipronged strategy. Though India claims to have 
opposed every move designed to close its nuclear 
option, its willingness to co-sponsor the fissile 
materials cut-off treaty along with the U.S suggests 
otherwise.This implies a ban on the production of 
fissile materials. Keeping the nuclear stockpile at 
the prevalent level and submitting to international 
verification the nation's enrichment and spent fuel 
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reprocessing plants. This is equivalent to becoming a 
signatory to the NPT of course so long as the fissile 
material treaty is not signed, India's intention to 
retain its reservations regarding the NPT is more 
conspicious. 
, , ,UN's ROLE 
136. MENON (Bhaskar) , . Heads we win, tails you lose. Times 
of India. 5,26? 1995, April, 2;10. 
The manipulation of a majority by nuclear weapon 
states to get approval for on indefinite extension of 
NPT at the forthcoming UN meeting has caused 
resentment among the nuclear have nots. The resentment 
of non-nuclear weapon states is built on solid 
ground. Under the NPT, the nuclear weapon states 
committed themselves to "Pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and on nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international 
control. By comparision, the current draft is feeble. 
It recognises that in case of aggression with nuclear 
weapons or threat of such aggression against a non-
nuclear weapon state party to the treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons 
state permament member of the security council would 
bring the matter immediately to the attention of the 
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council and seek council action to provide, in 
accordance with the charter. The obvious intention 
of the nuclear weapon states to hold on to their 
privileged position raises questions as to their real 
motives. It is more than just a "bad habit". 
, ,US'S ROLE. 
137. DATTA (Savita). US and Indian Non-Proliferation 
objectives and concerns. Indian Defence Review. 9,3; 
1994, July; 15- 9. 
This article takes a look at the US non-proli-
feration objectives and Indian concerns regarding 
comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. Although the 
difference in the Indo-US approaches to the nuclear 
question became evident in 1968 itself when the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. India 
strongly objects to the IAEA being used as an 
exclusive tool in the hands of NWs to promote their 
interests. India feels that the US demand for short 
notice and unannounced inspections can only become 
meaningful only if the NWS undertake to work for the 
delegitimization of nuclear weapons. Besides, the 
right to information, inspection and consultation 
regarding the nuclear plants can be compiled with on 
the basis of universality. 
In the West, most of the energy - needs are met 
by nuclear power. However, the Western countries 
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discourage the use of nuclear energy by third world 
countries because it is the peaceful nuclear 
programmes which have provided some countries with 
weapons capabilities. While India respects the 
western concerns, it insists that it is the 
responsibility of the west to cooperate with the third 
world in the development of renewable energy sources. 
However, any conditional transfer of technology which 
involves the giving up of the peaceful nuclear option 
should be rejected. As long as the west itself 
derives benefits of nuclear power, it would be 
unjustified to ask the third world not to do so. 
India's stand regarding the NPT is therefore 
quite clear and unambiguous. By extending the NPT 
indefinitely without any commitment to put an end to 
discrimination would mean the legitimization of 
nuclear weapons in the hands of NWis*. Total nuclear 
disarmament within a specified time frame or at least 
a commitment to place the existing nuclear weapons 
under international control is the onky way in which 
the NPT can be made meaningful. 
138. IYENGAR (P.K). Nuclear Issue • Caution against 
bartering away our capabilities. Indian Express. 
61, 316; 1993, September, 16;8. 
At present there is a Non-proferation Treaty, 
signed by a majority of United Nations members, which 
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purports to regulate the spread of nuclear know-how 
and technology around the world. According to this 
treaty, five countries - the United States^ Russia, 
Britain^ France and China, which detonated a nuclear 
device before 1968, are designated as nuclear powers, 
and are free to develop their nuclear potential. 
Presently the attention of the Western Power seems to 
be focussing on the threshold states. Pressure is 
building on them to sign the NPT as non-nuclear 
states, with all the attendant constraints on the 
development and use of nuclear technology - even for 
the civilian nuclear power programmes. This is a price 
no forward looking developing country can pay, and our 
consistent stand on this issue is commendable. 
Unfortunately, the planning process at present suffers 
from a lack of informed opinion and a sense of 
inertia. Bureaucracy is often show to change its 
attitudes. Economists are confused even about 
fundamental concepts such as self-reliance indigenous 
technology and independence of action in science, 
technology, defence, communications etc. In the 
present fluid scenario, we must have a very clear 
perception of what our goals are, where our priorities 
lie, and how we must respond to pressures in specific 
situations. The issues are complex, many of them being 
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technical in nature, and need careful, broad based 
study before decisions can be reached. 
139. MALHOTRA (Inder). Political Commentary : New Twists to 
Nuclear Issue. Times of India. 154,218; 1991, 
September, 12; 8. 
The more lasting and apparently intractable 
difficulties of U.S. Policy-makers arise from two 
other developments both of which are of great 
importance to India. Interestingly, both emanate from 
Araerica's own actions and pronouncement^. Some American 
sources known for their blind faith in the present 
pattern of non-proliferation reply that the NPT 
controls on non-nuclear weapon states would have to 
be strengthened greatly even as more nations sign the 
treaty. But here they non snack into great difficulty, 
whatever the new world order or disorder, it would be 
virtually impossible to impose fresh restrictions on 
the nuclear have nots at a time when the nuclear haves 
remain unwilling to agree to even a comprehensive ban 
on all nuclear tests. In short in any future 
Indo-U.S. dialogue on the NPT, India would have ample 
room for manoeure if only New Delhi would play its 
cards with the necessary skill and sophistication 
instead of going on repeating that it would not sign 
the NPT. 
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140. SECURITY FOR Some, Indian Express. 63,157; 1995, 
April, 10;8. 
There is nothing new or positive in the latest 
American initiative to offer a security pledge to 
non-nuclear weapon states in the event of an 
aggression involving nuclear weapons. The U.S policy 
on nuclear non-proliferation is riddled with double 
standards. The most glaring example is the kid-glove 
treatment of Israel, which is a closet nuclear weapons 
power. The Arab Countries have rightly rejected such 
a U.S approach and are now against an indefinite 
extension the NPT. An amendment to the treaty, 
binding the U.S and other nuclear states to come to 
the aid of the Arabs in the event of a nuclear threat 
from Israel. By keeping the non-signatories out of 
the purview of the pledge, the nuclear powers are only 
trying to perpetuate the discriminatory nature of the 
NPT and the steps which follow from the implementation 
of the treaty. 
141. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Time for Parliament to be firm on 
NPT. Times of India, 158,104; 1995,May,2;10. 
An impression that there is perhaps a tacit 
understanding between India and the U.S. on the issue 
of non-proliferation treaty is gaining ground at both 
places. India, not a party to the NPT and its 
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bitterest critic had, therefore, not put up a struggle 
against the treaty, also, that India has joined forces 
with those non-aligned countries which, though members 
of the NPT, were putting up a stiff fight against its 
indefinite and unconditional extension. The facts 
indicate that such an Indo-American deal may be 
plausible though the conclusions arrived at are 
unnecessary. India, while opposing legitimisation of 
nuclear weapons and any discriminatory treaty on 
nuclear and missile systems should pledge to work for 
the above treaties leading to a nuclear weapon free 
world. If the Indian parliament can make such a dec*, 
laration before 10th of May, 1995 it would help the 
non-aligned countries fighting against indefinite 
extension in New York. 
, , , D.S - SOVIET DRAFT, INDIA'S 
ROLE 
142. PANDE (Savita). Future of NPT and India : Any options? 
Strategic Analyses, 17,4; 1994, July; 447- 57. 
From about 1966 the Indian attitude to the non-
proliferation issue appreciably hardened, and India 
since then consistently criticised the U.S - Soviet 
draft treaty on three grounds imbalance of 
obligations between the nuclear weapon powers and the 
non-nuclear - weapon countries, inadequate security 
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guarantees, and discrimination in the development 
ofpeaceful nuclear explosives. India advocated a 
comprehensive test ban, a cut-off of fissile material 
for weapon purposes. Besides it opposed the 
discriminatory safeguards system which it thought 
"would hinder technological development and increase 
the gap between advanced and developing countries. 
India, it was stated would only accept the controls 
applied on a universal basis. India also opposed the 
discrimination in the peaceful nuclear explosions -
"privelege of a few countries and denied to others". 
':\7ithout signing the NPT, India should unilaterally 
make a formal pledge to abide by the NPT provisions 
barring the export of nuclear weapons or of military-
related nuclear technology. Specifically, this would 
mean (a) requiring that any nuclear exports would be 
subject to International Atomic energy Agency 
inspections in the recipient country to verify that 
military-related technoology is not involved, and (b) 
withholding from other states any technological or 
other assistance related to the development of nuclear 
weapons. 
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, U.S ROLE 
143. WAKE-UP Call. Times of India. 152,126; 1989, May, 
7; 6. 
United States defence secretary William Percy's 
assertion that the U.S would retaliate against a 
chemical attack with nuclear weapons if necessary 
should alert this country to the logic of nuclear 
deterrence. Mr. Percy's stand follows from the 
international community's legitimisation of nuclear 
weapons through the unconditional and indefinite 
extension of the Non-proliferation treaty. The U.S 
feels that in spite of these conventions and the 
international verification and safeguards system 
prescribed by some of them. The threat of 
proliferation is real. Of course, the U.S should know 
having helplessly watched the Chinese breach of the 
NPT and being permissive in respect of Pakistani 
proliferation. Almost all the proliferation threats 
the U.S envisages are in the Eastern hemisphere and 
some of them in the neighbourhood of India. Mr.Perry 
talks of aggressors using these weapons in an attempt 
to gain a decisive edge in a regional war. In the 
Indian subcontinent. Pakistan using the umberalla of 
nuclear capability, is attempting to gain an edge in 
Kashmir. Mr. Perry's logic would necessitate India 
having a robust minimum nuclear deterrent 
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proportionate to threats from weapons of mass 
destruction India faces directly in its own region. 
Unlike the United States which faces no such threats. 
Mr. Perry's report is a wake-up call to the Indian 
policy makers that the formulation of a nuclear 
deterrent policy books no further delay. 
, , .WESTERN THREATS, NATIONAL 
CONSENSUS. 
144. SUNDARJI (K). Western Threats on NPT : National 
Consensus needed. Indian Express. 64, 6V 1995, 
November,11; 8. 
The Indian reaction to the farcial permanent 
extension of the NPT has been throughly subdued. The 
NPT regime would continue to be discriminatory and 
cynical. The legitimacy of the nuclear weapon as an 
instrument of international power stands reemphasised, 
Becase of nebulous futute threats the United States 
has decided to hold on apparently permanently, to a 
nuclear arsenal. Punitive measures may include 
conventional as well as nuclear attacks to bomb India 
into the stone age, as was attempted somewhat 
unsuccessfully in North Vietnam, using only 
conventional means. One of the reasons for jbhis lack 
of consensus is the somewhat enhance battle that goes, on in 
the media between analysts espousing opposed causes. 
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One set of opposed beliefs is between so called 
visionaries and so-called pragmatists. We have also 
to decide whether it is practical to demand that the 
big powers have to promise that they will forswear 
nuclear weapons by a certain future date. 
, .TREATY - REGIONAL TEST BAK - INDIA, 
PAKISTAN 
145. VANAIK (Achin). Nuclear Notebook: changing Climate. 
Economic and Political Weekly. 24,2*, 1989, January, 
14; 64- 5. 
India and Pakistan can both make reliable low-
technology or ' early generation' bombs without 
bothering about testing. But testing is necessary, if 
one wants to go further up the technology ladder to 
make thermonuclear or hydrogen bombs or tactical 
warheads for battle-field artillery, etc. Further-
more, without testing, the military will be very 
reluctant to deploy such weapons. Benazir Bhutto has 
reiterated Pakistan's proposal for a regional nuclear 
test ban. One way of getting round India's objection 
to the proposal may be to talk in terms of a regional 
test ban of a limited duration which has to be 
periodically renegotiated. The peace movements of 
Europe and elsewhere then must take the new 
circumstances into consideration. They must recognise 
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that there can be further disarmament pacts which 
should of course be welcomed but always with demands 
for more and with convincing explanations as to why 
these have come about, what new dangers are emerging 
and why a truely nuclear free world is far from the 
actual ambitions of superpowers and the other nuclear 
weapons powers. 
, , TREATY STARTS II, US'S ROLE. 
146. CHELLANEY (Brahma). Nuclear treaty: Crucial test for 
India. Indian Express. 64, 75; 1996, January, 19;8. 
The Americans are facing a major challenge in 
fashioning a test ban treaty as a technical fix to 
prevent the rise of new nuclear powers and cap the 
capabilities of threshold states, particularly India. 
The United States faces on uphill task in Genneva' 
The Chinese and French testing America's own plan to 
conduct underground hydronuclear experiments in 
Nevada, and Moscow's and Washington's failure so far 
to ratify START-II and the chemical weapons convention 
have generated a sense of betrayal, with many 
non-nuclear states feeling "Once bitten, twice shy". 
International hope that the cold war's end would 
spur radical nuclear disarmament has been dashed. 
India's support has emerged as critical to the success 
of the negotiations, and it is no surprise that New 
Delhi has come under intense Western diplomatic 
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pressure not to back away or attempt a still birth at 
Geneva. There can be no credible CTBT without India's 
backing and participation. The stage has been at 
Geneva for an interesting dual involving the rival 
strategic interests of the Principal actors. Whatever 
the outcome, testing, as Mr. Keting said, is only a 
symptom of the problem and the main challenge lies in 
dealing with the actual malaise-nuclear weapons. 
, , TREATY - TEST BAN. 
147. KAPUR (Ashok). India's nuclear agenda-II Indian 
Express. 59,83; 1991, January, 24;8. 
India's response should rest on the first 
scenario. The Argentina. Brazil model is not relevant 
for India and Pakistan because nothing like the 
Pakistani hatred of India and Hindus exists in the 
Argentina - Brazil case and there are no comparable 
insurgencies there either, secondly. Indian should 
stop espousing the cause of disarmament. It is not 
likely to happen. At the recent NPT review conference 
and in the recent meeting to discuss the possibility 
to convert the partial test ban into a comprehensive 
test ban treaty, the USA, U.K., and Canada rejected 
the utility of the CTBT and they rejected the link 
between the NPT and CTB. The propoer Indian response 
should be to integrate the nuclear capability into 
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Indian defence planning and to adjust its nuclear 
posture by discarding disarmament and emphasising 
regional security. But the emphasis in the latter 
should not be on bilateral nuclear deals but rather it 
should be on unilateral actions and bilateral talks. 
India already possesses nuclear weapons capability but 
it has hesitated to advertise it as a part of its 
policy of restraint. The issue for India is not only 
to prepare for a nuclear defence against its enemies 
but even more important is the need to change the 
state of the Indian mind about nuclear affairs. 
, , , PROBLEMS 
148. EDMONDS (John). Complete nuclear test ban-why has it 
taken so long? Security Dialogue. 25,4; 1994, 
December;357- 88. 
The first tripartite U.S/U.S.S.R/U.K 
negotiations on complete cessation of nuclear tests 
took place between 1958 and 1963 and led to the 
partial Test Ban Treaty. The second tripaltite 
negotiations were undertaken between 1977 and 1980, 
in this context the Soviet Union made important 
concessions to U.S and U.K demands, but serious 
differences in Washington led President Jimmy Garter to 
alter the U.S position. U.S unwillingness to resume 
CTB negotiations led to years of inaction. In 1992 
there were positive moves, as testing moratoria were 
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introduced by all nuclear-weapon states except China. 
Among the most serious problems in the negotiations is 
the opposition of officials within those government 
which favour a CTB. The most important lesson from 
the earlier attempts to reach an agreement is that 
political leaders must make essential decisions and 
aim to secure popular support. 
, FOREIGN POLICY 
149. DIXIT (J.N). India's foreign policy. Strategic 
Analysis. 13, 12; 1991, March; 1387- 409. 
Recent changes in government in both India and 
Pakistan as well as external developments imply 
changes in the contents of India's national interest. 
Although some continuties remain. Post-colonial 
motivations have come to an end, security and economy 
interests have changed, national consensus regarding 
foreign policy is deteriorating, political 
expectations are higher and the nation-state itself is 
being challenged. More specifically, India will 
continue to adhere to the Non-alignment movement and 
to support the UN while India remains committed to 
nuclear non-proliferation. It would like to see the 
development of a less discriminatory arms control 
regim. India is concerned about the widening gulf 
between the North and South. It intends to promote 
better relations with its neighbouring countries,which 
are the most significant elements in its foreign 
, policy.Cooperation with Pakistan is of particular importance. 
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, SOUTH ASIA 
150. "INDIA N-WEAPON STATE" U.S. Competition Master. 
35,2; 1993, September; 147- 48. 
Another indication of Persistent American 
prejudice against India came in the third week of July 
when a U.S. official disclosed that the Clinton 
Administration regards India as a State Pursuing a 
nuclear weapons programme. The U.S. is continuing to 
work out some arrangement towards nuclear non-
proliferation in the region but had failed in this 
attempt. This, the U.S official asserted, was because 
India rejected the proposal for a five-power accord 
between Pakistan, China, Russia and the U.S. 
InSeptember the U.S will again initiate talks to 
resolve the nuclear proliferation issue. The Clinton 
administration considered Kashmir as a disputed 
territory with India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people 
as parties to the dispute. The effort to end South 
Asian conflicts, whether it was the Indo-Pak tensions 
or, the instability in Afghanistan, was an essential 
component of promoting U.S interests in the sub-
continent. 
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,FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDIA AND CANADA. 
151. OVER THE hurdles. Frontline. 12,9; 1995, May,5,-
53- 6. 
Nuclear ties between India and Canada were soon 
strained. When the construction of the second unit 
with Canadian assistance had just got under way. 
India conducted- its peaceful nuclear explosion on 
May 18, 1974 at Pokhran in Rajasthan. Canada reacted 
sharply, arguing that there was no difference between 
peaceful nuclear explosion and those for military 
purposes. Four days later, Canada suspanded Assistance 
for RAPS-2 and the near by heavy water plant under 
construction. The second unit is also shut down now 
for the in-service inspection of the coolant channels 
which contained heavy water. The AERB an independent 
statutory body charged with safety standards^ had 
stipulated that the reactor be shut down from 
August 1, 1994 to carry out the ISI of the coolant 
channels, done every seven years. The second unit of 
RAPS should be back on line in 1995 after the ISI. 
If decision on re-tubing the coolant tube is taken, 
it might take another 40 months. Though the units were 
undershut down. There was activity as usual all over 
the station, employees were sore while the less-than-
optimal performance of the Canadian-built first unit 
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had come under media glare, the excellent performance 
of the second unit had not received proper 
appreciation. 
, , INDO-US 
152. BHADAURIA (Sanjeev). Nuclear Issue and Indo-U.S 
Relations. Indian Journal of Strategic Studies. 1?) 
1992', 136- 16. 
The nuclear research began to expand after 1952, 
when President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Plan 
unfolded. Indian's Security Policy after the 
Sino-Indian war of 1962 shifted to recognise the hard 
boiled realities of world politics. But it was the 
first Chinese atomic test in October, 1964 which began 
exerting pressures on the Indian Government to adjust 
its nuclear policy to theMthanged situation. The 
evolution of India's first nuclear power station took 
place in 1961 and the legal instrument for the most 
tangible demonstration of indo-US nuclear 
cooperation was the 'Agreement on the Tarapur Atomic 
Power Station was signed on 8th August 1963, it was 
only in 1968 when the Nuclear NPT came into being that 
India's attention was diverted towards the nuclear 
issue, although debate on it had continued. In India's 
view the treaty seeks to disarm the unarmed following 
the armed to keep arming. But the American action plan 
under which a five na.tion conference to discuss 
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non-proliferation in the region can be seen to have 
one goal 'to persuade India and Pakistan to sign the 
Nuclear NPT. India has not been asked to sign the 
Nuclear NPT under any coercive threat on the military 
front but the threat of aid cut is no less a patent 
weapon. Mr. Narshiraa Rao attended the special US 
Security council session in January, 1992, there was 
massive pressure upon him to agree to sign the NPT or 
atleast to make an official declaration of the 
manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. 
153. VINOD (M.J). Idealism and self-interest in conflict 
the nuclear issue in the U.S - India relations. 
Journal of Political Science. 53,2; 1992, April-June; 
218- 52. 
Linkage between ideology and national self-
interest is noticeable in both U.S and India foreign 
policy and has been the source of differences between 
the two countries, especially in the area of nuclear 
technology. Asa result, a cycle of suspicion and 
resentment has developed. The unilateralism and 
iconsistency of the U.S have antagoaiized India while 
revealing the fragile credibility of its non-
proliferation policies. U.S pressure on India 
regarding nuclear matters has proven ineffective and 
has han^ pered cooperation. 
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, INDIA AND CHINA, COMPARATIVE STUDY. 
154. SABHERWAL (D.P). India and China Contrasting Nuclear 
Profiles. Mainstream. 34,33; 1996, July, 20; 25- 7. 
India and China stand out as the only developing 
countries to have achieved comprehensive nuclear 
capability that covers areas of peaceful application 
as well as weapon capability. But the balance between 
weapon capability and peaceful applications in the 
two countries is vastly different, titled as it is 
heavily on weapons programme in the case of China and 
focussed largely on peaceful applications in India. 
The contrast between the Indian route to nuclear 
capability and the road China has followed is 
manifest. The two routes follow the different 
objectives India and China had while setting out to 
harness nuclear power and create nuclear technology 
that matched those objectives. India, on the other 
hand, while developing nuclear capability on a sound 
base - a head of China except in the limited domain of 
weaponisation -lagged behind in staking its claim as 
a nuclear weapons capability power on the world stage. 
This despite the fact that Indian Scientists created 
weapons capability rather cheap - as a byproduct of 
its nuclear power development programme, and the 
cheapest atomic detoriation attained by any country. 
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, NUCLEAR TEST, OPINIONS. 
155. HUXLEY (Aldous). Incoherent Response. Times of India. 
158,284;i995, December, 23;12. 
The stories currently appearing in the Western 
media about Indian preparations to conduct a nuclear 
test and the opinions of various U.S experts quoted 
in them bring to mind similar reports in prominent 
American newspapers in the mid-eighties about Indian 
preparations to bomb. Pakistan's nuclear installation 
in Khutta. At that time too authoritative US official 
sources were cited and satellite photographs were 
said to have offered conclusive proof of a missing 
Indian Jaguar Squadron which was believed to have been 
shifted from its usual station in order to be readied 
for a surprise attack on Pakistan. In the present 
circumstances, it would not have been an all together 
negative development of the U.S report had been true. 
The Indian Public finds the reports totally incredible 
since neither the Government nor the opposition in 
parliament has had the requisite sense of purpose to 
get a resolution passed in the two Houses stating 
clearly that this country would not negotiate on 
nuclear and missile issues exccept on the basis of a 
non-discriminatory framework of disarmament. 
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, NUCLEAR WAR, DANGER, SOUTH ASIA 
156. SINGH (Satinder). Nuclear war South Asia - The worst 
case. Indian Defence Review. Digest. 3; 1992; 3-22. 
This article is basically meant to bring out the 
need for defensive measures against a nuclear attack, 
be it from Pakistan or from China. Serious 
consideration should be given now to such a 
possibility. It is possible that this representation 
of a worst-case scenario favours India. It is 
possible that many more disasters will actually occur 
till the situation stabilises. The determination to 
fight on after serious reverses may take time to 
develop. On the other hand the Indian people have 
never wavered in their resistence to aggression. This 
had been seen even in the worst days of 1962,but both 
the Government and the Army had failed to capitalise 
on this spirit support from the world community 
depends largely on the will tp fight on its adversity. 
Many of Mr. Churchill's impractical strategic ventures 
in World War II were designed with this in mind. It 
was thus that he won U.S support and the backing of 
most of the free world. In the event of nuclear 
aggression, India's size and resources place it in a 
favourable situation in relation to its neighbours. 
The political leadership must realise this. 
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Production of nuclear weapons must not lag behind 
political threats. Moral considerations affecting the 
security of the country. 
_,OPTIONS, EVALUATION 
157. WHY INDIA may want to Retain the Nuclear Halo. India 
Today. 19,8; 1994, April, 30; 49-51. 
There is a need for India to evaluate its 
options carefully. It would be-naive to get carried 
away by the new mood of pragmatism and make massive 
cutbacks in the nuclear programme just because 
Pakistan might agree to cap its capability. When India 
exploded the bomb in 1974, the NPT nations made it a 
Pariah and relaliated by pulling out of existing 
agreements and banning the sale of nuclear technology 
and material to India even if it was for civilian use. 
Now the NpT is coming up for extension next year and 
the US is keen on its indefinite continuance as it is 
a handy weapon to keep erring, nations in line without 
imposing any cuts on its own programme. India's 
strategists too have failed to successfully argue 
their case on the nuclear issue. Pakistan has won 
repeated diplomatic victories projecting itself as a 
nation willing to negotiate, making India seem 
obdurate in contrast. Also India should have worked 
out with Pakistan a range of confidence building 
measures on nuclear weapons much earlier. Whatever 
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decision Rao takes it would be as critical as the one 
India took in 1974 when it decided to explode a 
nuclear bomb. It could forever change the course of 
Indian history. And may be the world's as well. 
,OPTIONS - JUSTIFICATION 
158. PRADHAN (Pradyot). Indian Security Environment in the 
1990s - External dimension, Strateqc Analysis, 12,6; 
1989, September; 649- 72. 
India is surrounded by an infant democracy 
(Pakistan) a military dictatorship in the grab of 
democracy (Bangladesh) two monarcheis (Bhutan and 
Nepal), a communist state (China) and a small but the 
bulent democracy (Srilanka). The close working 
relationship between nuclear China and nuclearizing 
Pakistan will bring in a qualitative change in the 
strategic environment of the subcontinent. The growing 
Sino-soviet rapprochment is another cause of concern 
for India. India's overseas oceanic trade routes are 
threatened by the pres ence of the super powers in 
the Indian ocean and the Chinese navy cruising the 
blue waters in the 1990s cannot be ruled out. In view 
of such threats India must exercise her nuclear 
options. India going nuclear is just mobilizing enough 
force not to feel helpless in the face of nuclear 
neighbours and adversaries. 
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, OPTIONS, REVIEW 
159. PRADHAN (Pradyot). Nuclear Pakistan:India's response. 
India Quarterly. 43,1; 1987, January-March, 1-14. 
India and Pakistan are two strinkingly different 
countries. The formation of Pakistan created mutual 
distrusts and abandoned all hopes of peaceful 
co-existence and both India and Pakistan found 
themselves vulnerable to mutual threats. The prospect 
of nuclear Pakistan will being in qualitative change 
in the strategic environment of Soth Asia. Today, 
India is surrounded by nuclear weapon states - China 
and USSR in the north, the US in the Indian Ocean. 
With a nuclear Pakistan tomorrow, India has no 
alternative but to exercise nuclear option. It will 
prevent India from being pushed around by any power 
bloc - the US or the USSR or China. Indian nuclear 
policy which presently exhibits ambivalence, will have 
to address to the problem of nuclear weapons 
capability. 
, ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS 
160. SINGH (Swaran). National Security Strcutrue,' A 
Comparative Study of India, Pakistan and China. 
Strategic Analysis, 16, 12; 1994, March; 1535- 553. 
In the post cold war world where the subject of 
"national security" has become increasingly demanding 
and complex. It is the "organizational" factors that 
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have come to be today, of prime importance. 
Particularly for India, which today is not in a 
position to keep obtaining "State-of-at" technologies 
or even to compete with its immediate neighbours like 
China and Pakistan is increasing its defence spending 
the only opinion is to make raajtimum use of its 
available resources. This organizational factor seems 
to be far more reliable as a last resort in seeking 
national security in the face of the immediate threat 
posed by Pakistan and China. 
,PAKISTAN'S THREAT 
161. NAIR (Vijai K)). Nuclear Policy. Indian Defence 
Review. 9,2; 1994, April; 22- 5. 
The present nuclear scenario in the subcontinent 
and wants India to counter Pakistan's nuclear 
challenge timly. The statement of Assif Ahmad Ali 
Pakistan's foreign minister in Uzbekistan in January 
94 was a direct and authentically articulated threat 
to the security of South Asia in general, and India in 
particular. This threat cannot be wished away or 
ignored. It is necessary that the Government of India 
makes an appropriate response and takes firm measure 
to put into place a credible deterrent to forestall 
Pakistan's nuclear moves. Finally, the Government 
must crystallize its nuclear policy and create 
the unfrastructure that would give the country the 
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necessary deterrent and the armed forces the where-
withal to survive in combat in a nuclear environment. 
,POWER SECTOR, NARORA PLANT, SAFETY SYSTEM 
162. SHARMA (Dhirendra). Narora accident: The Untold Story. 
Hindustan Times. 70, 164* 1993, June, 16;13. 
What was the role of the Atomic Energy 
Regulatory Board in running the Narora Plant? If the 
Board had not cleared the unit-I, who ordered the 
full-load operation of a defective nuclear power 
plant? In 1974, Narora was estimated to cost Rs.209.89 
crore, but the estimates were revised in 1980 to 
327.40 crore, and by the time the NAPS achieved 
critically in 1989-90 the real cost. Without fuel and 
heavy water, had reached Rs.750 crore. But all these 
years, the NAPS had not contributed even a minimum of 
10 per cent of its promised power to the northern 
grid. besides the NAPS have been consuming 
uninterrupted 30-40 MWs for more than one decade. 
The nation has now been assured that the newly 
installed safety system of "thermosiphoning" had saved 
the reactor. No reason to doubt the veracity of this 
claim. 
,_ , SAFETY MEASURES 
163. SUBRAMANIAN (T.S). Safety Concerns. Frontline. 12,9; 
May, 5; 54- 5. 
Every nuclear power station in India has an 
environmental survey laboratory set up ahead of civil 
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construction. Nuclear reactors in India employ a 
multi-barrier concept, ensuring defence in depth. The 
first barrier is the ceramic nature of the fuel, the 
second, the closed puis of the fuel tube, the third, 
the closed loop primary coolant circuit system, 
fourth, the closed reactoir building, made of 
reinforced concrete and steel, and finally, the 
exclusion zone of 1.6 km. around the plant, where 
nobody lives. Besides these engineered safety 
features, attention is given to the personal safety of 
the employees. Everyone in the operation and 
maintenance units is given intensive training not 
only on the system but also on protecting onself 
against radiation. They examined the villager^, 
analysed the data and reported to the Government that 
the ailments and defects have nothing to do with 
radiation that there is no incidence of Radiation -
induced diseases in the village and that they are 
fairly attributable to the poor hygienic conditions 
and living habits of the villages. 
, , TECHNOLOGY, DEVELOPMENT 
164. GOPALAKRISHNAN (A). Lighting up the Future: Revamping 
the Nuclear Power Sector. Times of India. 159,201; 
1996, August,23; 10. 
Considering the extremely poor quality of our 
coal and the inevitable compulsions to use clean-
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coal technologies in the future, the cost of thermal 
power, the mainstay of electricity production in 
India, will invariably rise. In this context, we have 
to take a serious look at nuclear power. Since it 
could became a potentially viable option in the 
future. Following the Pokhran explosion in 1974. The 
developed countries isolated India and blocked it 
from driving the benefits of global technological 
developments in the nuclear field. Interaction between 
DAE's R&D managers and NPC engineers is another area 
which needs substantial improvement. It has to be 
realised that the nuclear power sector is the primary 
customer for DAE's R&D output and therefore, the 
relevance and priority for such work should be mainly 
determined by the NPC. Activities in the nuclear power 
sector have to be sequenced and dovetailed 
appropriately, taking into account realistic time 
schedules and the resource position for key nuclear 
materials. Revamping the organisational structures 
and management approaches in the nuclear sector will 
involve substantial changes, going beyond mere 
tinkering with the prevailing outmoded practices in 
DAE. 
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, PROGRAMMES. 
165. DIXIT (J.N). Nuclear thought Police t Ignore the 
campaign. Times of India. 158,74; 1995, March,28;12. 
Non-official reports on India's nuclear 
programmes often become inputs in the official 
negotiating stance of IncMa.'s. western interlocutors, 
resulting in advocacies about capping the country's 
nuclear technology. The remaining years of this 
decade, commencing with various international 
conferences being held on these subjects during this 
59th anniversary year of the UN, will see these 
pressures increasing on India and other major 
developing countries, even on a super-power like 
China. While not being confronlationist and remaining 
in the mainstream of international orientations on 
these issues, India has to assiduously protect its 
capacities and potentialities, imperative for 
safeguarding its technological, economic, political 
and security interests. 
, , FUNDS CRUNCH 
166. NUCLEAR POWER t Funds crunch hits projects. 
Competition Master. 37, 9; 1996, April? 792. 
A funds crunch has hit India's nuclear 
programme, according to the Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission Mr. R. Chidambaram. A major reason 
for the crunch is the non-recovery of dues for power 
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delivered to various State Electricity Boards, 
totalling Rs. 912 crore. The major defaulters are UP 
with Rs.269 crore, Rajasthan with Rs.ll2 crore and 
Haryana with Rs.l07 crore. The nuclear power 
corporation has plans to increase the installed 
capacity of its atomic power plants from the present 
2,000 mw to 20,000 mw in the next two decades, but 
this would depend on budgetary support. An option 
being considered is to attract public funds though 
this would mean a change in the Atomic energy Act, 
which vests ownership with the Government. 
.PROLIFERATION, SOUTH ASIA 
167. AGARWAL (Prashant). Slowing Nuclear Proliferation in 
South Asia. India Journal of Strategic Studies. 
17; 1992; 128- 33. 
The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and the 
subsequent Chinese explosion in 1964 generated a 
strong desire in India to achieve nuclear weapon 
capability. During this period relations between India 
and Pakistan were also not very cordial because 
Pakistan had signed a border agreement with China in 
1963. This also forced India to undertake a 
modernization programme of its defence forces. The 
Indian nuclear aspirations and its modernization 
programme of the defence forces heA once again 
brought India and Pakistan to a cross-road. It is not 
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in the interest of India to tightly links its nuclear 
policy with that of Pakistan, but it would have to 
take into account the effect on both nuclear China a 
prospective nuclear Pakistan specially in the context 
of their politico-military relationship that exists 
between them, while formulating its foreign as well as 
security policy options. India lacks a credible 
deterrence against China, but given the present growth 
of India's space and nuclear programme which will 
certainly provide India with atleast medium range 
missile capability in the near future and would create 
a much needed credible deterrence against China. The 
choice for India is simple and fairly clear exercise 
the nuclear option and at the same time work for 
elimination of weapons from Asia and Indian Ocean 
region. In the Indian subcontinent, mutually 
acceptable solution would not only prevent nuclear 
proliferation in the region but would also open 
various fronts on which they can collaborate with each 
other for their economic prosperity. 
168. NAIR (Vijai K.). Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia! 
The military implications. Indian Defence Review. 
10,1; 1995, January-March; 27-34. 
The military has two distinct roles to play in 
the overall nuclear strategy. It must provide infra-
structural support to the strategic component of the 
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nuclear policy and reorganize itself to carry out its 
traditional task against external threats when ordered 
to operate in the hostile nuclear environment. 
This article does not purport to be a 
comprehensive treatise of the problem, but is intended 
to provide a basis for debate and to acquaint the 
uninitiated with the question of nuclear weapons and 
their effect on conventional military operations. 
Its importance lies in the fact that while national 
debate on whether India should ©r should not exercise 
her nuclear strategic option rages, scant attention 
appears to have been paid to a crucial element. The 
military. The degradation of combat potential that an 
inimical NWS could include into the nation's military 
by holding a threat in being has not figures in public 
discussions or writings. The Indian government and 
its military leaders can no longer ignore these 
ground realities without jeopardizing the supreme 
national security interest. Political considerations 
nowithstanding, the military scene on the Indian 
subcontinent has been radically transformed. Nuclear-
weapon arsenals have been created by two hostile 
neighbours. Short-and long-term threats are discenible 
with a concomitant fallout on the military Psyche 
with additional possibilities of degrading its output 
in a future conflict. If work has not already begun 
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integrate the military into the national nuclear 
strategy, it needs to be done with a sense of urgency. 
Finally, whjile indulging in a game of nuclear 
ambiguity, an important but indirect means of 
communicating capabilities and credibility is to 
reform military strcutures to meet the imperatives of 
conventional war in a nuclear weapons environment. 
Therefore, the Indian military must institute 
doctrinal organizational and equipping changes so that 
they would have the capacity to undertake conventional 
military operations with a degree of confidence. 
, SAFETY, MEASURES. 
169. GOPALAKRISHNAM (A). Nuclear Safety regulation,* A case 
for autonomy. Indian Express. 64, 263,* 1996, July* 
27; 8. 
As in the case of all potentially hazardous 
industries, the nuclear installations of the 
Department of Atomic Energy must also bear the full 
responsibility for the safety of their workers, the 
general public and the environment. The Atomic Energy 
Regulatory Board was constituted for the purpose of 
independently overseeing that the Department of Atomic 
Energy installations and other radiation facilities 
in the country were indeed fulfilling their safety -
related obligations. Do we want a nuclear regulatory 
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system which might do some justice to its duties only 
when it is headed by a bold and competent individual, 
who will then be retained in his job only for a 
single term? In addition to making the Atomic 
Energy Regulatory Board independent, it must also be 
strengthened with the addition of qualified technical 
manpower and essential infrastructure. The composition 
of the Board should also be enlarged and the 
Government should ensure that individuals, owing no 
special allegiance in any way to the Department of 
Atomic Energy are selected for appointment. In the 
long term, parliament must consider framing an Atomic 
Energy (Safety and Regulation) Act, under which the 
Atomic Energy Regulatory board is recognised as a 
statutory body with adequate powers and obligations 
for public accountability. 
, .UN'S RESOLUTION, INDIA'S ROLE 
170. MENON (Bhaskar). India rejects 'discriminatory' UN 
resolution. Times of India. 158, 88; 1995, April,13;13 
India has dismissed a UN Security council 
resolution on nuclear security assurances offered by 
the declared nuclear powers as "discriminatory" and 
"riddled with its and buts". Ambassador Parkash 
Shah, making his first appearance in the security 
council since assuming the post as Indian envoy at the 
United Nations in February. It is particularly 
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disheartening that in his post-cold war age, which 
provides the ideal opporetunity for achieving complete 
and genuine nuclkear disarmament, all that the most 
powerful countries in the world can think of are half 
measures aimed at preserving the balance of terror on 
the one hand and power by nuclear weaponary on the 
other. In other words, even membership in the NPT 
will not be enough to safeguard a country from nuclear 
attack by the far developed nuclear weapon states if 
the country has not "complied" with the treaty. 
,SECURITY COMPLEX, INDIA. 
171. Abraham (Hty). India's 'strategic enclave'.' Civilion 
scientists and military technologies. Armed Forces 
and Society. 18, 2; 1992, Winter; 231- 52. 
The Indian security complex has become a 
divesified set of establishment, which have grown up 
around two models.The first model is based on a top-
down system, less suited to technological innovation 
and development, which concentrates on licensed 
production and production for the civilian market. The 
second model is a flexible , project-oriented system, 
which has been able to produce both a nuclear device 
and ballistic missiles. This articles examines some 
important factors driving the latter model, which is 
responsible for India's growing strategic 
capability. The focus is on the efforts of a civilian 
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scientific elite, which entered the security sector 
due to control of dual-use high technologies and the 
failure to fulfill its original mandate of cheap 
nuclear power. 
,SECURITY, EVALUATION 
172. MATHEW (C.J.M). For An Indian Nuclear Deterrent. 
Defence Seminar. 5,2 and 3; 1996, April; 9. 
Recent opinion surveys have revealed that the 
two questions of most concern to voters are corruption 
and national security. Corruption is an internal 
aberration which can be dealt with given the political 
will of the Government and the support and cooperation 
of the people. However, where national security is 
concerned existing international realities come into 
play. Notably, the advent of the nuclear bomb and 
associated weaponary such as missiles has created a 
whole new scenario in the theatre of war. Where 
security matters are concerned defence planners need 
to look far into the future because, unlike humans 
nations do not perish. Unfortunately we have been too 
engiosed with Pakistan and China as the epicentres of 
our threat perceptions. 
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, SOUTH ASIA. 
173. CHELLANEY (Brahma). South Asia's Passage to nuclear 
power. International Security. 16,1? 1991, Summers; 
43-72. 
Advances in India and Pakistani nuclear 
programmes are challenging the international non-
proliferation regime. The singal must effective non-
proliferation proposal for South Asia would be on 
international agreement on a total test ban. Analyses 
of proliferation tend to view it strictly in military 
terms, ignoring its political value. The present 
nuclear order is not stabilising for third world 
countries, many of which view the nuclear Non-Proli-
feration as discriminating. Neither Pakistan nor India 
has any incentive to denuclearize. The risks of 
nuclear war in South Asia are modest, and stability 
does exist due to territorial proximity, but this 
should not prevent efforts for greater political 
cooperation and nuclear transparency. The 
complexi ties of South Asian nuclear proliferation 
reveal the obsolescene of the Non-proliferation 
Treaty. Its renewal in 1995 should include more 
realistic and widely accepted policies. 
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174. PERKOVICH (George). Nuclear third way in South Asia. 
U.S.I, journal. 123, 514; 1993, October-December-; 
477- 92. 
The threat posed by nuclear weapons has shifted 
dramatically in the aftermath of the cold war. As a 
Mauch 29, 1993, New Yorker article by Seymour Hersh 
warned, India and Pakistan have the means and possibly 
the motives to engage in nuclear conflict. India's 
nuclear weapons programme is interwined with its 
enormous civil nuclear programme. In terms of 
employees, India's combined civilian and military 
nuclear complex is one of the largest in the world. 
It employees more than 20,000 scientific and 
technical personal at 16 sites and provides some 
measures of political cover for the weapons programme. 
When India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, it 
could conviniently claim it was for peaceful purposes. 
India knows how to manufacture a nuclear weapon's 
non-nuclear components as well. It is plausible to 
assume that the extensive Indian nuclear establish-
ment continues to conduct research and development on 
lower-weight, higher-power weapons. The Indian defense 
elite exhibits a similar, if less categorical, 
wariness of abstract nuclear strategies built around 
deployed nuclear arsenals. Deployed nuclear weapons 
are seen as self-deterring and unusable. For example. 
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Raja Rammana, the former head of India's nuclear 
complex, concluded in a Summer 1992 address that 
the logic of deterrece, namely that neither country 
possessing nuclear weapons will start a war, depends 
on many assumptions. 
175. SATTAR (Abdul). Reducing nuclear dangers in South 
Asia. Regional Studies. 13,1; 1994-95, Winter; 3-30. 
A provident approach to containing nuclear 
dangers must evince a realistic understanding of the 
security concerns that drive the nuclear programs of 
Pakistan and India, and attach priority to limiting 
nuclear capabilities and strengthening restraints 
against weaponization, missile deployments and 
transfer or accidental loss of fissionable materials 
and technology. These objectives call for a 
responsive and affirmative strategy founded in the 
principle of non-discrimination, and a cooperative 
international framework designed to assuage the 
conxieties of the countries involved as well as of the 
world community. 
, .CONFLICTS. 
17f5. GHOSH (Partha S) . Nuclear rivalry in South Asia." 
Strategic imperiatives and national pride. Conflict 
Studies. 274; 1994, September; 1-22. 
Recent exposure of the availability of weapons, 
grade nuclear materials from post-cold war Russia via 
213 
Germany to possiblr buyers in Third World countries 
such as Pakistan has once again highlighted those 
countries nuclear capabilities and intentions. The 
author describes the rationale behind nuclear defence 
strategies in India and Pakistan in the light of 
curent "carrot and stick" diplomatic initiatives and 
the diferent approaches of the two states to regional 
security. Each state accuses the other of nuclear 
ambitions, with almost half a century of conflict 
between them, the matter has now assumed serious 
dimensions, while the region is strategically less 
important in the global system it is growing 
insignificance in international trade and investment. 
The West is increasingly uneasy therefore, about a 
nuclear arms race in South Asia. The study examines 
national pride and international concern in a region 
where three rival nations- China India and Pakistan -
are confronting each other across disputed borders 
with nuclear weapons. The only way forward is a 
"harmonious blending of the concepts of nationalism 
and internationalism. 
, ,UN'S ROLE 
177. GORDON (Sandy), South Asia's nuclear genie is out. 
What now? Pacific Research.7,2; 1994, May;3-7. 
The nuclear weapons programs of India and 
Pakistan are now well advanced. It is doubtful in 
these circumstances that attempts to force the 
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south Asian threshold power to roll-back hard won 
capabilities are efficacious. It seems likely that 
India is seeking to settle its nuclear differences 
with the West, and particularly with the US, on the 
basis of a capped program that would give it a 
threshold deterrence capability against China, and a 
strong lead against Pakistan. From New Delhi's 
perspective, a universal regime such as that 
potentially provided by the UN resolution on the 
cut off of fissionable material would offer far more 
than a regime focussing solely on South Asia. The UN-
sponsored regime would provide India with the 
flexibility to continue to develop its delivery and 
weapons - building capabilities, should it desire to 
do so. Given the extent to which nuclear-related 
technologies have developed in south Asia, and 
particularly in India, the UN - sponsored resolution 
offers the best way of proceeding. 
f , , US POLICY. 
178. PARANJPE (Shrikant). American Policy toward problems 
of nuclear proliferation in South Asia*. An Indian 
Perspective. Assian Affairs an American Review. 
16,4; 1989-90, Winter; 187- 96. 
The concern about nuclear proliferation in South 
Asia is a product of the increasing tensions between 
India and Pakistan and their nuclear weapon 
capabilities. US Policies in the 1980s regarding 
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South Asia sought to tackle India's nuclear programme 
on one hand and seek a balance between the US Pakistan 
Security linkage and Pakistan's nuclear ambitions on 
the other. The carnegie task force Report attempted 
to outline the dynamics of nuclear proliferation in 
south Asia and made recommendations on slowing down 
the nuclear arms race in the region. In understanding 
the compulsions of Indian nuclear policy. However, one 
most look into the overale Indian foreign policy 
approach and security perceptions. India is likely to 
retain her "deliberately vague" nuclear doctrine in 
the near future. 
, , U.S'S ROLE 
179. BOSE (TC) United States and South Asia': The nuclear 
proliferation dimension. Strategic Analysis. 16,12; 
1994, March; 1597- 616. 
One of the cardinal principles of US foreign 
policy during the past two decades has been to deter 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and 
Pakistan. The reason is that the India and Pakistan 
Proliferation dynamic impinges directly on the US 
middle East concerns and interests which have 
normally been deemed vital due to their connection 
with access to Persian Gulf Oil. The Proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in South Asia would have profound 
implications for US National Security interests. 
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The US appears to hold the views that the continuing 
regional tensions between India and Pakistan combined 
with the two countries ongoing programmes to acquire 
nuclear capability mean that armed conflict has the 
potential to escalate to a nuclear exchange. 
.TECHNOLOGY, COOPERATION, BRAZIL 
180. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. Strategic Digest. 26,6', 1996, 
June; 901-. 14. 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso confirmed 
last night (20 January) that Brazil will sign an 
agreement on thoriom, an element that can be used 
for nuclear purposes, with India. Brazil has the 
world's largest thorium reserves and India has been 
accused of trying to develop a nuclear bomb. Cardoso 
has acknowledged that the thorium issue will be on the 
agenda of the visit he will be making to India as of 
22 January. He avoids, however, talking about a 
nuclear agreement" out of fear of negative reactions. 
India's ability to obtain nuclear weapon«is was 
directly aided by its nuclear power programme", and 
that Plutonium for India's "nuclear bomb test n 1974 
was derived from its civilian 40 MW (thermal) CIRUS 
heavy water reactor, a joint Canadian Indian Project". 
It says India and Pakistan were among several 
signatories and non-signatories of the nuclear 
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non-proliferation treaty that were using their 
civilian nuclear energy programmes to mask attempts to 
acquire nuclear weapons. 
,TECHNOLOGY, PROLIFERATION. 
181. CLANCY (Tom) and SEITZ (Russell). Five minutes past 
midnight and welcome to the age of proliferation. 
National Interest. 26, 1991-92, Winter? 3-12. 
The globalization of high technology has given 
new meaning to proliferation. Increased access to 
information, often under the guises of unrelated 
sciences or civilian purposes, and the potential for 
financial gains by selling technological know-how will 
make it possible to duplicate almost all past 
technology. Current anti-proliferation regimes are not 
sufficient to halt the quantitative nor the 
qualitative spread of nuclear technology. The 
perception of chemical and biological weapons as 
beirfg less dangerous makes their proliferation even 
more likely. The exponential growth of technologies 
of information is likely to make the current 
proliferation regime a fit object for catastrophe 
theory. 
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182. PILAT (Joseph F) and KIRCHNER (Walter L). Technologi-
cal promise of counterproliferation. Washington 
Quarterly 18, 1; 1995, Winter; 153-156. 
Examination of the elements of a counter-
proliferation strategy reveals that in most cases 
technologies will be critical of these instruments of 
policy are to be available to policy makers. Critical 
areas are command, control, communications and 
intelligence, counterforce, active defence, passive 
defence and proliferation prevention. Properly 
conceived and utilized, counter-proliferation could 
strengthen traditional non-proliferation activities, 
however, there political and military difficulties in 
undertaking counterproliferation. Technology will not 
provide the resolution of the emerging. Proliferation 
problem, but by supporting non-proliferation and 
counterproliferation efforts, it may help us manage 
this important obstacle to the transition from the 
cold war competition to a more cooperative post-cold-
war. 
,URANIUM, SUPPLY. 
183. GOODING (Ken). Stocking the Nuclear Pile. Times of 
India. 3, 35; 1993, May, 30;7. 
The Uranium market changed dramatically in the 
1980s when brokers and other intermediaries began to 
act for their own accounts. Over optimistics forecasts 
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about future nuclear power demand contributed to the 
build up nearly 80,000 tonnes of surplus uranium in 
stocks at power companies in North America, Western 
Europe and East asia by that time. By selling from 
these stocks, the brokers became an important new 
source of uranium supply. The Uranium Institute in its 
long-range projections assumes imports of about 6,000 
tonnes a year from the CIS. It also assumes there 
will be a 15 per cent increase of nuclear generating 
capacity worldwide from 1991 to 2000. The present 
uranium glut has quite naturally raised questions 
about the continuing need for the reprocessing of 
nuclear fuel. Twenty years ago, countries with nuclear 
power programmes believed that reprocessing would 
help reduce the volume of radioactive wastes, and so 
ease disposal problems. It would also release 
Plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. Plutonium was 
considered an essential fuel for "fast breeder" 
reactors and for nuclear weapons. 
,US's ROLE 
184. DEVARJAN (P). Nuclear Capability! Sense and 
Sensibility. Financial Express. 17, 116;- June,2;6. 
The US decision to twine bilateral aid to India 
with its nuclear policy is going to hurt. A 
presidential certification of India not possessing any 
additional nuclear device in 1992-93 is a must for 
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funds to flow. The US has been soft on Pakistan and 
rather hard on India as this country has been 
consistently questioning the authority of the US to 
dictate nuclear policy while being itself a nuclear 
nation. There is also the fact of India showing off a 
Pakistan proposal to achieve regional nuclear non-
proliferation through a conference involving India, 
Pakistan and the three nuclear Powers-China the USSR 
and the US. India could propose mutual third party 
inspection of all defence establishments, including 
nuclear facilities for peace to take root. A similar 
offer could be made to China as India can in no way 
get back the territories lost in the 1962 was 
possessing nuclear weapons does not provide any 
security. The bluff can be called if, for a start, 
India, Pakistan and China sit around the negotiating 
table to work out options for limiting their ambitions 
to possess nuclear weapons. 
185. GURUSWAMY (Mohan). Nuclear theology and status. 
Indian Express. 62, 219; 1994, June, 13,8. 
The debate on nuclear arms and missile system 
has been greatly shaped by Western influences, mostly 
American, acting to serve their own national and even 
civilisational interests. While the tactics keep 
changing depending on time and place, the broad 
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contours of the strategy are clearly visible. 
Essentially three tracked, one is the moral high road 
where the opposition to these technologies and weapons 
is framed in terms of values. Influencing the 
theology of weapons calls for greater sophistication 
and co-option skills. Here the targets are people 
with influence within the establishment, often these 
people are not without some zeal for enhancing 
national security. The attempt, therefore, would be to 
reconcile these with the larger g,Oals of the West. In 
his recent White House speech to announce the renewal 
of MFN status to China. Bill Clinton allowed to 
China's nuclear arsenal, its vote and veto in the UN 
Security Council, and its powerful place in Asian and 
global security as being among the major factors that 
led to his reversal from his earlier aggressively 
stated position. 
186. SABHERWAL (O.P). India's nuclear Policy : Coping with 
US Threat. Indian Express. 64, 54? 1995, December, 
29; 8. 
Much water has flown down the Ganga since 1974 
to raise India's overall nuclear capability. If an 
enunciation of India's nuclear policy is to be made, 
these advancements have to be made known. India has 
to learn lessons of impact on its vital interest by 
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the way the Pakistan land has been played - and is 
still being played - to beat down India's nuclear 
standing and push it into the widerness of nuclear 
have roots. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability has 
been highlighted or overlooked according to 
Washington's requirements. India should therefore not 
be obsessed by the Pakistan factor. There is a 
scientific input too in American nuclear diplomacy 
which is sought to be used to dudge Indian politicians 
and the third world. While curbs on weapon-grade 
Plutonium will inevitabely ensure after the fissile 
material cut-off treaty comes into force, these curbs 
cannot be extended to reactor - grade plutonium 
production and use in India's nuclear programme, as in 
other countries such as France and Japan. This note of 
caution is necessary as the United States is allergic 
to Plutonium in the hands of developing nations and 
seeks to manipulate scientific data to suit its ends. 
, WEAPONS 
187. MACK (John E). Nuclear weapons and the dark side of 
humankind. Political Psychology. 7,2; 1986, June; 
223--33. 
The dark, violents elements in human nature are 
expressed with particular intensity in one group 
relationships, especially through the vechile of 
international conflict. Our species attraction to 
violence, and the willingness of citizens to comply 
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unthinkly with aggressive nationalistic policies, 
have created a crisis of survival for human kind in 
the nuclear age. Traditional tribal patterns of 
power, dominense, defence and war making haVe become 
maladaptive in the context of nuclear devices of mass 
destruction. Understanding and control of mankind's 
propensity to group violence and revenge are 
necessary to prevent the termination of life on earth 
as we know it. Psychologists, Psychiatrists and 
Psychoanalysts are exploring new ways of acheiving 
this awareness and are participating increasingly in 
the political process itself. 
, ,BOMBS, POKHARAN TEST 
188. BHARGAVA (G.S). Nuclear test by Indiat Departure from 
past policy. Indian Express. 64, 95,* 1996, February, 
8; 8. 
India has a reputation for responsible 
behaviour as a legacy of Nehru's leadership. It led 
the campaign against nuclear tests. Even the Pokhran 
test was conducted underground to minimise the risk of 
radiation leak. China not only stayed out of the 
treaty but persisted with atmospheric tests long after 
the treaty had come into force. We are in a different 
league and it is no use trying to draw parallels 
between the two countries. If a future Indian 
Government tries to enulate China, in the name of 
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demonstrating strength and determination we will be 
treated like a sheep in wold's clothing. Moreover, 
even the most ardent advocate of nuclear tests has 
not claimed that they are essential or even relevant 
for our security. Gen Sundajrjiwho has studied the 
subject in depth and as a former chief of Army staff 
is abreast of the country's threat perception has 
found no case for a nuclear test. He subscribes to the 
concept of nuclear deterrence in the South Asia 
context and cannot be faulted as an armchair 
idealist or a "bleeding heart". He also reconciles 
his no-test stand with his strategy of second strike 
capability. 
, , , : i', REACTIONS 
189. CHELLANEY (Brahma). Pokhram and after: Caught between 
thrift and drift. Indian Express. 63, 195; 1995, May, 
18 ;9. 
The Pokhran test was a momentous development 
with a global political fallout is well known. It 
impelled the secret formation of the London supplipers 
club, the reshapping of the international non-Prolife-
ration regime, and the inclusion of dual-use items in 
western export controls. It also had a major impact on 
US Policy, leading to significant institutional 
reforms in export policy the enactment of the 1978 
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Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, the attachment of non-
proliferation conditions to foreign aid, and the 
emergence of the sanctions approach to proliferation. 
The support including Indian co-sponsorship of the 
1993 UN resolutions on a CTB and fissile cut-off, was 
originally intended to blunt US land Western) 
pressure. At a minimum, the decision to perpetuate 
the nuclear monopoly of the P-5 calls for a 
]^appraisal of India's arms control policy. The 
fissile cut-off and CTB were intended to be steps 
towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 
, ,BOMB US'S REACTIONS 
190 . BEiASKAR(Uday O . I n d i a ' s Nuclear Yeti.Times of India-.6,9;1995,Dec., 
24;16. 
The Indian nuclear bomb and preparations for the 
related test 'streaked' briefly across the global 
consciousness again, this time courtesy the New York 
Times. The front page story in the New York Times 
(December -15) dwelt on spy satellites and 
imagery gleaned from Pokhran - the site of India's 
peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 - and conjectured 
rather dramatically that the next nuclear test by 
India could be "this weekened". This story was picked 
up by others including the Washington Post and 
television networks and informed 'guesstimates' were 
made about the nuclear bomb - the veritable equivalent 
of the Himalayan Yeti. There is a constant attempt 
to Portray India and the sub-continent in a negative 
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nuclear context where by events and their inter-
pretation have been deliberately distorted. India is 
portrayed as a furtive, dog-in-the- manager aspiring 
powers. Indo-US relations will be strained by this 
issue but it would be counter productive for either 
side to take a decision based on inflexible positions. 
India's nuclear capabilities, its ethical position 
and its understandable sensitivity to the pitfalls of 
nuclear subservience need to be recognised, ultimately 
it may be prodent to retain the elusive nature of the 
nuclear Yeti. 
, ,CAPABILITY, INDIA PAKISTAN. 
191. CHARI (P.R). Indo-Pakistan nuclear Stand-off. Fact 
and Fiction. Indian Express. 62, 355,* 1994, October, 
27; 8. 
India and Pakistan possess the capacity to 
develop first-generation fission nuclear devices 
deliverable by aircraft. The strategic value of such 
devices would derive partly from national faith, but 
largely from adversary fears, India revealed its 
ability to explode a nuclear device in 1974, which is 
an important milestone in the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. But, it is dubious of India could produce 
anything more than crude devices without undertaking a 
regular nuclear weapon test explosion series to 
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authenticate these devices. The foregoing would 
inform that India and Pakistan only possess, at most, 
at present the capacity to proceed towards developing 
unsophisticated untested, first-generation, fision 
nuclear devices, that could, perhaps, be deliverable 
by aircraft. 
, , CONVENTION, INTERNATIONAL 
CHEMICAL WEAPON. 
192. DIXIT (J.N). India won't give in. Indian Express. 
63, 137j 1995, March, 21j8. 
There have been media reports that India is 
foreclosing its nuclear options under US pressure, 
that the US is gradually succeding in pushing New 
Delhi towards discriminatory non-proliferation 
arrangement through the measures of the comprehensive 
test ban, capping of nuclear technology and cutting 
off of production of fissile material. Given the 
ground realities of tactical nuclear, weapons and 
missile deployment around India, there can be no 
question of New Delhi agreeing to any discriminatory 
non-proliferation arrangements. India has agreed to 
discuss a regime for the cutting off of fissile 
material production and abjuring further production 
provided this also is universal, non-discriminatory 
and equally applicable to all countries, regardless of 
228 
whether they are nuclear weapon or non-nuclear weapon 
powers. India has stressed that the governing approach 
should be the some which led to the signing of the 
international chemical weapons convention. 
, , DEVELOPMENT . 
193. IT'S AN obscenity. Indian Express. 64,216; 1996, 
June, 16|8. 
To the drum-beats of nuclear explosions in lop-
Nor and the pacific ocean the nuclear weapons powers 
are marching the world towards what they promise will 
be greater peace and security. It is an abscenity, 
China's latest test is part of a series intended to 
make its arsenals ever more deadly, let it be clearly 
understood, the most serious menace to world peace 
and security is the nuclear arsenals of the five 
powers, the US, Russia,China, France and Britain. It 
is they who have contaminated the air, water and earth 
with thousands of nuclear tests. It does not sit 
well with them to preach absitinnence to others. At 
the same time, the economy must get the foremost 
attention. Nothing must be allowed to divert the 
country from the path of rapid growth and 
technological advancement which it is embarked upon. 
With greater prosperity and know-how will come the 
answers to India's security concerns. 
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.WEAPONS H-BQM9f MANUFACTURING 
194. SABHERWAL (O.P). India's right to a nuclear status. 
Indian Express. 63, 294;1995, August. 25;8. 
India and China are the only developing 
countries to have achieved nuclear capability that 
covers areas of both peaceful application and weapon 
capability. But the balance is vastly different -
titled heavily on weapons programme in the case of 
China, and focussed largely on peaceful application 
in India. The first Indian Nuclear test, the 
implosion at Pokhran in 1974 - was based on plutonium 
provided by the spent fuel test plant built at BARC. 
Even the Pokhran test was conducted before the NPT 
became fully operational by the entry of France in the 
nuclear club, and of course China's entry in the NPT 
came much later. Does India have ready-to-use nuclear 
weapons in its basement to back up its deterrence 
status? The answer is both Yes and No. This is a 
well-kept secret, but going by American intelligence, 
India has a stockpile of 50 to 60 A - Bombs in its 
arsenal plus the capability of manufacturing the 
H-bomb. 
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,WEAPONS MISSILE 
195. CHERIAN (John). Indian advances. Frontline. 12,16; 
1995, August, 11; 45. 
Since the second World War, missiles have come 
to occupy a key role in deterrence strategy. The 
Indian rationale for its missile policy is that it 
faces threats from two immediate neighbours. Besides, 
policy makers say many countries in the region have 
sophisticated short-range and medium-range missiles. 
The Gulf war showed they are 'cost-effective. It 
was only in 1983 that India sanctioned Rs.380 crore 
for the indigenous production of missiles under the 
integrated guided missiles development programme, 
though the decision to go ahead with a programme was 
taken in the mid-1960s. Indian planners feel that 
missile especially the Prithvi, have an important 
role to play in overall defence policy. Highlevel 
Indian officials have said that a goal of the 
integrated guided missiles development programme is to 
market or under take koint production of missiles like 
Prithvi. 
, , , PRITHVI, 
DEPLOYF«BNT 
196. CHERIAN (John). Paying for com^-^lacency. Frontline. 
12,21;1995, October,20; 127-128. 
The Indian Government is still cagey on the 
subject of deployment of the Prithvi. Gujral feels 
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Delhi sent to wrong signals to Washington by giving 
the impression that the Agni missile programme had 
been capped. Robin Raphel had also told the U.S. 
Congress that New Delhi had responded favourably to 
the U.S. CTBT and missile capping proposals. Home 
Minister S.B. Chavan, however, issued a strong 
statement saying the decision of the U.S. Senate 
would lead to tension between India and the U.S he-
- said some^  countries India and Pakistan to keep 
fighting. "The U.S. move will force US to buy arms. 
A huge amount of money which could be utilized for 
the uplift of the poor has to be spent on defence", 
he said. 
, , PROGRAMMES SOUTH ASIA 
197. IQBAL (Mohammad). Missile Proliferation in South 
Asia. Regional Studies. 8,2; 1990, January; 3-34. 
India has been conducting research in nuclear 
and space technologies for economic as well as 
military purposes with the objective of attaining 
prominence in the Indian Ocean Littoral. It has 
exploded a nuclear device, fabricated a variety of 
satellites and launched them from home-built 
platforms with indigenous boosters. A military 
oriented "Integrated guided Missile Development 
Programmes" is being pursued vigorously. Pakistan had 
to follow suit although it lags behind its neighbour 
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neighbour. With ever growing population demanding a 
better quality of life, scarce resources are being 
expended for developing armament which can only 
guarantee a new security equilibrium with increased 
destructive potential. It is imperative that the 
political leadership in the sub-continent change its 
policy of mutual confrontation to bring about 
peaceful coexistence and constructive cooperation. 
, .AISA, U.S. 
198. CHERIAN (John). Missile manoeurves. Frontline. 12,16, 
1995, August 11; 43- 6. 
Curbing nuclear and missile proliferation in 
Asia has been one of the major goals of the Bill 
Clinton administration in the United States. 
Washington has been selectively going about 
implementing its agenda with a degree of success. 
India's successful testing of its surface-to-surface 
missile, Prithvi, and Pakistan's latest acquisition of 
Chinese M-11 missiles as a pretext to mount pressure 
on the two. the missile issue has obviously come in 
handy for the U.S. administration to 'micromanager' 
relations with China. China could soon join the ranks 
of the missile superpowers. It has taken care to 
project that it does not face any threat perception 
from India. The heart of the present controversy is 
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the status of the Prithvi and the Pakistani 
acquisition of the Chinese M-11 missile. The other 
missiles that have been indigenously developed under 
India's integrated Guided Missile Development 
Programme started in 1983, were the short-range 
surface to-air-missile Trishul, medium-range surface-
to-air missile Akash, and anti-tank guided missile 
Nag. Pakistan has also been pressuring Washington to 
see that India does not deploy it Prithvis, 
threatening that it would deploy its own in case India 
does. 
, , , THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS 
199. FETTER (Steve). Ballistic missile and weapons of mass 
destruction. What is the threat? What should be done? 
International Security. 16,1» 1991, Summer; 5-42. 
There has recently been an increased focus on 
the proliferation of ballistic missile technology in 
the third world. Conventially armed missiles are 
generally inefficient, so proliferation has focused on 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which 
increases the threat of mass destruction. 
Proliferation is dangerous because it increases the 
severity of a given crises, makes preemptive, 
accidental or terrorist use more likely, and determine 
more complicated. US policy respop "•. to these threats 
fall into four categories, sticks, carrots, defence 
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and management. Defence and deterrence are imperfect 
and unreliable solutions. The best approach is the 
creation of an arms control regime which does not 
favour the superpowers. The UN is an appropriate forum 
for addressing these concerns. 
, , OPTIONS 
200. BAJPAI (Kanti). India Should give up the Nuclear 
option. Times of India. 159, 214; 1996, January; 24,10 
India does not need nuclear weapons and it 
should give up the option to produce them, countries 
want the bomb for a variety of reasons but the primary 
one is to deter its enemies from military attack. 
Pakistan is undoubtedly a military threat to India. 
Nuclear weapons are equalises. By pursuing the 
Nuclear option, we have allowed to Pakistan to become 
our strategic equal, with disastrous consequences. 
India's policy of nuclear ambiguity, often presented 
as a military and diplomatic necessity, is no such 
thing but rather its opposite. What should India do? 
India should offer to give up its nuclear weapons 
capability. In doing so, we should add the condition 
that if Pakistan does not do so within six months of 
a year we reserve the right to ressume our 
programme. 
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2 01. CHOPRA (Pran). India and the Bomb-II. Nuclear 
Deterrence as last Resort. Times of India. 159,17; 
1996, January, 19;10. 
Influential Indian analysts believe that if 
India had decided to do, so a few years ago, it could 
have achieved nuclear weapon status with much less 
risk of serious complications in its relations with 
other countries. But the risk, they add, will only 
increase with time because stiffer restrictions can be 
expected to be placed in future on the search for 
nuclear weapon status by countries which do not have 
it at present. As they see if the present choice 
before India are. First, it can for go nuclear 
weapons unconditionally. Second, it can become a 
. nuclear weapon country covertly and develop enough 
capability to hit back nuclear weapons at any country 
which makes a nuclear attack upon it. Third, it can 
acquire this capability but under a veil which 
reveals enough to deter a potential opponent, so that 
the need for using the capability might never arise. 
Fourth it can openly become a nuclear weapon country. 
Recent changes in the world of diplomacy have opened 
up room for the fifth option. Pakistan's nuclear design, and 
the compulsions they have created for India, are 
better understood today. Secondly, more countries are 
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beginning to recognise that at times America tourists 
the arms of other countries nor for American reasons 
than for more peace. Thirdly, more countries are 
feeling opposed by such arm twisting. And finally, 
some of them are no longer as hopelessly dependent 
upon US approval of their actions as they used to be, 
and better able to follow their own choices then they 
were before. 
' , POLITICS* SOUTH ASIA. 
202. KAMAL (Nazir). Nuclear and missile proliferation 
issues. Some approaches to stability in South Asia. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 13,4/ 1992, March; 
375- 95. 
Ever since the Indian atomic device test in 
1974, nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia has 
been a salient regional issue and a cause of 
increasing international concern. Another issue of 
growing significance is the development of ballistic 
missiles by India and Pakistan. Public support in both 
countries has been increasing for exercising the 
nuclear weapons option and accelerating the 
development of ballistic missiles. Alongside these 
militasization trends, the adversorial relationship 
between India and Pakistan has worsened. The violent 
unrest in India - held Kashmir has once again 
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sensitized attitudes on both sides towards tbeir major 
territorial dispute over Kashmir. The domestic 
political situation in India and Pakistan has 
worsened. The violent unrest in India-held Kashmir 
has once again sensitized attitudes on both sides 
towards their major territorial dispute over 
Kashmir. The domestic political situation in India and 
Pakistan has further complicated their bilateral 
relations. Meanwhile, defence spending by both 
countries has become burdensome and a drag on their 
plants for economic modernization and development. 
Strengthening security and stability in South Asia is 
a herculen task, but the imperatives for adopting new 
political thinking are clear and pressing. In the 
post-cold war situation, the role of outside powers 
no longer presents problems. Much depends on 
reciprocal acts of statesmanship by the Indian and 
Pakistani leadership. 
,WEAPONS, PROBLEMS. 
203. GARRITY (Patrick J). Depreciation of nuclear weapons 
in international politics. Possibilities, limits, 
uncertainties. Journal of Strategic Studies. 14,4, 
1991, December; 463-514. 
In the past, nuclkear weapons appear to have had 
a major impact in five analytical categories 
deterring war among the great powers, conferring 
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international status, providing political-strategic 
leverag; , supporting domestic political coherion, and 
defining military plans, operations and force 
structure. Now nuclear weapons are deoreciating in 
their value, at least in terms of the relations among 
today's major powers. That said, it is difficult to 
make confident predictions about the character, 
extent, and reversibility of nuclear depreciation. The 
total stockpile of nuclear weapons will decline 
substantially, but the number of nations possessing 
them could well increase. Policy-makers and academics 
should therefore turn their attention to now nuclear 
depreciation should be properly managed, and how far 
nuclear weapons can and should be deemphasized. 
, , PROGRAMS,_SOUTH ASIA. 
204. GORDAN (Sandy). Capability south Asia's nuclear 
weapons, programs* a window of opportunity? Asian 
Survey. 34,7; 1994, Julyu; 662- 73. 
The nuclear weapons programmes of India and 
Pakistan are no^i wall advanced. In these circumstances 
its is doubtful whether attempts to force the South 
Asian threshold powers to roll backhand won 
capabilities are any longer efficacious. The major 
actors such as the US will need to recognize the 
nuclear status quo in South Asia and begin to explore 
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other means of preventing a spiraling nuclear 
competition from developing in the region, given this 
situation, the UN resolution calling for negotiation 
of a regime for the non-discriminatory banning of the 
production of fissionable material for weapons 
purposes offers the best and perhaps the only way of 
capping the nuclear weapons race in South Asia. 
, , PROLIFERATION, INDIA-PAKISTAN. 
205. NUCLEAR WEAPONS and Proliferation Issues. Strategic 
Digest. 26,6; 1996, June; 894-900. 
At the United Nations, Pakistan has called for 
categorical assurances from India that it will not 
carry out another nuclear test, thus jeopardising the 
conclusion of a CTBT in the near future. Speaking at 
the UN Conference on disarmament in Geneva today, 
Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram said Pakistan would 
take appropriate measures if nuclear-capable missiles 
are deployed along its borders. The race to acquire 
nuclear technology between India and Pakistan is one 
of the regional threats which confronts that United 
States. It is comparable to the threat of global 
conflict that once cloaked the rivalry between 
Washington and Moscow during the height of the cold 
war. "The proliferation of these horrific weapons 
poses a grave and urgent risk to the United States and 
one citizens allies and troops. 
240 
,SOUTH ASIA. 
206. LEHMAN (Ronald F) . Nuclear Weapons and south Asia: 
conflict Cold War or Movement Away from the Abyss. 
Indian Defence Review. 1993, January; 56-60. 
The somewhat restrainted arms competition 
between India and Pakistan still threatens to become 
a race to build nuclear arsenals. The applicatioon of 
such measures in South Asia would enhance 
international security, would be consistent with 
global norms against proliferation and also would be 
in the national interests of India and Pakistan, the 
NPT's continued vitality and relevance has clearly 
been demonstrated and been strengthened in the last 
year with the adherence of China and announced 
intention of France to join. Some Indians have cited 
the threat posed by China's nuclear weapons and the 
experience of India's border clashes with China as 
reasons for keeping open India's nuclear weapons 
options. India's security concerns are understand-
able, but acquiring nuclear weapons would be very 
unlikely to increase India's security vis-a-vis China. 
The evidence suggests that this would be true for 
South Asia at least as much as for any other region in 
the world. Using the imagination and resourcefulness 
of leaders and experts in India, Pakistan and other 
interested States. 
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207. VANAIK (Achin). Nuclear insecurity in the Indian 
sub-continent^ An uneasy true. Bulletin of Peace 
Proposals. 20,4; 1989, December;389- 98. 
India and Pakistan are both practicing a species 
of nuclear ambiguity with regard to the operational 
and declared aspects of their nuclear weapons policy. 
They have both reached the nuclear threshold. This 
regional stand-off given the political tension between 
the two countries is sufficiently unstable to be 
disturbing. India's rationalizations, in particular, 
as to why it must keep the nuclear option open. eg. 
the China factor, have serious weaknesses. Both 
countries in their own security interests should move 
towards establishing a South Asian Nuclear weapons 
free zone. An important transitional measure would be 
a mutually accepted regional test ban. 
, ,SUBMARINES 
208. MENON (Raja). Deterrence Must shift underwater. Times 
of India. 158,69? 1995, March, 23; 10. 
The strategic compulsion that pushed nuclear 
propulsion into submarines are as real today as in 
1950 when the project was first launched. Just as 
armies use terrain to advantage. Submarines use 
hydrological conditions to mask their presence. 
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So successful have they been that the submarine's 
ability to conceal its position is an accepted 
tactical fact today. What most laymen do not 
appreciate is that making a bomb is easy. Creating 
deterrence is not many countries have not considered 
the dynamics of nuclear deterrence seriously. To them 
a nuclear weapon is just another bomb, bigger than 
other bombs. The sophistication with which it has to 
be employed, so that it is never actually used is 
never comprehended, TO be clubbed with such nations 
is a disgrace for India. If there is the intention of 
entering the nuclear club one day, it must be done 
with foresignt and patience. The people have the right 
to nuclear deterrence out at sea. 
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